Folder continued from previous reel

MALAGASY REPUBLIC Vol. 1

3

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1a	report	Biography	N/D	B
4a	report	Biography	N/D	B
6	memo	Kissinger to the President	6/26/71	B
7a	memo	Kissinger to the President	6/24/71	B
10	memo	Wright to Kissinger	6/3/71	B
25a	report	Biography	N/D	B
32	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	4/1/74	B
33	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	4/1/74	B
34	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	4/1/74	B
35	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	3/27/74	B
36	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	2/5/74	B
37	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	1/15/74	B
38	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	1/10/74	B
39	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	10/17/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

BOX NUMBER: 739

FOLDER TITLE: (3)

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
41	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	7/13/72	B
48	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	8/27/71	B
49	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	7/9/71	B
52	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	7/7/71	B
53	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	7/6/71	B
55	telegram	Tananarive to secstate	6/25/71	B
57	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/24/71	B
58	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/23/71	B
59	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/23/71	B
69	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/10/71	B
70	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/10/71	B
73	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/9/71	B
74	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/9/71	B
75	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/4/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

BOX NUMBER: 739

FOLDER TITLE: (3)

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
79	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/2/71	B
81	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/1/71	B
83	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	5/1/71	B
84	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/1/71	B
54	telegram	Tananarive to Secstate	6/29/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

739

FOLDER TITLE

3

RESTRICTION CODES

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G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE (28995)

WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER ACTION

FROM: per Marshall Wright

SUBJECT: Anthony Marshall asked to leave Madagascar

Urgent
Copy sent PDB
JUN 1971

On June 1, one of our political appointees in Africa, Tony Marshall, was told to leave Madagascar within 5 days. This is sure to get publicity -- and will probably take on CIA-and-all-that overtones. Therefore, I thought you would want to give the President a report on what we know so far.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial the attached memorandum to the President. (Tab A).

Attachment

Tab A - Suggested memo to President.

A

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE (28995)

WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Anthony Marshall Asked to Leave Madagascar

On June 1, and acting on President Tsiranana's orders, the Foreign Minister asked Ambassador Anthony Marshall (New York Republican) to leave Madagascar within five days. The Foreign Minister did not offer any clear explanations but stated that the action was the result of interference by the US in Madagascar's political affairs.

In Washington, Under Secretary Johnson summoned the Malagasy Ambassador and said that the recall request was unprecedented because no explanations were offered.

Tsiranana's action is probably based on the belief that the Embassy was somehow assisting Andre Resampa, who up until recently was the assumed heir to the Presidency. Simultaneously with the move against our Ambassador, Resampa was arrested for "conniving" with an unknown Embassy.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
06	01	06	02	09	28195	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ____ KISSINGER X HAIG ____

FROM: ELIOT ____ ROGERS, W ____ LAIRD, M ____ Wright

U ____ LOU ____ C ____ S X TS ____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ____ NO FORN ____ BUO ____ EYES ONLY ____ CODE WORD ____ SENSITIVE ____ NODIS ____ EXDIS ____ LIMDIS ____ RES DATA ____

SUBJECT: Anthony Marshall asked to leave Madagascar.

REFERENCE: S/S ____ OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

APP'TS: PRES ____ HAK ____ TALKER ____ MEMCON ____ DATE REQ. ____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	■		
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			X
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK (____)
MEMO FOR PRES. (____)
REPLY FOR ____ SIGNATURE (____)
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH (____)
MEMO ____ TO ____ (____)
RECOMMENDATIONS (____)
JOINT MEMO (____)
REFER TO STATE (____)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY (____)
CONCURRENCE (____)
DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
06/02	Wright	HAK	X	Pres. for Infor. (0602)	
6/3	Hak	Wright	S	Rcdo	
6/3	NSC/S	HAK	X	Pres for info (6/7)	
6/10	Pres	NSC/S	C	Noted by Pres	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH ____ NOTIFY ____ DATE ____
SEE LOG ____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO ____
JOINED BY LOG ____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) ✓
SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, X HM
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: ____
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ✓ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA
DO ✓ INIT ____
DATE ____
ORIG) NSC ____
TO) PAF ✓
WHC ____
SUBF ____

JUN 14 1971

★ GPO: 1971—412-412

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO DA	RECD MO DA HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
06 01	06 01 19	28995	HAK

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____
KISSINGER XXXXXX
HAIG _____

FROM: ELIOT _____
ROGERS, W _____
LAIRD, M _____
Wright

U _____ LOU _____ C _____ ~~S~~ XXXXX TS _____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
NO FORN _____ BUO _____ EYES ONLY _____ CODE WORD _____ SENSITIVE _____
NODIS _____ EXDIS _____ LIMDIS _____ RES DATA _____

SUBJECT: Ambassador Anthony Marshall asked to leave Madagascar for unexplained reasons

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	■		
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			X
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EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ..... ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ..... ( )
MEMO _____ TO _____ ..... ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
REFER TO STATE ..... ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... ( )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
~~May~~ Jun 1	NSC/S	HAK	X	Pres for info (06/04)	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____
SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____
JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) X
SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, ____ HM
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ____ NO X

MICROFILM DATA
DO _____ INIT _____
JUN 07 1971 DATE _____
ORIG) NSC _____
TO) EAF _____
WHC _____
SUBF _____

★ GPO: 1971—412-412

28284

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Good paper and well written

INFORMATION

SECRET

April 30, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

THROUGH: RICHARD T. KENNEDY

FROM: C. A. CROCKER CAC

SUBJECT: Ex-Im Financing for the Cabora Bassa Project

GE's application for Ex-Im financing to cover the export of equipment for the Cabora Bassa dam presents us with an admittedly difficult decision. Our interests run in contrary directions, and there is certain to be vocal opposition whether we approve or reject the application.

However, I am concerned that the arguments in favor of Ex-Im financing may oversimplify the issue we face. There is, of course, no question about the economic benefits of U. S. participation in this project. But in foreign policy terms, there is more at stake than a simple choice between accommodating our Portuguese ally during current difficulties in the Azores negotiations and bowing to the sensitivities of our sometimes friends in non-aligned black Africa.

As I see it, the foreign policy issue involved is whether we should be responsive to the Portuguese at the cost of a significant and visible modification of our Southern African posture which is likely to damage our position in Africa and the UN and lend credence to domestic charges that the Administration is following a "southern strategy" in Africa. USG encouragement of GE's participation in the Cabora Bassa project will be difficult, if not impossible, to square with our careful, low-profile policy on Southern Africa to date because:

--the Portuguese have dramatized the project's significance as, eventually, Africa's biggest hydroelectric dam. They have broadcast their hope that it may pave the way for the immigration of one million Portuguese settlers into Mozambique. The dam has become a striking symbol of Portugal's determination to stay in Africa.

SECRET

--the project has also become a flypaper for political and military attack. African states have made Cabora Bassa a prime target in their campaign of rhetoric and resolutions in OAU, non-aligned, and UN meetings; domestic liberal and black critics of western support for Portuguese Africa have also addressed the subject. Furthermore, during 1970, FRELIMO guerrillas stepped up their activities in Mozambique's Tete District, with Cabora Bassa being the obvious target.

--to date, three European companies (Swedish, Italian, and British) have pulled out on political grounds, and the U.S. has had no involvement with the project. There is no question that in the context of our past policies in the area, USG encouragement of GE participation would be seen as a new departure, similar to, though not as dramatic as, the U.K.'s decision to supply arms to South Africa.

If we approve Ex-Im financing, the domestic reaction will come from a small but vocal segment of opinion, including

--most black Congressmen and a smattering of white Congressmen such as Senator Case and Representative Ogden Reid. Senator Muskie's recent Lagos speech calling for more aid to black Africa and an end to the predominance of European interests in our Africa policy may tempt him to take a stand on this issue.

--Africa-oriented black groups, academics, journalists, church groups, and students.

This would clearly be a manageable reaction in domestic political terms, and we would probably get some of it even if we refused Ex-Im financing but GE got the contract anyway. Nonetheless, a favorable decision would confirm impressions that the Administration downgrades African and black concerns in the face of other issues. We would be charged with implicitly tolerating, even abetting, Portuguese colonialism in Africa.

In Africa, we would be loudly denounced for aofavorable decision on Ex-Im financing. Much of this would be for domestic African consumption, and I would not expect any countries to retaliate economically or sever diplomatic relations. However, it would be noted that we refused to help with the Tan-Zam railway project (which the PRC subsequently took on), that South Africa will be the principal beneficiary of Cabora Bassa power, and that Portugal's position in Africa will gain directly from U.S. association with the project.

Regardless of the facts, we would be seen as favoring white over black interests and abandoning our balanced posture in Southern Africa. This would complicate our relations with African militants. More important, it could sour the atmosphere for dialogue and contact between white and black in Africa by implying that we are prepared to do business with white southern Africa rather than apply pressure for political change. In my view, dialogue can succeed only if we do both.

A final factor is our objectives in Portuguese Africa. A favorable decision on Ex-Im financing would probably be seen in Lisbon as further evidence, following our decision on the sale of 707s, that this Administration will not actively oppose, and may even help, them in Africa. U. S. financial help for a project they have proclaimed as a testament of their determination cannot be interpreted otherwise, at least in Lisbon. Secondly, the dam clearly reinforces the growing interdependence of Mozambique and South Africa, a trend past U. S. policy has not encouraged. On these grounds, more than any others, I question whether it is advisable to be responsive to our Portuguese friends by endorsing GE's proposed investment in Mozambique.

CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
04	30	05	06	15	28284	

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ✓

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ____ KISSINGER ✓ HAIG ____

FROM: ELIOT ____ ROGERS, W ____ LAIRD, M ____ Kennedy

U ____ LOU ____ C ____ S ✓ TS ____

NO FORN ____ BUO ____ EYES ONLY ____ CODE WORD ____ SENSITIVE ____

NODIS ____ EXDIS ____ LIMDIS ____ RES DATA ____

SUBJECT: A position on Ex-Im Financing for the Cabora Bassa Project

REFERENCE: S/S ____ OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

APP'TS: PRES ____ HAK ____ TALKER ____ MEMCON ____ DATE REQ. ____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	■		
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			✓
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			✓
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK (____)
MEMO FOR PRES. (____)
REPLY FOR ____ SIGNATURE (____)
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH (____)
MEMO ____ TO ____ (____)
RECOMMENDATIONS (____)
JOINT MEMO (____)
REFER TO STATE (____)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY (____)
CONCURRENCE (____)
DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

Log in & out

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
04/30	Kenny	HAK	C/X	Info	
05/06	HAIG	Kenny		See Haig Note	

DISPOSITION

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SEE LOG ____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO ____

JOINED BY LOG ____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) ✓

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SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: ____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ____ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA

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MAY 10 1971

★ GPO: 1971—412-412

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL April 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: FRED BERGSTEN

FROM: AL HAIG

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President from Secretary Connally

Fred:

The attached memorandum to the President from Secretary Connally was hand carried in by John Huntsman, the White House Staff Secretary, asking for any comments we might have on it before he forwards it to the President.

Would you please prepare a memorandum to the President for Henry's signature, in coordination with Mel Levine and Hal Sonnenfeldt, giving him the pertinent facts.

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

27814

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 4/20

TO: Gen. Haig

FROM: John Campbell

For your information _____

Comments:

For appropriate review and forwarding to the President.

SECRETARIAT - ACTION

WRIGHT

27814

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7106006

April 23, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Export-Import Bank Financing for Cabora Bassa

The Secretary has asked me to respond to Mrs. Davis' memorandum of April 21.

We do not consider it in the interests of the United States to provide Export-Import Bank facilities, either credits or guarantees, for General Electric's participation in the Cabora Bassa dam project. The basic issue in this case is whether or not the U.S. Government should become involved in the financing of the project. We do not oppose the export of General Electric equipment for this project without U.S. Government involvement.

Approval of the General Electric application would be damaging to over-all U.S. interests in Africa and cause us serious problems at the UN. South Africa will consume most of Cabora Bassa's initial power and will be its prime beneficiary for the foreseeable future. The African states oppose the project on the grounds that it will serve to increase South Africa's influence in the region, buttress Portugal's hold on Mozambique, and be of little benefit to the local African population.

In 1968, the Johnson Administration approved in principle $60 million of Ex-Im financing to support a private American bid to build Cabora Bassa in competition with government-supported foreign suppliers. (This commitment lapsed with the award of the contract to a competitor.) At that time, there was relatively little insurgency in the area or public African opposition to the project. Even so, the USG limited the financing ($106 million had been requested) to discourage governmental involvement. Since then, insurgent activity near the dam site has grown markedly; Ex-Im participation could thus now involve us as a government in an increasingly difficult security situation. An even more important factor is that African opposition to the project has become much more manifest.

During the past year, the UN General Assembly, the Organization of African Unity, and the Conference of Non-Aligned States (representing some 54 "third world" states) approved resolutions asking all states to refrain from participating in the project; and the Conference sent Zambian President Kaunda on a mission to Bonn, Paris and Rome, inter alia to urge that governmental support to participating companies be withdrawn. The Germans and French told Kaunda they could not break the commitments they had made earlier when there was less African concern. Official German sources report, however, that the FRG will grant no additional financing support to the German firms which constitute General Electric's only competition in view of previous Swedish withdrawal from the project. African considerations caused the Italian Government to withdraw, and apparently discouraged the Swedes.

We are enclosing a paper dealing with balance of payments and other economic aspects of this problem.

There is a relationship to the already difficult negotiations on our Azores base rights. However, we believe the answer to the Azores problem lies in increasing the PL-480 quid pro quo as we have already proposed. We do not think the U. S. should attempt to placate the Portuguese in a way which would damage our African and UN interests.

Up to now, the policies of this Administration in southern Africa have successfully kept us disengaged, both in Africa and the U. S., from major issues which African countries consider of particular importance to their interests.

We consider Cabora Bassa, like the sale by the UK of arms to South Africa, to be such a major issue in southern Africa. Given the rising opposition to this project by African leaders over the past year, U.S. Government involvement now would be taken as a clear sign of official rejection of their expressed concerns, as well as a signal of U.S. support for a long-range colonial commitment by Portugal in Africa and expanded South African influence in the region. It would diminish the effectiveness of a

successful policy with which this Administration is identified. For these reasons, we conclude that we should reject the General Electric Ex-Im application and the Secretary has so informed the Export-Import Bank and the National Advisory Council.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Paper re Technical Aspects of Export-Import Bank Involvement in the Cabora Bassa Project.

27814

Technical Aspects of Export-Import Bank Involvement in the Cabora Bassa Project

This study deals with certain background and technical aspects of Export-Import Bank involvement in the Cabora Bassa Project.

1968 Decision

In the late 1960's, the U.S. construction firm Morrison-Knudsen joined a Franco-American consortium to bid on the $300 million Cabora-Bassa project. M-K requested a $106 million Eximbank direct credit in support of their bid. Following extensive consideration within the Department, then Under Secretary Katzenbach worked out a compromise arrangement with Eximbank President Linder authorizing a bank commitment of $60 million. The attached record of this decision clearly suggests that both Messrs. Katzenbach and Linder sought to discourage any U.S. Government involvement in the project. Moreover, M-K faced government-supported foreign competition when the 1968 decision was made. In the present situation, GE understands that the West Germans have refused to increase their original financial commitments to cover the converter station which the Swedes were to build prior to their withdrawal from the project. Embassy Bonn reports that the FRG will not guarantee any additional obligations that any German firm may assume with regard to the project. We do not know whether any of the existing FRG financial cover would be available for a German converter station. According to GE, the Swedish and Italian withdrawal from the project left a financing gap. Embassy Lisbon reports that according to unspecified local sources ZAMCO, the South African-German-French consortium building the dam, has arranged financing bringing its offer within one million dollars of the total original contract.

Availability of Converter Technology

The available technology for converting AC high voltage current to DC for long distance transmission are the "mercury vapor" and "solid state" systems.

The Swedish "mercury vapor" system has been preeminent in this field and is used by GE under licensing arrangements. GE's new "solid state" system has so far been applied only in a Canadian power plant presently under construction. According to GE, the Portuguese have decided that the "solid state" rather than the "mercury vapor" system is needed for the Cabora Bassa project. GE claims that the technical difficulties of "mercury vapor" may have been as important as political considerations in forcing the withdrawal of the Swedes and the abstention of the British from the project. According to USG engineering judgment, the Swedish mercury vapor system has proven to be very dependable in actual operating systems. It is anticipated that the solid state devices might provide even better service after they have undergone commercial operating experience.

GE is the only company with operating experience in "solid state" technology. Its German competitor Siemens believes it can deliver similar technology. However, GE alleges that the Portuguese are uneasy about the Germans' expertise in the relevant aspects of solid state technology and that the Germans have approached GE about a licensing arrangement. In the absence of government-supported financing for the German suppliers, it would appear that GE retains a competitive technical edge in the sale of solid-state technology to the project. Siemens holds the advantage of already being in the consortium. Unspecified local sources in Lisbon report that the Portuguese are expected to decide within a few days to proceed on the basis of a German converter station.

Competitive Financing Costs and the Question of Risk Cover

At present, the commercial cost of money in the United States is less than in West Germany. In this respect, GE would also retain a competitive edge over Siemens since the firms are presumably of equal creditworthiness. We suspect that the real problem for both firms is risk cover rather than the cost of funds. The proposed Eximbank financing plan calls for repayments over 12 years beginning in 1975, with Eximbank (1) guaranteeing the commercial bank half of the proposed financing and (2) being repaid from the last six years of maturities. Commercial banks would normally not lend

at such long maturities, and both GE and Siemens would probably hesitate to extend such long-term credit at their own risk.

Impact on US Balance of Payments

It should be noted that the potential balance of payments benefits from the proposed transaction would accrue only over a sixteen year period. The timing of the benefits would also vary greatly depending on whether or not off-shore financing could be obtained for the commercial bank portion. Conversely, in the event of a cash sale, equal balance of payments benefits would probably accrue in less than a 5-year period.

Conclusion

The political reasons for non-USG involvement in this project are clear. It is also clear that a cash sale would produce greater balance of payments benefits than the proposed Eximbank transaction. What is not clear is whether USG involvement is required for the sale.

Attachment:

As stated.

4/23/71

1-a

February 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject; Mozambique - Cabora Bassa Dam (Zambesi Dam)

Date: February 27, 1968

Participants: Department of State
Under Secretary Nicholas de B. Katzenbach

Export-Import Bank
Harold F. Linder, President & Chairman

Mr. Katzenbach opened the conversation by saying he was not very enthusiastic about this $106 million, and Mr. Linder responded that he wasn't either. Katzenbach said he doesn't like to say it can't be done but he is certainly not anxious to urge it and doesn't know the best way of handling it. Mr. Linder said we could find a very simple reason: we want to help the U. S. balance of payments situation as much as we possibly can, the additional large amount of money the Congress has just given us has to last us for 5 years, and we don't want to make $100 million loans which will take 15 years plus a period of grace to get our money back when we can lend the same amount say for airplanes where we can get our money back in 7 years. Or we might tell Morrison-Knudson all we can possibly do is $60 million and that they will have to find the rest of the money somewhere else without our guarantee. Mr. Katzenbach said he didn't care which way it was done. If State were to say we couldn't do this for political reasons then perhaps Morris-Knudson could start complaining, "but nothing compared to what we would probably get on the other side, irrational as that may be".

/s/ H L

Harold F. Linder
VAG:vw

cc -- Mr. Sauer
Mr. McLaughlin

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230

27814

APR 15 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR The President

FROM: Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT: Cabora Bassa Project, Mozambique

Because of the potential $50 million of U.S. exports and the resultant beneficial impact on our balance of payments and employment situation, I have taken a continuing interest in the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project in Mozambique.

A decision authorizing Eximbank to provide appropriate financing would permit General Electric to supply the electric terminal for this project. In addition, the successful installation of American equipment in Mozambique would almost certainly lead to substantial future sales for U.S. corporations.

In my view, the economic development which will result from construction of this dam will eventually be more beneficial to black Africans than to white Africans. Also, even though the electricity generated by the project will initially be sold to South Africa, it will be available for use in Mozambique as internal power needs develop.

In 1968, Eximbank, with State concurrence, indicated that it would consider financing $50 to $55 million of equipment for the Cabora Bassa Project. I do not think the conditions which led to that approval have changed significantly since then. Furthermore, present policy, as stated in the January 16, 1967, National Policy Paper on Portugual, imposes no limitations on Eximbank facilities for U.S. exports to the Portuguese African territories. In view of these considerations, I recommend that you approve Eximbank financing. The State Department objects to so doing, based on foreign policy considerations.

I hope that you will decide in favor of permitting Eximbank to assist in financing this major export sale.

Maurice H. Stans

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC # 27814 tab 3

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

16 APR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Relations with Portugal

I have noted with some apprehension a recent trend in our relations with Portugal which, if not quickly reversed, may jeopardize our continued access to important facilities in the Azores. I share the evaluation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that for the foreseeable future these facilities will continue to be of major strategic value to the US. In my view, these facilities are taking on added importance as the Soviets increase their naval activities in the Atlantic. We depend on them for anti-submarine warfare activities, for key communications and direction-finding operations, for aircraft staging and support, and for mid-Atlantic search and rescue operations. They have also been of unique value for ferrying aircraft to Israel; although the Government of Portugal knows about these flights, they have seen fit to ignore them officially.

Two problems in particular are of present concern. The first is the US package for use in the Azores discussions. I strongly endorse Secretary Rogers' recommendation that you authorize him to offer a PL 480 program of $5 million this fiscal year, $10 million in FY 72, and $15 million in FY 73. The Portuguese have indicated a PL 480 program is their preferred quid pro quo; the amounts involved are commensurate with our stake in the Azores; the non-military character of such assistance avoids many of the political complications which direct military aid would arouse. I fear that if the US does not develop a more satisfactory quid pro quo before we resume discussions, the ensuing impasse would seriously harm our interests in the Azores and would weaken Portugal's ties to NATO.

Secondly, I am much concerned over the Department of State's opposition to EXIM Bank financing to allow General Electric to sell important components for the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project in Mozambique. Any final decisions against this undertaking could only be regarded in Lisbon as an unfriendly response to a project of great importance to Portugal, and would be taken as a reversal of our 1968 decision to permit up to $55 million in EXIM Bank financing. Coming on top of present difficulties in the Azores talks, such a position on our part would only strengthen the hand of those within the Portuguese Government who question the utility of cooperation with the US. The implications for our efforts to reach a satisfactory understanding on the Azores are obvious. Beyond this, we would in effect be overriding the interests of an established NATO ally in a questionable attempt to gain favor with those who are not likely to

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-1801

change their attitude towards us no matter what we do -- an approach hardly calculated to strengthen the Alliance. I would therefore also recommend that, in addition to increasing the PL 480 program, the EXIM Bank be authorized to support General Electric's arrangements to sell electrical equipment for the Cabora Bassa project.

I am sending copies of this memorandum to Secretaries Rogers, Hardin, Connally and Stans for their information.

28082

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

APR 27 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am writing to express my views regarding the proposal to provide Export-Import Bank support for the General Electric Company in seeking a contract with the Government of Portugal to supply solid state rectifiers for a large electric power project at Cabora Bassa (Mozambique). I understand that Eximbank support of the project would involve important considerations affecting U.S. military and foreign policy interests. However, there are economic and commercial factors which I believe should also be given due weight in arriving at a final decision in the matter.

The assistance requested of Eximbank would support $50 million in exports of U.S. equipment. The sale itself should provide an excellent opportunity for follow-up sales by General Electric both for the expansion of Cabora Bassa and for a similar $50 million station which will be needed in South Africa, the other end of the transmission line. G.E. has indicated that it will finance this latter station from non-U.S. Government sources. Finally, successful participation in this project may lead to many future projects of like magnitude throughout the world.

The gain to U.S. industry, labor, and to our balance of payments from this transaction would accordingly amount to $50 million plus further prospective sales in connection with the same project and probable future opportunities growing out of technological leadership in high voltage transmission equipment.

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Failure to finance the General Electric sale would only risk giving the business to German competitors, as the project will go forward whether or not Export-Import Bank financing is involved.

While I do not profess to be expert on the political issues involved I think that in the balance of loyalties between Portugal, a NATO ally, and some of the individual African leaders opposing this project I would bet on the former.

John B. Connally

John B. Connally

5

27814 tab 5

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

April 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PETER G. PETERSON

SUBJECT: Export-Import Bank Financing for the Cora Bassa Dam in Mozambique

I have reviewed the files (State - Tab A; Commerce - Tab B; Treasury - Tab C; and Defense - Tab D) and note the split positions on the politics of this project, both domestic and foreign, as well as the uncertainty over whether or not General Electric would get the business without Export-Import Bank participation in the financing.

On the economic issue, uncertainty can be limited by endorsing the views of Stans, Connally, Laird, and Kearns. This project means business, jobs (2,000-4,000), and probably balance of payments advantages ($50-$100 million). However, there remains the possibility that, given the uncertain political future of Mozambique, we might never be paid in full. This danger could be minimized by a guarantee by the Government of Portugal. A request for such a guarantee would also serve to flush out the Portuguese, whose real intentions are somewhat obscure.

On the international politics, which State invokes in opposing Export-Import Bank participation, I defer to Henry's judgment. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we have a more serious problem, as Secretary Laird asserts, with the Portuguese over the Azores than we have vis-a-vis the black Africans vs. South Africa. It is clearly for you to decide whether this could swing votes amongst domestic minority groups but I suspect it is a marginal issue for them.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Export-Import Bank assistance to Cora Bassa provided the Government of Portugal guarantees the proposed Export-Import Bank loan.

Approve_____

Disapprove_____

CONFIDENTIAL

27814

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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CONFIDENTIAL

April 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Export-Import Bank Financing for Cabora Bassa

The Secretary has asked me to respond to Mrs. Davis' memorandum of April 21.

We do not consider it in the interests of the United States to provide Export-Import Bank facilities, either credits or guarantees, for General Electric's participation in the Cabora Bassa dam project. The basic issue in this case is whether or not the U.S. Government should become involved in the financing of the project. We do not oppose the export of General Electric equipment for this project without U.S. Government involvement.

Approval of the General Electric application would be damaging to over-all U.S. interests in Africa and cause us serious problems at the UN. South Africa will consume most of Cabora Bassa's initial power and will be its prime beneficiary for the foreseeable future. The African states oppose the project on the grounds that it will serve to increase South Africa's influence in the region, buttress Portugal's hold on Mozambique, and be of little benefit to the local African population.

In 1968, the Johnson Administration approved in principle $60 million of Ex-Im financing to support a private American bid to build Cabora Bassa in competition with government-supported foreign suppliers. (This commitment lapsed with the award of the contract to a competitor.) At that time, there was relatively little insurgency in the area or public African opposition to the project. Even so, the USG limited the financing ($106 million had been requested) to discourage governmental involvement. Since then, insurgent activity near the dam site has grown markedly; Ex-Im participation could thus now involve us as a government in an increasingly difficult security situation. An even more important factor is that African opposition to the project has become much more manifest.

CONFIDENTIAL

See Close out completed (4/27) →

Rptd to Wright 4/22

During the past year, the UN General Assembly, the Organization of African Unity, and the Conference of Non-Aligned States (representing some 54 "third world" states) approved resolutions asking all states to refrain from participating in the project; and the Conference sent Zambian President Kaunda on a mission to Bonn, Paris and Rome, inter alia to urge that governmental support to participating companies be withdrawn. The Germans and French told Kaunda they could not break the commitments they had made earlier when there was less African concern. Official German sources report, however, that the FRG will grant no additional financing support to the German firms which constitute General Electric's only competition in view of previous Swedish withdrawal from the project. African considerations caused the Italian Government to withdraw, and apparently discouraged the Swedes.

We are enclosing a paper dealing with balance of payments and other economic aspects of this problem.

There is a relationship to the already difficult negotiations on our Azores base rights. However, we believe the answer to the Azores problem lies in increasing the PL-480 quid pro quo as we have already proposed. We do not think the U. S. should attempt to placate the Portuguese in a way which would damage our African and UN interests.

Up to now, the policies of this Administration in southern Africa have successfully kept us disengaged, both in Africa and the U. S., from major issues which African countries consider of particular importance to their interests.

We consider Cabora Bassa, like the sale by the UK of arms to South Africa, to be such a major issue in southern Africa. Given the rising opposition to this project by African leaders over the past year, U.S. Government involvement now would be taken as a clear sign of official rejection of their expressed concerns, as well as a signal of U.S. support for a long-range colonial commitment by Portugal in Africa and expanded South African influence in the region. It would diminish the effectiveness of a

successful policy with which this Administration is identified. For these reasons, we conclude that we should reject the General Electric Ex-Im application and the Secretary has so informed the Export-Import Bank and the National Advisory Council.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Paper re Technical Aspects of Export-Import Bank Involvement in the Cabora Bassa Project.

Technical Aspects of Export-Import Bank Involvement in the Cabora Bassa Project

This study deals with certain background and technical aspects of Export-Import Bank involvement in the Cabora Bassa Project.

1968 Decision

In the late 1960's, the U.S. construction firm Morrison-Knudsen joined a Franco-American consortium to bid on the $300 million Cabora-Bassa project. M-K requested a $106 million Eximbank direct credit in support of their bid. Following extensive consideration within the Department, then Under Secretary Katzenbach worked out a compromise arrangement with Eximbank President Linder authorizing a bank commitment of $60 million. The attached record of this decision clearly suggests that both Messrs. Katzenbach and Linder sought to discourage any U.S. Government involvement in the project. Moreover, M-K faced government-supported foreign competition when the 1968 decision was made. In the present situation, GE understands that the West Germans have refused to increase their original financial commitments to cover the converter station which the Swedes were to build prior to their withdrawal from the project. Embassy Bonn reports that the FRG will not guarantee any additional obligations that any German firm may assume with regard to the project. We do not know whether any of the existing FRG financial cover would be available for a German converter station. According to GE, the Swedish and Italian withdrawal from the project left a financing gap. Embassy Lisbon reports that according to unspecified local sources ZAMCO, the South African-German-French consortium building the dam, has arranged financing bringing its offer within one million dollars of the total original contract.

Availability of Converter Technology

The available technology for converting AC high voltage current to DC for long distance transmission are the "mercury vapor" and "solid state" systems.

The Swedish "mercury vapor" system has been preeminent in this field and is used by GE under licensing arrangements. GE's new "solid state" system has so far been applied only in a Canadian power plant presently under construction. According to GE, the Portuguese have decided that the "solid state" rather than the "mercury vapor" system is needed for the Cabora Bassa project. GE claims that the technical difficulties of "mercury vapor" may have been as important as political considerations in forcing the withdrawal of the Swedes and the abstention of the British from the project. According to USG engineering judgment, the Swedish mercury vapor system has proven to be very dependable in actual operating systems. It is anticipated that the solid state devices might provide even better service after they have undergone commercial operating experience.

GE is the only company with operating experience in "solid state" technology. Its German competitor Siemens believes it can deliver similar technology. However, GE alleges that the Portuguese are uneasy about the Germans' expertise in the relevant aspects of solid state technology and that the Germans have approached GE about a licensing arrangement. In the absence of government-supported financing for the German suppliers, it would appear that GE retains a competitive technical edge in the sale of solid-state technology to the project. Siemens holds the advantage of already being in the consortium. Unspecified local sources in Lisbon report that the Portuguese are expected to decide within a few days to proceed on the basis of a German converter station.

Competitive Financing Costs and the Question of Risk Cover

At present, the commercial cost of money in the United States is less than in West Germany. In this respect, GE would also retain a competitive edge over Siemens since the firms are presumably of equal creditworthiness. We suspect that the real problem for both firms is risk cover rather than the cost of funds. The proposed Eximbank financing plan calls for repayments over 12 years beginning in 1975, with Eximbank (1) guaranteeing the commercial bank half of the proposed financing and (2) being repaid from the last six years of maturities. Commercial banks would normally not lend

at such long maturities, and both GE and Siemens would probably hesitate to extend such long-term credit at their own risk.

Impact on US Balance of Payments

It should be noted that the potential balance of payments benefits from the proposed transaction would accrue only over a sixteen year period. The timing of the benefits would also vary greatly depending on whether or not off-shore financing could be obtained for the commercial bank portion. Conversely, in the event of a cash sale, equal balance of payments benefits would probably accrue in less than a 5-year period.

Conclusion

The political reasons for non-USG involvement in this project are clear. It is also clear that a cash sale would produce greater balance of payments benefits than the proposed Eximbank transaction. What is not clear is whether USG involvement is required for the sale.

Attachment:

As stated.

4/23/71

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230

27814

APR 16 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR The President

FROM: Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT: Cabora Bassa Project, Mozambique

Because of the potential $50 million of U.S. exports and the resultant beneficial impact on our balance of payments and employment situation, I have taken a continuing interest in the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project in Mozambique.

A decision authorizing Eximbank to provide appropriate financing would permit General Electric to supply the electric terminal for this project. In addition, the successful installation of American equipment in Mozambique would almost certainly lead to substantial future sales for U.S. corporations.

In my view, the economic development which will result from construction of this dam will eventually be more beneficial to black Africans than to white Africans. Also, even though the electricity generated by the project will initially be sold to South Africa, it will be available for use in Mozambique as internal power needs develop.

In 1968, Eximbank, with State concurrence, indicated that it would consider financing $50 to $55 million of equipment for the Cabora Bassa Project. I do not think the conditions which led to that approval have changed significantly since then. Furthermore, present policy, as stated in the January 16, 1967, National Policy Paper on Portugual, imposes no limitations on Eximbank facilities for U.S. exports to the Portuguese African territories. In view of these considerations, I recommend that you approve Eximbank financing. The State Department objects to so doing, based on foreign policy considerations.

I hope that you will decide in favor of permitting Eximbank to assist in financing this major export sale.

Maurice H. Stans

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

#8 Cabora Bassa

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

February 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Mozambique - Cabora Bassa Dam (Zambesi Dam)

Date: February 27, 1968

Participants: Department of State
Under Secretary Nicholas de B. Katzenbach

Export-Import Bank
Harold F. Linder, President & Chairman

Mr. Katzenbach opened the conversation by saying he was not very enthusiastic about this $106 million, and Mr. Linder responded that he wasn't either. Katzenbach said he doesn't like to say it can't be done but he is certainly not anxious to urge it and doesn't know the best way of handling it. Mr. Linder said we could find a very simple reason: we want to help the U. S. balance of payments situation as much as we possibly can, the additional large amount of money the Congress has just given us has to last us for 5 years, and we don't want to make $100 million loans which will take 15 years plus a period of grace to get our money back when we can lend the same amount say for airplanes where we can get our money back in 7 years. Or we might tell Morrison-Knudson all we can possibly do is $60 million and that they will have to find the rest of the money somewhere else without our guarantee. Mr. Katzenbach said he didn't care which way it was done. If State were to say we couldn't do this for political reasons then perhaps Morris-Knudson could start complaining, "but nothing compared to what we would probably get on the other side, irrational as that may be".

Harold F. Linder
VAG:vw

cc -- Mr. Sauer
Mr. McLaughlin

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2-2814

AT THIS TIME:

1. Do you intend to take action? No

   If so, reasons for holding _____

2. This item has been incorporated with _____

3. Do you recommend "No Action Required"? _____

4. Is this item "OBE"? Yes - GE withdrew its participation in the project.

Please return this sheet with attached correspondence to the NSC Secretariat as soon as possible.

Thank you.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
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DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER _____ HAIG _____

FROM: ELIOT _____ ROGERS, W _____ LAIRD, M _____

U ____ LOU ____ C ____ S ____ TS ____

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NODIS ____ EXDIS ____ LIMDIS ____ RES DATA ____

SUBJECT: _____

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING		X	
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ..... ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ..... ( )
MEMO _____ TO _____ ..... ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
REFER TO STATE ..... ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... ( )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

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5/28				o/c per Johnston	

DISPOSITION

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SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

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SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ____ NO ____

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★ GPO: 1971—412-412

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
4	20	4	20	18	27814	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ____ KISSINGER ____ HAIG X

FROM: ELIOT ____ ROGERS, W ____ LAIRD, M ____ CAMPBELL, J

U ____ LOU ____ C X S ____ TS ____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ____ NO FORN ____ BUO ____ EYES ONLY ____ CODE WORD ____ SENSITIVE ____

NODIS ____ EXDIS ____ LIMDIS ____ RES DATA ____

SUBJECT: Sec State's recon on the Cabora Bassa Project, Mozambique

REFERENCE: S/S ____ OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

APP'TS: PRES ____ HAK ____ TALKER ____ MEMCON ____ DATE REQ. ____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
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STAFF SECRETARY			
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	X		
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EUROPE/CANADA		X	
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC		X	
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... (X)
REPLY FOR ____ SIGNATURE ..... ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ..... ( )
MEMO ____ TO ____ ..... ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
REFER TO STATE ..... ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... ( )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
DUE DATE: 4/24

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
0421	WRIGHT	DAVIS	S	Sign Memo Eliot	
				Davis sgd Memo	
4/21			D	LDX'd to State (ASAP 04/24)	
				Recd State Secy	
4/23		Wright		Appropriate Action (5/3)	
4/26	FR	ML		drafts attached.	
6/15	Wrg/Ltr	NSC/S		OBE. NAR. per Wright	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH 2C806 NOTIFY ____ DATE ____

SEE LOG ____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO ____

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SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, ____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: ____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ____ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA
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★ GPO: 1971—412-412

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

(26806)

SECRET

April 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

ACTION

APR 23 1971

FROM: Marshall Wright

SUBJECT: Denial of Ex-Im Financing to GE in Mozambique

Secretary Rogers has come down firmly against USG participation in the Cabora Bassa Dam project in Mozambique (Tab 1). He so intends to inform the Export-Import Bank. This would kill General Electric's hope for Ex-Im assistance and, GE claims, preclude their participation. The project represents $50 million of exports, and possibly double that amount if GE lands a contract for a similar installation at the terminal in South Africa. Secretary Stans strongly disagrees with Rogers and will probably appeal to the President. The Vice President, who discussed the project with Foreign Minister Patricio, may also show an interest.

I find it very difficult to decide what I should recommend to you on this issue. There is no question that Cabora Bassa is a major symbol in Black-Southern Africa relations. Any USG support of the project would be viewed by many Africans, and by the Portuguese, as support for Portuguese colonialism and disregard for African opinion. We would suffer substantial criticism in Congress, from the public and in Africa. We might lose a few UN African votes on Chirep, and on other issues. Finally, we would be supporting a project in an area of active insurgency.

However, if we rule against US business interests, we will also be subject to Congressional criticism. We would not be implementing the President's desire to move quietly toward full Ex-Im facilities for South Africa and the Portuguese territories, and the last Administration approved a $60 million commitment to the project several years ago. (However, there is no way this move could be taken "quietly".) And Fred Bergsten notes that $50-100 million of exports, with the attendant 2,000-4,000 jobs, is not insignificant in view of the present unemployment and trade balance problems.

I tend to go along with State. A major factor in that judgment is my suspicion that GE may get the contract with or without Ex-Im facilities. (GE is ahead of its competitors on the technology involved, solid state converters.) So, I am inclined to think we should say out of this for the time

being, and let Secretary Rogers try to carry the day with Ex-Im and Commerce. If he fails, and the issue is sent here for resolution, my uncharacteristically tenuous counsel is to refuse Ex-Im facilities.

A discussion of this issue, which expands the pros and cons, is attached at Tab 2.

Hal Sonnenfeldt concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

No action, unless dissenting agencies refer the matter to the White House for decision.

Agree ____ Disagree ____.

Attachments

Tab 1 - Eliot to Kissinger memo, April 8.
Tab 2 - Discussion of the issue, with arguments pro and con.

cc: Hal Sonnenfeldt
Fred Bergsten

36806
tab 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7104870
CONFIDENTIAL

April 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Ex-Im Financing for Cabora Bassa

The Secretary intends to inform the Export-Import Bank and the National Advisory Council that we do not consider it in the interests of the United States to provide Export-Import Bank facilities, either credits or guarantees, for G.E.'s participation in the Cabora Bassa dam project. The basic issue in this case is whether or not the U.S. Government should become involved in the financing of the project. We do not oppose the export of G.E. equipment for this project if non-USG financing can be arranged.

Approval of the G.E. application would be damaging to over-all U.S. interests in Africa and cause us serious problems at the UN. South Africa will consume most of Cabora Bassa's initial power and will be its prime beneficiary for the forseeable future. The African states oppose the project on the grounds that it will serve to increase South Africa's influence in the region, buttress Portugal's hold on Mozambique, and be of little benefit to the local African population.

During the last year, the UN General Assembly, the session of the Organization of African Unity, and the Conference of Non-Aligned States (representing some 54 "third world" states) approved resolutions asking all states to refrain from participating in the project; and the Conference sent Zambian President Kaunda on a mission to Bonn, Paris and Rome, inter alia to urge that governmental support be withdrawn. The Germans and French told Kaunda they could not break the commitments they had made earlier when there was less African concern over the project.

African considerations did cause the Italian Government to withdraw, and apparently also discouraged the Swedes from participating.

The Secretary considers Cabora Bassa to be a major issue in southern Africa. Given the rising opposition by the African leaders over the past year, U.S. Government involvement now would be taken both as a clear sign of disdain for their expressed concerns, and as a signal of support for a long-range colonial commitment by Portugal in Africa. For these reasons, he has concluded we should reject the G.E. Ex-Im application.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE (26806)

WASHINGTON

SECRET

ACTION

March 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: Marshall Wright

SUBJECT: The Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique

The bureaucracy is now considering whether to permit the Ex-Im Bank to guarantee participation by General Electric in the Cabora Bassa Dam project in Mozambique. Frank Shakespeare has written you on this subject (Tab 2) to inform you of the vigorous opposition of his Africanists to any U.S. Government support for this project. Frank makes it plain that he disagrees with his Africanists, but thought you should have the benefit of their views as well as his.

Rightly or wrongly, the Cabora Bassa project has become one of the symbols of the black-white struggle in Africa and U.S. Government support for the project is of great political significance. Secretary Stans is very much for participation, while State has not yet made up its mind. The final decision will be made in the N.A.C., and I have asked that to be held up until we have had time over here to review the positions of the various agencies.

Attached at Tab 1 is a reply to Shakespeare thanking him for alerting us to the problem, but being non-committal as to our position.

Bergsten and Sonnenfeldt concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Frank Shakespeare at Tab 1.

Cabinet Advisory Council for economic financial matters - Secretary of Treasury is chairman.

26806

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Frank Shakespeare
Director
United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique

I very much appreciated your memorandum of March 16 on the Cabora Bassa Dam. I fully agree with your estimate of the importance of this matter, and have asked to be informed of the positions of the various agencies before any final decision is taken.

Thanks for giving us both your views and those of your African Section.

Henry A. Kissinger

Dispatched recpt # 2333

2

26806

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

DIRECTOR

March 16, 1971

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
The White House

SUBJECT: Cabora Bassa Dam

The African section of USIA has appealed to me to urge the Administration to turn down proposed Ex-Im Bank support to General Electric for the $50 million participation by that company in the Cabora Bassa Dam project. They feel that reaction throughout Black Africa to USG involvement in the project would be intense and would jeopardize our future relations ... (including UN considerations). Furthermore, they believe an American presence at the damsite in Northern Mozambique, an area of continuing revolutionary guerrilla activity, might lead to sporadic acts of violence and thus become a focus of attention. They believe the issue should be decided primarily on the psychological considerations and Ex-Im support denied. Although not economic experts, their judgment is that the project will go ahead without Ex-Im involvement. They do not object to private participation by an American company, i.e., G.E.

I am forwarding these comments because of the intensity of the appeal by our African area officers. I do not agree with their recommendations.

My view is that since the Germans and French are already substantively involved in this project and since United States participation will only be as part of an international consortium ... (I understand a minor part) ... we should proceed. If the decision is to go forward, however, I think we should take steps to ameliorate the psychological problems in Black Africa that might ensue. Some of these steps are ...

1. A public announcement that electrical output of the Cabora Bassa Dam will be made available on a rational sharing basis to all countries in the region, namely: Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Rhodesia and South Africa. Some sort of board could decide on allocations among these countries in the years to come. The point should be stressed that this is a regional African project and is by no means meant to supply electricity exclusively to South Africa and Rhodesia.

2. The international nature of the consortium should be emphasized ... the fact that France and Germany have been involved for some time and that a United States company has been asked to participate because it can offer special technological skills. If the United States participation is a minority, this should be made clear.

It is distressing that France and Germany have been participating in this project with little furor in Black Africa. But now that United States participation is being considered, it is prophesied that a psychological storm will develop. This may be true ... indeed quite possibly it is true ... however, I do not think we should create a reputation of being diverted from actions that we judge in our interest simply because someone might not like it.

I have not sent comments to State on this project.

Frank Shakespeare

SECRET April 13, 1971

USG Participation in the Cabora Bassa Dam Project

General Electric has applied to the Export-Import Bank for a $22.5 million direct credit and a $22.5 million guarantee of a commercial bank loan to cover the export sale of $50 million of high voltage transmission equipment to the Portuguese Government entity in charge of the project. The dam itself is a mammoth hydroelectric project on the Zambezi River which will have a greater megawatt capacity than Aswan or Grand Coulee. Approval of the loan would probably ensure the export of $50 million in goods and services to Mozambique and promote the sale of a similar terminal to South Africa. General Electric claims that it cannot obtain the export contract without USG preferential financing.

Arguments Favoring Ex-Im Participation

-- The President has directed, although the Agencies do not know, that we move quietly towards providing full Ex-Im facilities for South Africa and the Portuguese territories.

-- GE would receive $50 million in business and be in line to receive a similar contract for an electrical terminal in South Africa.

-- Employment would be provided for 2,000 Americans over 1 year (or 4,000 man years if the South African sale is contracted).

-- GE says that it would lose the business without favorable Ex-Im financing.

-- Foreign Minister Patricio told the Vice President that there is no question that the Cabora Bassa Dam project will benefit millions of people regardless of race or color. Even if the Portuguese leave, the dam would continue to benefit the local people, Patricio said (source: Memorandum of Conversation between the Vice President and Foreign Minister Patricio of November 17, 1970).

-- West Germany and France are participating despite African appeals. They have not, thus far, received too much flak.

-- US-Portuguese relations, and our bargaining position on the Azores, would be strengthened.

-- The previous Administration approved an Ex-Im Commitment of $60 million for the project in the late 1960's. (Morrison-Knudson had sought $106 million but only $60 million was approved.)

Arguments Against Ex-Im Participation

-- This is a major African issue. Both the OAU and Non-Aligned Conference have urged non-participation.

-- We would be accused of supporting Portuguese colonialism and South African apartheid over black African interests.

-- African support at the United Nations would be difficult to obtain for issues such as Chirep, etc.

-- Segments of the Congress and public would accuse the Administration of following a "southern strategy" in Africa.

-- The Dam is located in an area of insurgency and American contractor personnel could be the target of attacks.

-- GE could still participate if it found private financing.

-- South Africa would be the principal beneficiary of the project. The benefits to the general Mozambican population are very long-term, indeed.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3/20/71

MAK

Marshall Wright has asked State for statement of various agency views. State, itself, has opposed in the past.

RAH

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO DA	RECD MO DA HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
03 16	03 17 13	26806	WRIGHT

LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER X HAIG _____

FROM: ELIOT _____ ROGERS, W _____ LAIRD, M _____

U _____ LOU _____ C _____ S X TS _____

NO FORN _____ BUO _____ EYES ONLY _____ CODE WORD _____ SENSITIVE _____

NODIS _____ EXDIS _____ LIMDIS _____ RES DATA _____

SHAKESPEARE

SUBJECT: Concern for US Financing of Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	X		
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA		X	
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC		X	
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... (X)
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ..... ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ..... ( )
MEMO _____ TO _____ ..... ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
REFER TO STATE ..... ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... ( )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
DUE DATE: 03/30

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
04/09				Reopened	
04/09	Eliot	HAK		State Reply Recd	
04/09	NSC/S	WRIGHT	X	Memo to HAK (0410)	
04/14	FR	ML		This has been coordinated with HS & FB, MW sandraft, and is ready for your signature.	
4/13	Levine	NSC/S		Dispatch	
4/13	MW	HAK	X	Decision (4/17)	
0426	HAIG	WRIGHT/S		Further action (0430)	
4/28	MY/FR	NSC/S		Overtaken by Log No. 27814 No further action on this folder.	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) 0 Be per 27814

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, ____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ____ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA
INIT _____
DATE _____
ORIG) NSC _____
TO) PRF X
WHC _____
SUBF _____

MAY 03 1971

★ GPO: 1971—412-412

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
03	16	03	17	13	20806	Wright

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER X HAIG _____

FROM: ELIOT _____ ROGERS, W _____ LAIRD, M _____ Shakespeare, F.

U _____ LOU _____ C _____ S X TS _____

NO FORN _____ BUO _____ EYES ONLY _____ CODE WORD _____ SENSITIVE _____

NODIS _____ EXDIS _____ LIMDIS _____ RES DATA _____

SUBJECT: Concern for U.S. financing of Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG Done			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			X
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	X		X
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA		X	
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC		X	X
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

- MEMO FOR HAK ..... (X)
- MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
- REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ..... ( )
- FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ..... ( )
- MEMO _____ TO _____ ..... ( )
- RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
- JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
- REFER TO STATE ..... ( )
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... ( )
- CONCURRENCE ..... ( )

DUE DATE: 03/20

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
3/17	NW	FR		This memo drafted memo to HAK with clearances of E and EUR. NW	
3/19	FR	NW		Drafts attached.	
3/19	NW	HAK	X	Sent memo to Shakespeare (3/23)	
3/30				HAK sent memo to Shakespeare	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO Shakespeare

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, ____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ____ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA

DO ✓ INIT _____ DATE 3/31

ORIG) NSC _____

TO) PAF ✓

WHC _____

SUBF _____

★ GPO: 1971—412-412

26252

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL February 26, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER ACTION

FROM: Marshall Wright MW

SUBJECT: Anthony D. Marshall Requests Appointment

Our Ambassador to Madagascar, Anthony D. Marshall, would like to pay a courtesy call on you.

Marshall is the son of Mrs. Vincent (Brooke) Astor. He is a Nixon backer, an Africanist and an intelligent, ambitious man. He has done an outstanding job in Madagascar. I think that Tony Marshall is also a nice guy and don't believe that he will waste your time.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to receive Ambassador Marshall sometime on March 16, 17 or 18.

Agree _____ Disagree ✓. HK by DCM 3/8

CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
02	26	02	26	09	26252	HAK

LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPT.

TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER X HAIG _____

FROM: ELIOT _____ ROGERS, W _____ LAIRD, M _____ WRIGHT

U _____ LOU _____ C X S _____ TS _____

NO FORN _____ BUO _____ EYES ONLY _____ CODE WORD _____ SENSITIVE _____

NODIS _____ EXDIS _____ LIMDIS _____ RES DATA _____

SUBJECT: Request for Appt w/ AMEMB Marshall to the Malagasy Rep.

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK X TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. Mar 16-18

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			X
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... (_____)
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... (_____)
REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ..... (_____)
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ..... (_____)
MEMO _____ TO _____ ..... (_____)
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... (_____)
JOINT MEMO ..... (_____)
REFER TO STATE ..... (_____)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... (_____)
CONCURRENCE ..... (_____)
DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
02 26	WRIGHT	HAK	X	Decision (0307	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, ____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ____ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA
DO ✓
INIT RJ
DATE _____
11 MAR 1971
ORIG) NSC _____
TO) PAF ✓
WHC _____
SUBF _____

★ GPO: 1971—412-412

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Saturday - December 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT (BRIEFING)

FROM: Henry Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador-designate to Malagasy Anthony Marshall -- Monday, December 15, 11:45 a.m.

This is a meeting for a picture only.

Marshall served in State during the Eisenhower Years. Since 1959 he has been a partner in New York firms, on the Board of Directors of companies doing business in Africa, and, most recently, President of the African Research and Development Company.

We have no major interests in the Malagasy Republic. There is an auxiliary NASA tracking station there. Otherwise, French interests are predominant as a hold-over from the colonial period, and the island's politics are relatively stable by African standards. Marshall's job will be an interesting listening post, however, on events in Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (when the Soviet fleet is increasingly showing its flag). A map of the area is at Tab A.

Even in passing, Marshall may raise with you the possibility of the APOLLO XII astronauts visiting Malagasy on their upcoming world tour. In light of the tracking station there, NASA is considering Malagasy as a logical candidate.

You might remark to Marshall:

-- His mission will be to preserve our NASA interests in Malagasy as well as staying alert to general developments in the area.

-- Understand that NASA appreciates the relevance of the APOLLO XII astronauts visiting Malagasy. The schedule is still being planned and Marshall can be sure a visit will be given special consideration.

Attachment

Tab A - Map of Malagasy Republic.

A

AFRICA

POLITICAL DIVISIONS

★ Capital

BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

0 500 1000 MILES
0 500 1000 KILOMETERS

75951 3-69

Base 58027 10-68

5082

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of the Malagasy Republic that the appointment of Mr. Jules Alphonse Razafimbahiny as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Malagasy Republic would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

Henry A. Kissinger

Henry A. Kissinger

MEMORANDUM

5082

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 3, 1969

FOR: Bill Watts

FROM: Roger Morris RM

SUBJECT: Agrement for new Ambassador to the US from the Malagasy Republic

I recommend that we concur with the Secretary of State's recommendation on the appointment by the Malagasy Republic of Mr. Jules Alphonse Razafimbahiny as the Ambassador to the US from Malagasy.

Attachment

Kissinger to Rogers memo concurring in Ambassador Razafimbahiny's appointment.

5082

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

18344 November 28, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. President:

The Government of the Malagasy Republic has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Mr. Jules Alphonse Razafimbahiny as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Malagasy Republic to the United States. A biography of Mr. Razafimbahiny is enclosed. A thorough review of United States Government records reveals no grounds for objection.

I believe this appointment would be satisfactory. If you concur, I shall be pleased to inform the Malagasy Government.

Respectfully,

William P. Rogers

Enclosure:

Biography.

The President,

The White House.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 25a ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

5/80

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HAIG

RE: Ambassador-designate Anthony D. Marshall

If confirmed, should the requested appointment be scheduled or is this another that falls within the policy guidelines for a turndown?

The President

should see_____

should not ✓

COMMENTS:

HAK has already recommended no on Marshall's nomination

Thanks.

Hugh

DEC 5 1969

HUGH W. SLOAN, Jr.

Dispatched 12/5/69

5780

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1969

Haig for.

FOR: General Haig

FROM: Roger Morris Roger

SUBJECT: Appointment with the President for US Ambassador-designate Anthony D. Marshall (to Malagasy Republic)

In his memorandum of December 2 (attached) Hugh Sloan asks your advice as to whether an appointment for Ambassador-designate Anthony D. Marshall should be scheduled with the President. I have recommended to Henry Kissinger that the President not see Marshall. A copy of the suggested memorandum from Kissinger to the President is attached for you to forward to Sloan should you wish to do so when you return his memorandum with your approval or disapproval.

Attachments:

Copy of HAK memo to the President with recommendation on appointment (for Marshall and Rountree)

Hugh Sloan's memorandum to you of December 2.

THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Secretariat

November 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DWIGHT CHAPIN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment with the President
for Ambassador-designate Anthony D. Marshall

The President has announced his intention to name Anthony D. Marshall as American Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic. Ambassador-designate Marshall is now in Washington for initial appointments and briefings. He will be here until at least the middle of December and would like to call on the President during that time, if it is feasible to do so.

A biographic sketch is enclosed.

Emil Mosbacher, Jr.

ANTHONY D. MARSHALL

President Nixon has announced his intention to nominate Anthony D. Marshall as United States Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic. Mr. Marshall is President of the African Research and Development Co., Inc., of New York. In Tananarive he will succeed Ambassador David S. King, who has returned to private life.

Mr. Marshall was born May 30, 1924, in New York City. He attended Brown University (A.B., 1950). From 1942 to 1946, he served in the Marine Corps, with rank of Captain. From 1950 to 1959, he was employed in various capacities by the Department of State.

In addition to his present position as President of the African Research and Development Co., Mr. Marshall is Chairman of the Board of Directors, NIDOCO, Ltd., Lagos, Nigeria. He is also a limited partner in the New York firms of Butler, Herrick and Marshall, and Tucker Anthony and R. L. Day.

Mr. Marshall holds memberships in a variety of societies and clubs, including African Studies Association of New York, African Medical Research Foundation, American Geographic Society of New York, National Geographic Society of Washington, and Royal Geographic Society of London.

Mr. Marshall is married to the former Thelma Hoegnell, and they have two children.

Nov., 1969

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ACTION

FROM: Henry Kissinger

SUBJECT: Proposed Appointments with US Ambassadors to South Africa and Malagasy Republic

State has recommended that you agree to brief calls by (1) Anthony Marshall, the new Ambassador-designate to the Malagasy Republic (a non-career appointee -- biography at Tab A) and (2) William Rountree, who is home for consultations from South Africa (biography at Tab B).

Applying strict criteria to limit these Ambassadorial calls, I see no policy reason for you to receive Marshall. We have an auxiliary NASA tracking station in Malagasy, but otherwise the island is reasonably quiet, French interests are paramount, and our political stake is not worth Presidential attention.

Rountree's mission in South Africa, however, is certainly one of the tougher and more important assignments. You know Rountree from his service as an Assistant Secretary of State during the Eisenhower Years. He has done a good job in Pretoria. I believe it would be worth your time to have his views on Southern African problems -- and to give him your own personal guidance -- in the context of the imminent NSC review of that subject (now tentatively scheduled for December 17).

Recommendation: That you approve a brief call by Ambassador to South Africa William Rountree.

Schedule Rountree only ____

Rountree and Marshall ____

Marshall only ____

Neither ____.

Attachments

Tab A - Biographic sketch on Ambassador-designate Marshall.
Tab B - Biographic sketch on Ambassador Rountree.

(Log nos. 4918/5180, 5034)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ACTION

FROM: Henry Kissinger

SUBJECT: Proposed Appointments with US Ambassadors to South Africa and Malagasy Republic

State has recommended that you agree to brief calls by (1) Anthony Marshall, the new Ambassador-designate to the Malagasy Republic (a non-career appointee -- biography at Tab A) and (2) William Rountree, who is home for consultations from South Africa (biography at Tab B).

Applying strict criteria to limit these Ambassadorial calls, I see no policy reason for you to receive Marshall. We have an auxiliary NASA tracking station in Malagasy, but otherwise the island is reasonably quiet, French interests are paramount, and our political stake is not worth Presidential attention.

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Recommendation: That you approve a brief call by Ambassador to South Africa William Rountree.

Schedule Rountree only ____

Rountree and Marshall ____

Marshall only ____

Neither ____

Attachments

Tab A - Biographic sketch on Ambassador-designate Marshall.
Tab B - Biographic sketch on Ambassador Rountree.

RMorris:mm - December 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL December 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER ACTION

FROM: Roger Morris

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Appointments for Ambassador Anthony Marshall (Malagasy Republic) and Bill Rountree (South Africa)

State has sent over two more requests for the President to receive Ambassadors to Africa.

I see no policy reason to recommend taking the President's time for Marshall. The Malagasy is French ground of no real importance to us. Rountree and South Africa are quite a different matter, however, and I think this is one of the few African cases that justifies a Presidential appointment.

Rountree knows the President from his earlier service as Assistant Secretary in the Eisenhower years. He should have the benefit of a direct talk with the President on Southern Africa.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Memo to President for your signature

4918

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S-18281

November 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request by Ambassador William M. Rountree for an Appointment with the President

Ambassador Rountree is in Washington for consultation until December 7. He is one of our most experienced Ambassadors, having served as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs and as Ambassador to Pakistan, Sudan and presently South Africa. The President met Ambassador Rountree on a number of occasions during the Eisenhower Administration while the Ambassador served as Assistant Secretary.

An opportunity for Ambassador Rountree to meet with the President to discuss our sensitive relations with South Africa would be especially appropriate at this time in view of the pending National Security Council consideration of the review prepared over the past several months of our policies toward Southern Africa and the options confronting us.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

William M. Rountree
American Ambassador to the
Republic of South Africa

William M. Rountree, a Career Minister in the Foreign Service, has been Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa since late 1965.

Born in 1917 in Georgia, Mr. Rountree received an LL.B. from Columbus University, Washington, D.C., in 1941.

From 1942-45 Mr. Rountree was Assistant to the Director of American Economic Operations, Middle East. In 1946 he was appointed Economic Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. During this assignment he served on the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine and Related Problems and as a member of the American Economic Mission to Greece in 1947.

In 1947 Mr. Rountree was named Special Assistant to the American Ambassador to Greece, where he served until 1949, when he was appointed Deputy Director of the Office of Greek,Turkish and Iranian Affairs. He later became Director of that office.

In 1952 Mr. Rountree was assigned as Counselor and Deputy Chief of the Embassy in Ankara. He then served during 1953-55 as Minister Counselor of the Embassy in Tehran.

Mr. Rountree returned to Washington in 1955 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs and was appointed Assistant Secretary for that region in 1956. During 1958 a reorganization of the Department established the Bureau of African Affairs as a special entity and Mr. Rountree continued until 1959 as the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

In 1959 Mr. Rountree was appointed Ambassador to Pakistan, where he served until 1962, when he was named Ambassador to the Sudan. He departed the Sudan in 1965 to become Ambassador to South Africa.

Mr. Rountree is married to the former Suzanne MacDowall. They have one daughter, Susan.

November 24, 1969

903

2. Rtn to RM-3/10

2838

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 9, 1969

OK

RM 3/10

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter of Appreciation from Malagasy Foreign Minister for Disaster Relief

Taking advantage of authority vested in him, our Ambassador in Tananarive, David S. King, has made available disaster relief funds to the Malagasy Government in the wake of a cyclone that devastated portions of the east coast of Madagascar in early February. Madagascar's Foreign Minister wrote Ambassador King a warm note of thanks for this gesture on the part of the US Government, and asked that his gratitude be expressed to the President. The Foreign Minister's communication to our Ambassador, together with its translation into English, is enclosed.

The Department proposes subject to your concurrence that the Secretary acknowledge the Foreign Minister's letter on behalf of the President along the lines of the enclosed draft cable.

John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Message from Foreign Minister
2. Draft telegram

Col. S/S, Andrea concurred 3/10/69 5:20 am

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MINISTERE
DES
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

-:-

Nº 69/010-AE/CAB/2

Le Ministre d'Etat

EXCELLENCE,

C'est avec une profonde émotion que j'ai lu votre lettre du 6 février dernier m'annonçant la volonté de votre Gouvernement de venir en aide aux sinistrés de Nosy Varika suite au passage .../-

Son Excellence Monsieur David S. KING
AMBASSADEUR EXTRAORDINAIRE ET PLENIPOTENTIAIRE
DES
ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE
-= Tananarive =-

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

FEB 13 1969

TANANARIVE, MADAGASCAR

.../-

suite au passage du cyclône " Dany ".

Je m'empresse de vous présenter ici les remerciements du Gouvernement, des populations éprouvées de Nosy Varika et du peuple malgache tout entier pour ce nouveau geste d'amitié qui concrétise, une fois de plus, les sentiments d'humanisme et d'amour du prochain que tout le monde reconnaît au grand peuple américain.

Je vous saurais infiniment gré de bien vouloir envisager la possibilité de transmettre au Président des Etats-Unis, au Gouvernement et au Peuple Américains l'expression de nos plus sincères remerciements.

Veuillez agréer, EXCELLENCE, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Tananarive, le 13 FEV. 1969

RABEMANANJARA Jacques

903

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 8131
T3/R-IV
French

2838

MINISTRY OF

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

No. 69/010-AE/CAB/2

[Office of] the

Minister of State

Excellency:

I was deeply touched by your letter of February 6 last informing me of your Government's willingness to aid the victims of tornado Dany in Nosy-Varika.

I wish to express to you the thanks of the Government, the victims in Nosy-Varika, and all the Malagasy people for this new gesture of friendship, which is, once again, clear evidence of the universally recognized love for humanity and good-neighborliness of the great American people.

I should greatly appreciate it if you would be good enough to convey to the President and Government of the United States, and to the American people, our very sincere gratitude.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my high consideration.

[Signed] Jacques Rabemananjara

Jacques Rabemananjara

Tananarive, February 13, 1969

His Excellency
David S. King,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America,
Tananarive.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISION

903 WORK COPY

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AmEmbassy, TANANARIVE

1. Please transmit following message from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Rabemananjara:

QUOTE: Your letter of February 13, 1969 to Ambassador King about American assistance given to the unfortunate victims of Cyclone Dany, has been forwarded to the White House. On behalf of President Nixon I want to say we have been most touched by the warmth of your sentiments. I wish to assure you of our deep sympathy for ~~those~~ unwitting victims of natural disasters of this kind, and of our wish to help in every way we can when such disasters occur.

Signed Rogers UNQUOTE.

2. Department does not plan release but has no objection to release by GOM.

E N D

AF/CM:JPSullivan:bg 3-5-69 2695 ~~XX/CMXXXXXXXXXX~~ The Secretary

PRR/PRDS/DEC - Mr. Street (informed) S/S
AF/AFCM - Mr. Tienken AF - Ambassador Moore

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'74 APR 12 AM 8:28

SECRET 4989

PAGE 01 TANANA 00495 111644Z

71
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 046674

R 111357Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6175

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 0495

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: TSPA, EAID, MA, US
SUBJ: RENEWAL NASA STATION AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 71416

1. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AT DINNER PARTY 10APR, I TOLD MIN TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT GEN ANDRIAMAHAZO WE ARE NOW READY TO NEGOTIATE TEXTS OF NASA STATION EXTENSION AND RAILROAD LOAN AGREEMENT SIMULTANEOUSLY. HE INDICATED HE WOULD ALSO LIKE THE TWO CARRIED OUT TOGETHER.

2. WHILE BALANCE OF CONVERSATION CRYPTIC BECAUSE OF PRESENCE OF OTHERS NEARBY, I GATHERED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES LAST WEEKEND HAD PREVENTED FULL DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN RATSIRAKA OF HEAD OF GOVT GEN RAMANANTSOA'S DECISION ON NASA STATION EXTENSION. THEREFORE MALAGASY SIDE WILL NOT BE READY PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER RATSIRAKA'S RETURN FROM SPECIAL UNGA SESSION. ANDRIAMAHAZO EXPECTS RATSIRAKA'S RETURN TO BE SOON, BY WHICH I TOOK HIM TO MEAN RATSIRAKA WILL NOT STAY UNTIL TERMINATION OF SESSION AT END APRIL.
MENDENHALL

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FORM

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'74 APR 5 PM 9:47

CONFIDENTIAL 1122

PAGE 01 TANANA 00456 050928Z

45
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
---------- 097202

R 050840Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6151

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 0456

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EAID, MA, US
SUBJ: FY75 ASSISTANCE

REF: STATE 068529

1. MUCH APPRECIATE SPEEDY RESPONSE GIVEN IN REFTEL TO MY PROPOSAL ABOUT FY75 ASSISTANCE.

2. HOWEVER, BEST-LAID PLANS OF MICE AND MEN GANG AFT AGLEY. AS REPORTED TANA'S 0454, FONMIN RATSIRAKA, AFTER BEING BACK ONLY SEVEN HOURS IN MADAGASCAR, DEPARTED EVENING 04APR WITH HEAD GOVT GEN RAMANANTSOA FOR POMPIDOU FUNERAL, AND PROCEEDING TO NEW YORK FOR UNGA SPECIAL SESSION.

3. I AM CONSIDERING WHAT ACTION TO TAKE VIS-A-VIS RATSIRAKA UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT AM INCLINED, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW NATURE YOUR RESPONSE, TO AWAIT HIS RETURN TO MADAGASCAR TO APPROACH HIM ALONG LINES SUGGESTED REFTEL. HIS RETURN WILL PRESUMABLY BE IN LATE APR OR EARLY MAY SINCE UNGA SPECIAL SESSION DUE LAST THREE WEEKS AND SESSION OF MALAGASY NATIONAL COUNCIL OF POPULAR DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULED START 24APR AND ALL MALAGASY MINISTERS EXPECTED APPEAR BEFORE IT TO DISCUSS AFFAIRS OF THEIR DEPARTMENTS.
MENDENHALL

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CONFIDENTIAL

7

FORM DS-1879

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 7748

'74 APR 4 PM 3 04

PAGE 01 TANANA 00445 041309Z

47
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
082340

Z 0412207 APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6146

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 0445

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EAID, MA, US
SUBJ: INFLUENCING MALAGASY FONMIN RATSIRAKA BY FY75 AID PROPOSAL

FOR UNDER SECRETARY SISCO AND AID ADMINISTRATOR PARKER
DELIVER OPENING BUSINESS APRIL 4.

BEGIN SUMMARY: FONMIN RATSIRAKA RETURNING TANA 04APR AND MAY LEAVE AGAIN VERY SHORTLY. THEREFORE REQUEST FLASH REPLY ON PROPOSAL TO TELL HIM US PREPARED CONSIDER FY75 AID PROJECT FOR MADAGASCAR. END SUMMARY.

1. FONMIN RATSIRAKA RETURNING TANA TODAY (04APR). ACCORDING TO MRS. RATSIRAKA'S STATEMENT TO MRS. MENDENHALL AT ENGLISH LESSON THIS MORNING. RATSIRAKA'S UNEXPECTEDLY EARLY RETURN PRESUMABLY MEANS HEAD OF GOVT GEN RAMANANTSOA SUMMONED HIM BACK TO INFORM HIM ABOUT FAVORABLE DECISION RAMANANTSOA HAS TAKEN ON THREE-YEAR EXTENSION OF NASA STATION (TANA'S 0420).

2. MRS. RATSIRAKA PROFESSED NOT TO KNOW WHEN FONMIN WOULD BE LEAVING FOR UNGA. HOWEVER, EARLIER TODAY, FRENCH CHARGE DESMAZIERES TOLD US THAT RATSIRAKA HAS APPOINTMENT WITH FONMIN JOBERT ON MONDAY 08APR.

3. SINCE THIS LIKELY MEAN QUICK DEPARTURE BY RATSIRAKA FROM TANA, WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY BY FLASH MESSAGE TO TANA'S 0424 AND 0426 REQUESTING AUTHORITY TELL HIM US PREPARED CONSIDER FY75 AID PROJECT FOR MADAGASCAR UP TO SPECIFIED AMOUNT.

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FORM DS-1050

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SECRET

PAGE 02 TANANA 00445 041309Z

4. FLASH PRECEDENCE USED FOR THIS MESSAGE AND PROPOSED FOR REPLY AS RECENT MESSAGES SLUGGED IMMEDIATE BOTH TO AND FROM WASH HAVE BEEN SUBJECT UNSATISFACTORY DELAYS.
MENDENHALL

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SECRET

12/20/66

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 642

PAGE 01 TANANA 00813 170608Z

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W
---------- 082678

R 131432Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4611

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 0813

EXDIS

SUBJ: TEXT OF "EVIDENCE"

REF: TANANARIVE 811

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT "EVIDENCE" DOCUMENT IN ENGLISH ORIGINAL:
QTE. WITHOUT INTERRUPTION CONTINUE WORK STARTED IN VIEW OF VP2
INSTALLATION.
GET THE 10 AGENTS TO WORK WITH SUBTLETY.
COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, CULTURAL AID WILL BE EXTENDED.
NECESSARY ACTION TO GET BASE DIEGO. IF FRANCE INSISTS,
METROPOLIS WILL DO NECESSARY.
3. AGENTS ARE POSTED AT MINETRANR AND DIRSEC.
NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF NARINDA--VERY IMPORTANT.
PLACE MINI-MICRO AT ZCY STATION.
ENGLISH BASE AT MAJUNGA WILL BE PROVIDED WITH NEW SATELLITE
RECEIVERS AND TRANSMITTERS.
(DO TRACT NOT TO CAUSE DAMAGE.)
JOHANNESBURG WILL SEND ITS VEDETTE BOATS--LOOK AFTER THEIR
ALTERNATE ## MERITSITOSIKAO-ESCA-MANAMBARO-EJEDA-CENTRAL POINT##
FOR COMMUNICATIONS.
INTERCEPT ISRAEL EMBASSY BROAD-CAST.
SUCCESS IN 8 MONTHS.
ARRIVAL OF 20 TOURISTS AT LEAST.
NEVER PRECIPITATE CONTACT WITH VP5.

FRENCH REPUBLIC PRESIDENCY INSISTS UPON VP3 INSTALLATION.
SUPPORT OUR CANDIDATE.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 TANANA 00813 170608Z

DO NOT PRESS ON RECEIVER-TRANSMITTER INSTALLATION IN PRESIDENT'S OFFICE.
NOTHING SURPRISING ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AT VP2.
WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK.
SEND 0134 OVER TO VP2. UNQTE.

2. FOLLOWING OUR GLOSSARY AND COMMENTARY ON FOREGOING:
A) VP NUMBERS REFER TO ORDER OF SENIORITY AMONG VICE PRESIDENTS PRIOR RESAMPA'S ARREST, I.E., VP2 IS RESAMPA, VP3 IS RABEMANANJARA, AND VP5 IS RAMANGASOAVINA.
B) "DIRSEC" REFERS PRESUMABLY TO DIRECTOR (OR DIRECTORATE) OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.
C) "ENGLISH BASE AT MAJUNGA" IS OF COURSE REFERENCE TO RAF DETACHMENT MAJUNGA WHICH HAS SINCE BEEN CLOSED DOWN A GOMR REQUEST.
D) WORDS APPEARING BETWEEN ASTERISKS (WHICH ARE OURS) IN SENTENCE BEGINNING WITH WORD "ALTERNATE" APPEAR IN FRENCH TRANSLATION ONLY, SINCE THIS PART OF SENTENCE IN PHOTOCOPY ENGLISH TEXT IS BLANK. PRESUMABLY WORDS SHOW UP IN ORIGINAL. "MERITSITOFIKAO" IS MISSPELLED NAME OF TOWN WHERE NASA STATION LOCATED. "ESCA" IS WELL-KNOWN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL FOR BOYS IN TANANARIVE OPERATED BY CANADIAN LAY BROTHERS. "MANAMBARO" AND "EJEDA" ARE TOWNS IN SOUTHERN MADAGASCAR NEAR FORT DAUPHIN WHERE AMERICAN-STAFFED HOSPITALS OF LUTHERAN MISSION ESTABLISHMENT ARE LOCATED.
E) WORD "INTERCEPT" IN NEXT LINE IS IMPROPERLY RENDERED AS "INTERFERE" IN FRENCH TRANSLATION.
F) WE READ FIRST WORD IN LAST SENTENCE OF DOCUMENT AS "SEND" THOUGH TRANSLATOR HAS READ AS "END" AND SO RENDERED IN FRENCH AS "TERMINEZ." XGDS-2.
MILLER

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M DS-1652

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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CONFIDENTIAL 547

PAGE 01 TANANA 00745 231200Z

2/3

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W
---------- 043099

R 231130Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4580

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 0745

EXDIS

REF: STATE 11587

1. CONVEYED REFTEL MESSAGE ORALLY TO GEN. RAMANANTSOA DURING ONE HOUR MEETING THIS MORNING. FOREIGN MINISTER RATSIRAKA ALSO PRESENT. RAMANANTSOA APPRECIATIVE COURTESY. SHOWED SPECIAL INTEREST ONLY RE TIMING EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE.

2. OTHER TOPICS DISCUSSED REPORTED BY AIRGRAM.
DECLASSIFY: GDS.
MILLER

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28

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 217

PAGE 01 TANANA 00661 021355Z

41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 013458

O 021323Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4537

72 JUN 2 PM 2:42

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 0661

EXDIS

FOR P AND EUR

SUBJ: REACTION PRESIDENT'S TRIP

REF: STATE 096887

1. GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF MADAGASCAR PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS FOLLOWING CIVIL STRIFE AND ADVENT MILITARY REGIME LAST MONTH, WHICH EXPLAINS NEAR ABSENCE ANY COMMENT PUBLIC OR PRIVATE RE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO SOVIET UNION. ONLY COMMENTARY THUS FAR WAS MAY 31 IN IMONGO VAOVAO, NEWSPAPER OF LEADING OPPOSITION PARTY AKFM, WHICH HERALDED AGREEMENTS AS OPENING PERIOD OF GREAT HOPE FOR FURTHER PROGRESS ON ROAD TO WORLD PEACE.

2. FACTUAL NEWS COVERAGE OF TRIP WAS HEAVY, HOWEVER, WITH ARTICLES BASED ON WIRE SERVICES APPEARING IN MADAGASCAR MATIN, TANANARIVE'S LARGEST NEWSPAPER; TRIP BEING FEATURED AS NUMBER ONE NEWS STORY THROUGHOUT WEEK ON NEWS BROADCASTS OVER MALAGASY STATE RADIO; AND FILM COVERAGE OF TRIP BEING SUBJECT HALF HOUR SPECIAL FEATURE PROGRAMMED ON PRIME EVENING TIME MALAGASY TV LAST NIGHT. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, TRIP THUS RECEIVED FAIRLY EXTENSIVE COVERAGE HERE.

3. AS SOON AS TRAUMA OF RECENT DOMESTIC STRIFE HAS WORN OFF A BIT MORE, I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL SEE BENEFICIAL IMPACT ON GOMR THINKING OF PRESIDENT'S TRIP AND NEW ERA OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS IT USHERS IN. PRESENT MILITARY REGIME HEADED BY ASTUTE, EXPERIENCED GEN. RAMANANTSOA ESPECIALLY WELL QUALIFIED APPRECIATE SIGNIFICANCE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND WHAT THEY PORTEND IN TERMS OF DE-ESCALATION US-SOVIET STRATEGIC CONFRONTA-

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PAGE 02 TANANA 00661 021355Z

TION AS WELL AS BROADER IMPLICATIONS THAW IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS OVER-ALL FOLLOWING MOSCOW SUMMIT. GOMR, INCITED BY EX-AGGERATED NOTION IMPORTANCE COUNTRY'S STRATEGIC LOCATION (TO US AT LEAST), HAS BEEN PRONE SEE INDIAN OCEAN AREA AS ACTIVE THEATER BIG POWER RIVALRY, WITH RESULT MALAGASY PRESS AND CERTAIN PART OF PUBLIC OPINION HAVE BEEN ONLY TOO READY ATTRIBUTE TO MINUTE US NAVAL PRESENCE INDIAN OCEAN OR TO NASA TRACKING STATION TANANARIVE, FOR EXAMPLE, SINISTER ROLE AND INFLUENCE ACTUALLY QUITE REMOTE FROM REALITY. MOSCOW TRIP, COMING AS IT DOES AFTER PEKING TRIP, WILL IN MY VIEW HAVE SETTLING EFFECT MAKING MALAGASY OPINION LESS SUSPICIOUS OF US MIGHT AND OF MOTIVES BEHIND BROAD SPECTRUM OUR POLICIES ECONOMIC AS WELL AS POLITICAL. IT MAY BE, TOO, THAT IN THIS ATMOSPHERE WE CAN SECURE FROM PRESENT MILITARY REGIME MORE ACTIVIST ROLE IN SUPPORT OUR POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS--NEXT UNGA, FOR EXAMPLE--THAN WAS POSSIBLE WITH PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. GP-3.
MILLER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 004

PAGE 01 TANANA 00187 260832Z

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W
---------- 057360

R 260715Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4297

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 187

EXDIS

SUBJ: US-MALAGASY RELATIONS

REF: STATE 29668

1. RABEMANANJARA HAD ACCOMPANIED TSIRANANA DURING PART OF LATTER'S TRIP THROUGH SOUTH AND SO I WAS ABLE SEE HIM ONLY THIS MORNING TO CARRY OUTSTATE 12700 DEMARCHE PURSUANT REFTEL.

2. RABEMANANJARA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR BRIEFING AND CONSIDERATION HE FELT WAS THUS SHOWN TOWARD GOMR IN PRESENT STATE OF OUR RELATIONS. ON SUBSTANCE HE COMMENTED THAT WHILE GOMR FAVORED DIALOGUE, GOMR NOT INSENSITIVE TO LIKELHOOD THAT ANY IMPROVEMENT BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND COMMUNIST CHINA WOULD AFFECT INTERESTS STATES OF INDIAN OCEAN AREA. SAID MADAGASCAR HAS LITTLE TO FEAR FROM SOVIETS WHEREAS PEKING HAS LONG BEEN INTERESTED EXTENDING ITS INFLUENCE THIS REGION. GOMR COULD NOT IGNORE PRESENCE MADAGASCAR LARGE CHINESE COLONY WHICH ONLY TOO LIKELY SWITCH ALLEGIANCE TO PEKING, WHICH WAS WHY PRESENT LEADERSHIP GOMR WOULD NEVER ENVISAGE RECOGNIZING PEKING.
GP-3
MILLER

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SECRET 604

PAGE 01 TANANA 00165 190917Z

19
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

---------- 010633

R 181500Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4287

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 0165

EXDIS

SUBJ: US-MALAGASY RELATIONS

REF: A) STATE 15362 B) TANANARIVE 163

1. SUGGEST STATE 12709 DEMARCHE, IF IT IS TO BE MADE AT ALL, BE MADE TO RABEMANANJARA EARLY NEXT WEEK. AS REPORTED TANANARIVE 162, TSIRANANA WILL BE ABSENT IN SOUTH UNTIL MIDDLE OF WEEK AND BY TIME I COULD HOPE GET APPOINTMENT SEE HIM PRE-PEKING VISIT BRIEFING WOULD BE THEN BE COLD FARE. ALSO FOR REASON MENTIONED REF B DO NOT CONSIDER TIME YET RIPE ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION US-MALAGASY RELATIONS WITH TSIRANANA, WHICH SUBJECT WOULD INEVITABLY ARISE AT ANY SUCH MEETING.

2. BELIEVE MIGHT BE MORE PRODUCTIVE AT THIS STAGE TRY LETTING RABEMANANJARA RUN INTERFERENCE FOR US WITH TSIRANANA, ESPECIALLY IF RABEMANANJARA WELL DISPOSED (TDCS DB-315/01129-72). MEETING WITH RABEMANANJARA OSTENSIBLY FOR DEMARCHE PURSUANT STATE 12709 WOULD GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY RAISE SUBJECT US-MALAGASY RELATIONS, NOTABLY AFTER RECEIPT NOTE AS SUGGESTED REF B. COULD INDICATE WOULD HAVE SOUGHT BRIEF TSIRANANA ALONG LINES STATE 12709 EXCEPT FOR LATTER'S ABSENCE, THUS ALSO ENSURING GOMR NOT MIFFED IF LEARNS EVENTUALLY FROM AFRICAN PARTNERS OF SUCH BRIEFINGS RECEIVED PRIOR PRESIDENT NIXON'S CHINA TRIP.

GP-3
MILLER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

7 OCT AM 8:38

CONFIDENTIAL 134

PAGE 01 TANANA 01528 061508Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W
---------- 065822

R 061430Z OCT 71
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4122
USUN NEW YORK 107
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 1528

EXDIS

SUBJ: CHIREP

REF: PORT LOUIS 940

1. PHONED JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SHIMIZU RE TRAVEL PLANS AND LEARNED HE PROPOSES PRESENT LETTERS CREDENCE MAURITIUS ONLY EARLY NOVEMBER. SAYS CANNOT TRAVEL PORT LOUIS SOONER DUE VISIT MADAGASCAR BY JAPANESE TRADE MISSION.

2. SHIMIZU SUBSEQUENTLY CAME TO SEE ME LATER TODAY TO DISCUSS CHIREP WHICH HE HAD ASSUMED, AND I CONFIRMED, WAS BASIS OUR INTEREST TIMING HIS TRAVEL PORT LOUIS. HE READ TO ME FROM TELEGRAM REPORTING MEETING NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 25 BETWEEN US AND JAPANESE DELS IN COURSE OF WHICH US DEL SAID TO HAVE INDICATED MAURITIAN PRIMIN PREPARED SUPPORT DR WHEREAS FONMIN DUVAL OPPOSED. SHIMIZU SAID HE WAS CONFUSED SINCE MAURITIAN OBSERVER ATTENDING
PSD NATIONAL CONGRESS TANANARIVE EARLY SEPTEMBER (BELIEVE IT WAS MIN EDUCATION JOMADAR) HAD TOLD HIM
MAURITIAN CABINET HAD FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY DECIDED VOTE IN FAVOR OUR RESOLUTIONS.
MAURITIAN PRESS HAD ALSO REPORTED LATE SEPTEMBER DUBAL STATEMENT SUPPORTING DR. SHIMIZU SAID HE HAD REPORTED BOTH THESE DEVELOPMENTS TO TOKYO.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TANANA 01528 061508Z

3. SHIMIZU ASKED FOR OUR CURRENT READING MAURITIAN POSITION AND SPECIFICALLY WHETHER WE WERE PESSIMISTIC OVER CHANCES GETTING MAURITIAN VOTE. IN REPLY SAID I WAS UNINFORMED COMPLEXITIES MAURITIAN SCENE THIS SUBJECT THOUGH MAURITIUS CURRENTLY AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES DEPARTMENT COUNTS AS HAVING DECIDED FOR OUR TWO RESOLUTIONS (STATE 180508). I INTERPRETED AMBASSADOR BREWER'S QUERY (REFTEL) RE SHIMIZU TRAVEL PORT LOUIS AS REFLECTING DESIRE ENLIST SHIMIZU SUPPORT HELP US ENSURE MAURITIAN POSITION WELL SHORED UP. TO ENSURE COMFORTABLE ADOPTION OUR RESOLUTIONS OF WHICH WE WERE CONFIDENT WAS ESSENTIAL ENSURE NO BACKSLIDING AMONG DELS NOW COUNTED IN PLUS COLUMN. (DID NOT ALLUDE PARA 1 REFTEL MENTION EVENTUAL GOJ DEMARCHE ON WHICH UNINFORMED).

4. SHIMIZU UNRESPONSIVE SUGGESTION THAT NOTWITHSTANDING IMPORTANCE OTHER OBLIGATIONS TANANARIVE HE CONSIDER ADVANCING DATE PRESENTATION HIS LETTERS PORT LOUIS IN VIEW IMPORTANCE GOJ AND USG ATTACH TO CHIREP. I ASKED WHETHER ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE SEND HIS COUNSELOR SONOYAMA TO PORT LOUIS FOR TALKS WITH MAURITIANS IF AMBASSADOR BREWER THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL. SHIMIZU SAID WOULD THINK OVER.

5. COMMENT: SONOYAMA WHO MAY BE KNOWN TO AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS IS NOT TERRIBLY IMPRESSIVE FIGURE AND ALSO ALMOST UNINTELLI-GIBLE IN WHAT HE DOES TO ENGLISH LANGUAGE. MUST DEFER YOUR JUDGEMENT WHETHER HIS PRESENCE IN ABSENCE SHIMIZU WOULD BE HELP-FUL AND BETTER THAN NOTHING.
EVIDENT SHIMIZU HIMSELF NOT
DISPOSED LEAVE TANANARIVE AT EARLY DATE UNLESS TOKYO
BUILDS FIRE UNDER HIM.
GP-3
MILLER

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CONFIDENTIAL

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 883

PAGE 01 TANANA 01443 091430Z

41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W
---------- 120253

R 091300Z SEP 71
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4088
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 1443

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

REF: STATE 164582

1. IN PAST FEW DAYS PRESIDENT TSIRANANA HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE CHANCE ENCOUNTERS AT CEREMONIAL FUNCTIONS TO SINGLE ME OUT FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION NOW THAT I AM KNOWN TO HIM FROM OUR AUGUST 27 MEETING.

2. WHILE BIDDING FAREWELL TO DIPLOMATIC CORPS AT CONCLUSION PSD CONGRESS OPENING CEREMONY SEPTEMBER 7, TSIRANANA PULLED ME ASIDE, GREETED ME WARMLY, AND SAID, "WE WILL ALWAYS REMAIN FRIENDS". ON MY ARRIVAL AT PRESIDENTIAL LUNCHEON SEPTEMBER 8 FOR KEY DELEGATES TO PSD CONGRESS AND DIPLOMATIC CORPS, TSIRANANA SINGLED ME OUT AND GREETED ME EFFUSIVELY, ONCE MORE CALLING ME HIS "FRIEND". FOLLOWING LUNCHEON HE STOPPED AND ENGAGED ME IN TWO-THREE MINUTE CONVERSATION, AGAIN ADDRESSING ME AS "FRIEND", WHILE MENTIONING EXCELLENT RECOLLECTION HE HAD OF PRESIDENT NIXON. I REPLIED HE TOO IS HELD IN HIGH ESTEEM BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND THAT WE WERE DELIGHTED FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS NOMINATION FOR RE-ELECTION (TANANARIVE 1440), THAT DECADE OF CLOSE RELATIONS WITH MADAGASCAR UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP WOULD CONTINUE IN FUTURE. IN PARTING TSIRANANA ONCE MORE PROFESSED WARM FRIENDSHIP. I REPLIED THAT LOOKED UPON HIM AS FRIEND TOO AND HOPED AS SUCH WE WOULD BE ABLE SPEAK OPENLY AND FRANKLY TO EACH OTHER.

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PAGE 02 TANANA 01443 091430Z

3. SEPTEMBER 8 ENCOUNTERS IN PARTICULAR WERE HIGHLY VISIBLE AND LIKELY CONTRIBUTE EASING OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EMBASSY AND GOMR OFFICIALDOM. GOMR MINISTERS SEEMED GO OUT OF THEIR WAY TO BE CORDIAL. MINISTER DELEGATE FOR INTERIOR JOHASY, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS ALMOST OBSEQUIOUS IN REGRETTING LACK OF RECENT CONTACT AND IN URGING I DROP BY ANYTIME TO TALK ABOUT "ANYTHING".

4. COMMENT: WHATEVER REASONS MAY BE MOTIVATING TSIRANANA, HE APPEARS BEAR NO GRUDGES FROM AUGUST 27 MEETING. CONTRARY TANANARIVE 1431 RECOMMENDATION MAY NOW BE IN OUR INTERESTS NOT ROCK BOAT BY SEEKING SET RECORD STRAIGHT AT THIS TIME.
GP-3
MILLER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 772

PAGE 01 TANANA 01150 081503Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W
---------- 035975

R 081402Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 1150

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

REF: TANANARIVE 1132

AT RECEPTION THIS NOON HAD OCCASION SPEAK WITH MOINE OF PRESIDENCY. HE SAID HAD MET TWICE WITH TSIRANANA SINCE OUR CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL BUT CLAIMED THAT HE HAD NOT RPT NOT INFORMED TSIRANANA OF HIS MEETING WITH ME. SAID THAT HE HAD TRIED TO RAISE QUESTION OF RECENT EVENTS WITH TSIRANANA, BUT HAD FOUND LATTER STILL FIRMLY PREJUDICED AGAINST AMBASSADOR MARSHALL AND FIVE PNG'D EMBOFFS WHOM HE CONVINCED GUILITY OF WRONGDOING. TSIRANANA HAD FURTHER EXPRESSED VIEW US HAD ONLY TO REPLACE AMBASSADOR AND EMBOFFS AND WHOLE BUSINESS WOULD BLOW OVER. MOINE SAID HE HAD TRIED INTEREST TSIRANANA IN DESIRABILITY CHECKING OUT HANDWRITING ON DOCUMENT BUT TSIRANANA SHOWED NO RPT NO INTEREST WHATEVER. GP-3.

MILLER

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SECRET

28

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 769

PAGE 01 TANANA 01140 071519Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /046 W
---------- 026271

P 071435Z JUL 71 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3914

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 1140

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH GOMR; PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

REF: TANANARIVE 1132

1. BELIEVE MOINE'S SUGGESTION LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON IN REPLY TO TSIRANANA'S LETTER IS WELL WORTH EXPLORING IF, INDEED DRAFTING OF SUCH REPLY IS NOT RPT NOT ALREADY UNDERWAY ANYWAY. IF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON WERE COUCHED IN STIFF TERMS, IT MIGHT WELL, AS MOINE BELIEVES, BE ONE THING THAT WOULD FORCE TSIRANANA HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS (AND ALSO APPEAL TO HIS VANITY). SILENCE COULD ALSO BE MISINTERPRETED.

2. LETTER MIGHT CATEGORICALLY DENY SPECIFIC YET VAGUE CHARGE MADE AGAINST AMBASSADOR MARSHALL. NOTE THAT PRESIDENT TSIRANANA CERTAINLY NOT QUESTIONING WORD OR INTEGRITY OF AMERICAN HEAD OF STATE. EXPRESS CONVICTION THAT PRESIDENT TSIRANANA TOO HAS DOUBTLESS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. BUT CIRCUMSTANCES LEAD US NONETHELESS QUESTION WHETHER ALLEGED EVIDENCE IS INDEED FULLY ACCURATE OR HAS BEEN PROPERLY INTERPRETED. MANIFOLD OBLIGATIONS OF HEADS OF STATE INEVITABLY REQUIRE THEM RELY HEAVILY ON ADVISERS AND PERHAPS PRESIDENT TSIRANANA HAS NOT RPT NOT RECEIVED GOOD COUNSEL IN THE MATTER. LETTER MIGHT THEN GO ON TO FLATTER TSIRANANA BY STATING THAT USG, WHICH HAS ENJOYED CLOSEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH TSIRANANA AND HIS GOVERNMENT IN DECADE SINCE INDEPENDENCE, HAS HAD AND CONTINUES HAVE EVERY REASON WISH HIM LONG LIFE SO THAT UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES MAY CONTINUE AND PROSPER IN FUTURE. LETTER MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT USG DESIRE BE CONFRONTED WITH EVIDENCE IS IN NO WAY TO BE INTERPRETED AS LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN TSIRANANA. BUT

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PAGE 02 TANANA 01140 071519Z

SIMPLY REFLECTS BELIEF THAT BETWEEN FRIENDS SERIOUS CHARGES THAT RISK UNDERMINING CLOSE FRIENDSHIP AND TIES SHOULD BE OPENLY DISCUSSED. FAILURE TO DO SO ON GOMR'S PART COULD ONLY BE INTERPRTED AS BETOKENING LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN US AND ITS PRESIDENT, WHICH HARDLY CONDUCIVE TO "NORMAL" FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS.

3. DELIVERY OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD FURTHER AFFORD US OPPORTUNITY TALK DIRECTLY FOR FIRST TIME TO ONLY PERSON WHO HOLDS KEY TO WHOLE PUZZLE, NAMELY, TSIRANANA HIMSELF. AS CHARGE I COULD REQUEST AUDIENCE WITH PRESIDENT OSTENSIBLY SIMPLY TO DELIVER LETTER AND SEIZE OCCASION RAISE SUBJECT RECENT EVENTS WITH HIM, NOTABLY IN LIGHT HIS IMMEDIATE REACTION TO TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON. REALIZE THERE IS RISK INVOLVED

IF TSIRANANA IS SO ERRATIC AND UNPREDICTABLE IN BEHAVIOUR THESE DAYS AS WE HAVE BEEN TOLD, BUT AT LEAST IT MIGHT BE WORTH A TRY. I COULD ALWAYS THROW BACK AT HIM FACT THAT PRESIDENCY AND FOREIGN MINISTER HAVE TOLD ME I ENJOY HIS CONFIDENCE AND THAT HE CAN THEREFORE BE SURE THAT I WILL NOT RPT NOT ABUSE HIS TRUST, ETC., ETC., ETC.
GP-3.
MILLER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

JUN 25 AM 8:35
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL 738

PAGE 01 TANANA 01057 242139Z

87
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
---------- 062310

O P 241648Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3855
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 1057

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

1. ANDREW JAFFE OF NEWSWEEK HAS JUST BRIEFED HASEY AND ME ON INTERVIEW HE HAD THIS AFTERNOON WITH RABEMANAJARA. JAFFE HAD REQUESTED INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENCY, WHICH SHUNTED HIM OFF TO INFORMATION MINISTRY, WHICH REFERRED HIM IN TURN TO FOREIGN MINISTRY, WHERE HE WAS TOLD RABEMANANJARA WOULD RECEIVE HIM.

2. RABEMANANUARA SAID HE AND SEVERAL OTHERS IN GOMR HAD NOW SEEN EVIDENCE WHICH TSIRANANA HAS AND IT DEFINITELY INDICATES EMBASSY INTERFERENCE IN MALAGASY INTERNAL AFFAIRS. RABEMANANUARA SAID WAS DOCUMENT ORIGINATING IN EMBASSY AND WAS IN PLAIN LANGUAGE AND NOT RPT NOT DECODED DOCUMENT. RABEMANANULFA SAID SUCH INTERFERENCE INTOLERABLE AND GOMR MAN THUS BEEN FULLY JUSTIFIED IN ACTIONS IT HAD TAKEN AGAINST EMBASSY. RABEMANANUARA STATED EXPLICITLY THAT FRANCE WAS NOT RPT NOT INVOLVED, AND THAT WAS "PURELY MALAGASY AFFAIR." (COMMENT: THIS PHRASE CROPS UP YET AGAIN. WOULD SUGGEST THAT GOMR OBTAINED INFORMATION THROUGH MALAGASY SOURCES.)

3. RABEMANANUARA SAID AMBASSADOR MARSHALL HAD BEEN HIS "BEST FRIEND." AMBASSADOR WAS DYNAMIC AND PROBABLY KNEW AND UNDERSTOOD MADAGASCAR BETTER THAN DID ANY OTHER AMBASSADOR HERE. PRESIDENT TSIRANANA HAD ALSO THOUGHT OF HIM AS FRIEND TO POINT WHERE HE HAD SENT HIS OWN BROTHER (SAIDIBAJY) TO ACCOMPANY AMBASSADOR ON VISIT TO TSIRANANA'S NATIVE VILLAGE. TSIRANANA WAS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD UNITED STATES, FOR HAD SENT HIS DAUGHTER TO STUDY THERE. WAS THUS DOUBLY DISTRESSING TO GOMR

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

THAT EMBASSY WAS GUILTY OF ACTS OF WHICH TSIRANANA HAD EVIDENCE. (COMMENT: RABEMANANJARA WENT INTO NO RPT NO SPECIFICS WITH JAFFE RE ACTS WITH WHICH EMBASSY CHARGED.)

4. RABEMANANJARA WENT ON TO SAY THAT AMBASSADOR MARSHALL PERSONALLY NOT RPT NOT IMPLICATED IN ACTIONS OF HIS STAFF. BUT AMBASSADOR LIKE A CAPTAIN OF A SHIP MUST TAKE RESPONSIBILITY. IN ACCEPTING AN AMBASSADOR'S LETTERS OF CREDENCE, RECEIVING GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN HIM. GOMR NO RPT NO LONGER HAD THAT CONFIDENCE IN AMBASSADOR MARSHALL AND WAS THEREFORE SUBMITTED TO DECISION THAT HE WILL NOT RPT NOT RETURN. (COMMENT: RABEMANANJARA PRESUMABLY SAID NOTHING TO JAFFE ABOUT AMBASSADOR MARSHALL'S RETURN FOR NORMAL LEAVE-TAKING, AND WE OF COURSE MADE NO RPT NO MENTION OF THIS TO JAFFE.) RABEMANANJARA SAID GOMR HAD SHOWN EVERY CONSIDERATION TOWARD AMBASSADOR MARSHALL IN EFFORT MAKE HIS DEPARTURE AS PAINLESS AS POSSIBLE. WHEN ASKED BY JAFFE ABOUT REPORT DIPLOMATIC CORPS HAD BEEN ASKED BOYCOTT AIRPORT FOR AMBASSADOR'S DEPARTURE, RABEMANANJARA DENIED GOMR HAD EXERTED ANY PRESSURE IN THIS REGARD.

5. JAFFE DEPARTING THIS EVENING FOR NAIROBI. SAID STORY ON MADAGASCAR AND RECENT EVENTS MIGHT BE IN NEWSWEEK JUNE 28 ISSUE.

6. COMMENT: JAFFE'S INFORMATION MUST BE CONSIDERED AS AUTHORITATIVE COMING AS IT DID DIRECTLY FROM RABEMANANJARA. JAFFE READ TO US FROM HIS NOTES TO BE SURE THAT WE MISSED NONE OF FLAVOR OF INTERVIEW OR EXACT WORDS RABEMANANJARA HAD USED. JAFFE HAS BEEN HERE FOR PAST FEW DAYS AND HAS BEEN SEEING SEVERAL PEOPLE (HIS ARRIVAL WAS ANNOUNCED IN MADPRESSE DAILY BULLTIN). HENCE, RABEMANANJARA DOUBTLESS KNEW NEWSWEEK STORY WAS IN WORKS AND CIRCUMSTANCES JAFFE'S GETTING TO SEE RABEMANANJARA STRONGLY SUGGEST LATTER BADLY WANTED SEE HIM. HENCE, RABEMANANJARA'S READINESS TELL AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST NOW IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL WHAT NEITHER GOMR EMISSARIES IN WASHINGTON NOR RABEMANANJARA IN HIS MEETINGS WITH ME PREPARED DIVULGE RAISES SERIOUS QUESTION

WHETHER GOMR CONSIDERS SPECIAL DELEGATION VISIT TO TANANARIVE AS MORE THAN A GESTURE TO ITS EGO AND EMPTY EXERCISE AS FAR AS POSSIBILITY REVERSAL ITS DECISION. IF GOMR GENUINELY

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PAGE 03 TANANA 01057 242139Z

LOOKED TO FORTHCOMING TALKS WITH SPECIAL DELEGATION AS MEANS CLARIFYING AFFAIR AND PERMITTING CLEARING OF US GOOD NAME, HARDLY SEEMS THAT RABEMANANJARA WOULD HAVE SPOKEN AS HE DID TO JAFFE OR EVEN HAVE AGREED RECEIVE HIM.

7. WHILE REGRETTABLE THAT WE MAY NOW HAVE REASON BE DISABUSED WHAT APPEARED HOPEFUL SIGNS OF PAST FEW DAYS, NOW SEEMS THAT UPON ARRIVAL SPECIAL DELEGATION WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH SITUATION WHEREIN GOMR--AND NOW EVEN INCLUDING RABEMANANJARA--COMMITTED TO BELIEVE US GUILT AND HENCE COMMITTED TO GOING AHEAD WITH AMBASSADOR MARSHALL'S RECALL AND DEPARTURE OF OFFICERS WHOSE PNG'ING HAS BEEN SUSPENDED. MOREOVER, IF GOMR HAS WHAT IT BELIEVES TO BE EMBASSY DOCUMENT THAT ITS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES HAVE PRODUCED OR WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO IT BY SOME OTHER COVERT SOURCE, IT MAY BE ALL THE MORE RELUCTANT TO PRODUCE IT THROUGH DESIRE NOT TO RISK EXPOSING SOURCE.

8. SPECIAL DELEGATION SHOULD THUS BE FOREWARNED TO BRING HEAVY AMMUNITION BY WAY OF CONTINGENCY MATERIAL, WHETHER LEVERAGE TO BE USED DURING TALKS HERE OR PICKING-UP-THE-PIECES DECISIONS TO BE ANNOUNCED LATER SHOULD TANANARIVE DISCUSSIONS NOT RPT NOT TURN OUT WAY IN WHICH ALL OF US, UNTIL NOW, HAD BEEN HOPING.

9. FOOTNOTE TO ABOVE IS THAT MID-AFTERNOON TODAY I PHONED RABEMANANJARA'S OFFICE REQUESTING SEE HIM SOON OR DISCUSS WITH HIS CABINET ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPECIAL DELEGATION VISIT, E.G., WHEN MEET ON JUNE 30, WITH WHOM, ETC. MINDFUL OF STATE 112955, I SUGGESTED THAT IN ANY CASE ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHOULD PROBABLY PAY INITIAL "COURTESY" CALL ON RABEMANANJARA IN LATTER'S CAPACITY AS FOREIGN MINISTER. AS OF 1900 HOURS LOCAL TIME, I HAVE NOT RPT NOT RECEIVED RESPONSE FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY.

GP-3
MILLER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 040

PAGE 01 TANANA 01021 220942Z

17
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P 220853Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3828
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PARIS

037885

'71 JUN 22 AM 11:39

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANALIVE 1021

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

REF: TANANARIVE 907

RE PARA 1 REFTEL, UNLESS DEPARTMENT OR AMEMBASSY PARIS PERCEIVE OBJECTION, MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR AMEMBASSY PARIS SEEK OUT MARTY OSTENSIBLY FOR HIS "IMPRESSIONS" AFTER RECENT VISIT MADAGASCAR IN COURSE OF WHICH MIGHT BE POSSIBLE OBTAIN DETAILS OF "IRRZNUTABLE PROOF" DOCUMENT WHICH HE CLAIMS HAVE SEEN. THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ADVANCE PREPARATION US SPECIAL DELEGATION TALKS HERE WITH GOMR AND ALSO PERHAPS ENABLE DELEGATION USE OUR POSSESSION THIS INFORMATION TO HELP FORCE DIVULGATION IF GOMR (TSIRANANA) INITIALLY STILL PROVES RELUCTANT PRODUCE DOCUMENT FOR DELEGATIONS'S PERUSAL.

GP-3.
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CONFIDENTIAL 615

PAGE 01 TANANA 01007 191558Z

52/11
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W
---------- 024137

O P 191035Z JUN 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3814
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 1007

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - (TEXT)

SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH PLANTEY

REF: STATE 109785

DELIVER ACTION OFFICE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

'71 JUN 20 AM 9:39
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1. SUMMARY-- FRENCH AMBASSADOR PLANTEY BELIEVES OR WANTS US BELIEVE SUSPENSION PNG ORDER AND AMBASSADOR MARSHALL'S RETURN DUE HIS DEMARCHES TO GOMR. HE SEEMED COOL TOWARD IDEA US EMISSARY. CLAIMED FRENCH NOT AT ALL BEHIND RECENT EVENTS AND HE IS CONCERNED OVER LOCAL GOSSIP IMPLICATING FRENCH. GAVE NO DETAILS HIS JUNE 17 MEETING WITH TSIRANANA. MAJUNGA DISCUSSION REPORTED SEPARATELY.

2. MET WITH PLANTEY FOR THREE QUATERS OF AN HOUR. HE OPENED BY ASKING FOR OUR LATEST READING OF SITUATION. I UNVEILED PARA 1 REFTEL. THIS PROMPTED HIM STATE THAT ON INSTRUCTIONS BASED ON DEPARTMENT REQUEST TO QUAI D'ORSAY FOR FRENCH ASSISTANCE HE HAD URGED THIS COURSE ON GOMR. SAID RE OUR SECOND OBJECTIVE HE HAD URGED GOMR PERMIT AMBASSADOR MARSHALL RETURN FOR NORMAL LEAVETAKIN "TO SAVE FACE," BUT THIS WAS DELICATE MATTER AND HE WAS NOT RPT NOT YET SURE HE COULD BRING IT OFF. I HAPPILY UNVEILED PARA 2 REFTEL.

3. PLANTEY COUNSELED PRUDENCE IN PRESENT SITUATION, NOT RPT NOT CROWDING GOMR AND PUSHING IT TO MORE RASH ACTION. IN THIS REGARD SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD SOMETHING ABOUT POSSIBLE DISPATCH OF US

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EMISSARY TO TANANARIVE AND HE WAS OF MIXED VIEWS ON WISDOM THIS COURSE. MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT US EMISSARY COMING TO TANANARIVE TO PRESENT EXCUSES. ALSO, RABENORO MISSION TO US WAS KNOWN AND "SINCE GOMR WAS NOT RPT NOT MASTER OF COUNTRY'S PRESS, LEAVING ASIDE MALAGASY-LANAGUAGE PAPERS NO ONE READS" THERE COULD BE UNFORTUNATE PRESS SPECULATIO. (COMMENT: I THOUGHT IT BETTER NOT RPT NOT BRING UP MENTION OF LE COURRIER WHICH IS THE ONLY LARGE CIRCULATION NEWSPAPER, KNOWN TO BE SUBSIDIZED BY FRENCH AND IN WHICH TSIRANANA WIDELY RUMORED TO BE STOCKHOLDER.) ALSO AKFM OPPOSITION WAS NOT RPT NOT FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD US IN THIS MATTER AND HE KNEW THAT RABEMANANJARA AND OTHERS IN GOMR WERE ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE TO AKFM VIEWS THESE DAYS. IN SHORT, QUESTION OF WHETHER TO SEND EMISSARY IS MATTER WHICH WE SHOULD WEIGH VERY CAREFULLY AND HE FELT THAT I AS CHARGE SHOULD BE EXTREMELY CIRCUMSPECT IN WHAT I RECOMMENDED THIS SUBJECT TO WASHINGTON. I THANKED HIM FOR "WISE" COUNSEL, AND IN ABSENCE DIRECT QUESTION DID NOT RPT NOT RPT NOT UNVEIL PARA 3 REFTEL.

4. I COMMENTED TO PLANTEY THAT THERE REMAINED US INTEREST IN CLEARING OUR GOOD NAME. I COULD NOT PREJUDGE EXTENT TO WHICH US MIGHT CHOOSE GO IN PURSUING THIS END. BUT IN THIS REGARD HAD HE HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT CONTENT OF "IRREFUTABLE PROOF" WHICH TSIRANANA APPARENTLY STILL HAD LOCKED UP? PLANTEY REPLIED NEGATIVELY AND THEN SAID WISHES RAISE WITH ME QUESTION OF RUMORS CIRCULATING IN TANANARIVE, SOME OF WHICH APPARENTLY COMING FROM AMERICAN CIRCLES, SUGGESTING THAT FRANCE MIGHT SOMEHOW BE IMPLICATED IN RECENT EVENTS. HE SAID COULD GIVE ME FORMAL ASSURANCE FRANCE HAD ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH IT --"NOUS N'Y SOMMES POUR RIEN." TO BE SURE, " ONE LENDS ONLY TO THE RICH" AND WAS PERHAPS INEVITABLE THAT FRANCE WOULD BE TARGET OF SUCH IDLE GOSSIP. SUCH RUMORMONGERING WAS REGRETTABLE, HOWEVER, AND HE ASKED MY ASSISTANCE IN STOPPING IT. I REPLIED THAT WITHIN EMBASSY MOST TRAFFIC ON RECENT EVENTS HAD BEEN VERY CLOSELY HELD, AND SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES, IGNORANT OF DETAILS HANDLING OF SITUATION IN WHICH EMBASSY AND OUR COUNTRY HAD BEEN VICIOUSLY AND WRONGLY ATTACKED, MIGHT THROUGH IGNORANCE AND FRUSTRATION NATURALLY HAVE INDULGED IN SPECULATION FOR WHICH THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO RPT NOT BASIS IN FACT. MOREOVER, THERE WERE NASA EMPLOYEES AND AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN WHO WERE ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED AND WHOSE GOSSIP WE COULD LIKEWISE NOT RPT NOT CONTROL. HOWEVER, I CONTINUED, WAS CERTAINLY NO RPT NO SECRET TO HIM AND HIS EMBASSY THAT RUMORS OF POSSIBLE FRENCH INVOLVEMENT WERE

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WIDESPREAD IN MALAGASY COMMUNITY AND, AND INDEED, EVEN IN FRENCH COMMUNITY, WHERE MANY BELIEVED US HAD BEEN FRAMED. STATED THAT I DEPLORED IDLE GOSSIP AS MUCH AS HE DID AND WOULD SEE WHAT I COULD DO TO HALT SUCH RUMORS, BUT OUR MEANS WERE OF COURSE QUITE LIMITED. EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR HIS WORDS ON THIS SUBJECT AND FOR HAVING SHARED WITH ME HIS CONCERN, FOR IT REFLECTED DEEP CONCERN WHICH EMBASSY AND WASHINGTON HAD FELT SINCE OUTSET, NAMELY, IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES AND THEIR INTERESTS HERE OF CAVALIER MANNER IN WHICH US HAD BEEN TREATED BY GOMR. IF MALAGASY BECAME INCREASINGLY DISQUIET AT "FOREIGN PRESENCE" IN GENERAL, THIS COULD ONLY BE HARMFUL TO FRENCH INTERESTS AS WELL AS OUR OWN. US CONSIDERED FRENCH PRESENCE AND HEAVY AID BURDEN IN MADAGASCAR AND IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA ESSENTIAL TO POLITICAL STABILITY AND WE MOST ASSUREDLY DID NOT RPT NOT WANT SEE FRENCH POSITION WEAKENED. INDEED, THIS PARTLY EXPLAINED WHY WE HAD BEEN IN SUCH CLOSE CONTACT WITH FRENCH GOVERNMENT IN PARIS, FOR DEVELOPMENTS HERE COULD AFFECT INTERETS BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. IN THIS WHOLE MATTER WAS OF COURSE EVIDENT THAT WHILE US ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO RELATIONS WITH MADAGASCAR, OVER-ALL FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE INFINITELY MORE IMPORTANT ON BROADER LEVEL. PLANTEY GLOWED.

5. PLANTEY ASKED THAT I RESPECT CONFIDENCE OUR DISCUSSION, SPECIFICIALLY VIS-A-VIS RABEMANANJARA. REASON, HE SAID, WAS THAT GOMR WOULD LOSE FACE IF LEARNED I WAS AWARE GOMR HAD NOT RPT NOT TAKEN DECISIONS ON ITS OWN BUT AFTER PRESSURE HE HAD BROUGHT TO BEAR.

6. DISCUSSION RE MAJUNGA PROJECT REPORTED SEPTEL.

7. COMMENT: PLANTEY SEEMS BELIEVE OR WISHES US BELIEVE THAT SUSPENSION PNG ORDER AS WELL AS AMBASSADOR MARSHALL'S RETURN WAS MAINLY RESULT HIS DEMARCHES. HE SEEMS DISPOSE DO NOTHING MORE ON OUR BEHALF, FEELING THAT "PRUDENCE" IS ALSO HIS OWN BEST COURSE. AT NO RPT NO TIME DID HE REFER TO HIS MEETING WITH TSIRANANA JUNE 17 AND WHAT MAY HAVE TRANSPIRED BETWEEN THEM CONCERNING RECENT EVENTS. IN VIEW PLANTEY'S SILENCE THIS MATTER, I CHOSE NOT RPT NOT PRESS HIM.

GP-3.
MILLER

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'71 JUN 19 PM 3:50

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

022173

PAGE 01 TANANA 01003 190747Z

10
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

O P 190740Z JUN 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3813
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 1003

EXDIS

SUBJ: US-MALAGASY RELATIONS

REF: STATE 109629

DELIVER ACTION OFFICE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

1. COMMUNICATED COMPOSITION DELEGATION TO RABEMANANJARA.

2. HE AGREED PRESENCE OF DELEGATION OVER JUNE 26 WEEKEND WOULD BE AWKWARD AND ARRIVAL DELEGATION JUNE 29 THEREFORE ACCEPTABLE.

3. SAID DID NOT RPT NOT KNOW WHETHER TSIRANANA WOULD RECEIVE DELEGATION SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON DID NOT RPT NOT RECEIVE RAB NORO.

GP-4.

MILLER

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SECRET 147

PAGE 01 TANANA 01000 182039Z

81
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

O R 181710Z JUN 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3810
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 1000

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

1. IF IN ELABORATION CONTINGENCY INSTRUCTIONS FOR SPECIAL DELEGATION BEING SENT HERE DEPARTMENT CONTINUES GIVE THOUGHT EVENTUALLY INVOKING GOOD OFFICES OF THIRD PARTY (PARA 10 STATE 104632), I WONDER HOW ACCEPTABLE SOMEONE LIKE MOBUTU WOULD BE TO GOMR. KNOWING ANTIPATHY AND FEELING OF SUPERIORITY OF MANY AFRO-ASIAN MALAGASY VIS-A-VIS BLACK AFRICANS, SUSPECT THAT GOMR MIGHT BE HESITANT AGREE INVITE IN BLACK AFRICAN TO HELP SOLVE MALAGASY PROBLEM. GOMR POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT ALSO MAKE MANY BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS THEMSELVES BIT RULUCTANT INTERVENE IN MALAGASY AFFAIR EVEN ON OUR BEHALF. LATTER PROBLEM WOULD NOT RPT NOT ARISE, HOWEVER, WITH BLACK AFRICAN LEADER WHO, MOREOVER, IS EXCEPTIONALLY CLOSE TO TSIRANANA, NAMELY, HOUPHOUET.

2. DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE REASON NOT RPT NOT SOLICIT HOUPHOET INTERVENTION IN CONTINGENCY ENVISAGED OR HAVE REASON BELIEVE HE WOULD
NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, WORK ON HIM THROUGH INTERMEDIARY AND, IN ANY CASE, THIS ROUTE MIGHT COMMEND ITSELF ANYWAY AS MEANS KEEPING PRESSURE ON GOMR. AMERICAN INTERESTS ENJOYING IMMENSE INFLUENCE WITH HOUPHOUET AND HAVING HIS FULL CONFIDENCE ARE GENERAL FOODS, WHICH ANNUALLY BUYS UPWARDS OF THIRTY PERCENT IVORIAN COFFEE CROP AND WHOSE RECOMMENDATIONS TO HOUPHOUET IN EARLY SIXTIES ALU CREDITED WITH HAVING SPARKED GROWTH OF IVORIAN COFFEE ECONOMY TO POINT WHERE COUNTRY IS NOW WORLD'S THIRD PRODUCER.

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3. ROBBINS OF BROWN BROTHERS HARRIMAN AND FORMERLY OF GENEL FOODS WHERE HE RETAINS CONTACTS AND INFLUENCE IS ON VERY CLOSE LERMS WITH HOUPHOUET. ROBBINS WAS ALSO HERE RECENTLY AND IN AMBASSADOR MARSHALL'S ABSENCE I ATTENDED DINNER IN ROBBINS' HONGD GIVEN BY WIFE OF RABEMANANJARA IN ABSENCE OF LATTER WHOM ROBBINS DESCRIBED AS OLD FRIEND. ROBBINS ALSO SAW TSIRANANA AND DISCUSSED COFFEE AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL QUESTIONS. IF CONTACTED BY AMBASSADOR MARSHALL, ROBINS (AS WELL AS OTTERBEIN, IF LATTER STILL CHIEF COFFEE BUYER FOR GENERAL FOODS) MIGHT BE WILLING SEND MBFSAGE TO HOUPHOUET ASKING LATTER INTERVENE WITH HIS GOOD FRIEND TQSIRANANA TO PREVENT DETERIORATION MALAGASY RELATIONS WITH US THBT GENERAL FOODS WOULD NOT WISH SEE RISK JEOPARDIZING ITS COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH MADAGASCAR AND, AND IF US GOOD NAME NOT CLEARED, WHICH COULD TARTSH US IMAGE ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. ROBBINS MIIWT ALSO SEND SEPARATE MESSAGES ALONG SAME LINES TO TSIRANANA AND RABEMANAJARA.

4. OCHSENBEIN, SWISS CHARGE, TELLS ME THAT GOMR OFFICIAL WITH WHOM HE SPOKE RECENTLY EXPRESSED FEAR AKIN TO HORROR THAT US IN RETALIATION MIGHT CEASE PURCHASE OF MALAGASY VANILLA. PERHAPS DEPARTMENT COULD PREVAIL ON LARGE VANILLA IMPORTER TO FIRE OFF CABLE TO GOMR EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND WHAT THEY COULD PORTEND FOR US-MALAGASY RELATIONS. CABLE NEED ONLY BE VERY BLAND AND NOT RPT NOT COMMIT VANILLA IMPORTERS TO ANYTHING, BUT IF EVEN MERE UBERY OF THIS SORT STRIKES GOMR IN SENSITIVE SPOT IT WILL HAVE SERVED PURPOSE IN KEEPING PRESSURE ON GOMR AND FUTHER UNNERVE THOSE WITHIN GOMR FEARFUL OF IMPLICATIONS FAILURE PROMPTLY RESTORE BASIS FOR GOOD RELATIONS. IN PRESENT MOOD GOMR MORE LIKELY REACT TO FACT THEY CAN'T SEEL THAT MUCH VANILLA TO ANYONE ELSE IF WE DIDN'T BUY THAN TO FACT WE COULDN'T BUY THAT MUCH VANILLA ANYWHERE ELSE IF WE STOPPED PURCHASES HERE.

5. RECENT EVENTS HAVE CAUSED MUCH BEWILDERMENT AND SOUL-SEARCHING IN MALAGASY CIRCLES AND MALAISE HAS CARRIED OVER INTO FRENCH COMMUNITY. LOCAL ECONOMIC CIRCLES HAVING TIES WITH US HAVE GROUNDS FEEL UNEASY, INCLUDING FRENCH-CONTROLLED MALAGASY INDUSTRY SUCH AS GRAPHITE, MICA AND SUGAR NOTWITHSTANDING RECENT SUGAR QUOTA INCREASE WHICH, THESE CIRCLES MIGHT CORRECTLY REASON, US CAN ALWAYS REDUCE).

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

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PAGE 03 TANANA 01000 182039Z

EVEN WITH SOMEWHAT MORE FAVORABLE OUTLOOK RESULTING FROM GOMR READINESS INVITE US DELEGATION HERE, WE WOULD BE WISE IN VIEW LOCAL SITUATION CONTINUE DISCREETLY EXERT PRESSURE ON GOMRTO AWAKEN IT TO FULL REALIZATION OF WHAT IT MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO CONSIDER FULL RANGE OF POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS ITS RECENT ACTIONS. CONTINUATION SUCH PRESSURE WILL ALSO MAXIMIZE CHANCES FOR THOSE WHO MAY PREACH REASON WITHIN GOMR TO BE HEARD WHEN TSIRANANA WILL LISTEN TO REASON.

GP-4.

MILLER

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SECRET 809

PAGE 01 TANANA 00999 181731Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

016915

O 181635Z JUN 71 ZFF
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3819
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 0999

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH GOMR
REF: TANANARIVE 0989

1. JUST CALLED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY AND INFORMED BY RABEMANANJARA THAT TSIRANANA AGREES SUSPEND DEPARTURE EMBOFFS PENDING ARRIVAL US DELEGATION BUT LATTER MUST RPT MUST COME SOON. RABEMANANJARA REPEATEDLY STRESSED NEED FOR HASTE.

2. TSIRANANA ALSO AGREEABLE AMBASSADOR MARSHALL RETURN TANANARIVE FOR NORMAL LEAVETAKING, PROVIDED HE RETURNS ONLY AFTER JULY 4. RABEMANANJARA SAID GOMR DESIRES AMBASSADOR MARSHALL NOT RPT NOT BE PRESENT HOST ANY OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS ON OCCASION US INDEPENDENCE DAY. RABEMANANJARA SAID THAT INSOFAR AS GOMR CONCERNED AMBASSADOR MARSHALL REMAINS RECALLED BUT WISHES ENABLE HIM SAVE FACE BY RETURNING TANANARIVE AFTER "CONSULTATIONS". I SAID THAT NORMAL LEAVETAKING WOULD ENTAIL FAREWELL CALLS AND PERHAPS RECEPTION TO WHICH GOMR MINISTERS WOULD BE INVITED AND I WOULD ASSUME THAT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WE COULD EXPECT THEY WOULD COMPLY RABEMANANAJARA REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. I ASKED WHETHER RABEMANANJARA AND OTHER MINISTERS INVITED WOULD ATTEND ANY JULY 4 CELEBRATION USA'S CHARGE WOULD HOST. HE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY.

3. I ASKED WHAT DURATION GOMR MIGHT ENVISAGE FOR PERIOD OF NORMAL LEAVETAKING. RABEMANAN SAID THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED

WHEN US DELEGATION WAS HERE.

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4. RABEMANANJARA REPEATED THAT AMBASSADOR MARSHALL INNOCENT OF ANY WRONGDOING IN THIS AFFAIR. I REPLIED THAT NOT RPT NOT ONLY WAS THIS TRUE OF AMBASSADOR BUT OF FIVE EMBOFFS; UNFORTUNATELY WE NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN TOLD WHAT WRONGDOING ANYONE WAS EVEN SUSPECTED OF.

5. RABEMANANAJARA WAS IN POSSESSION TELEGRAMS FROM AMBASSADOR RAZAFIMBAHINY RE VISAS ISSUED SULLIVAN AND STEVENS AND HE ASKED WHETHER THESE OFFICERS CONSTITUTED THE US DELEGATION. I REASSURED HIMAND SAID HAD ASKED DEPARTMENT INFORM ME OR RAZAFIMBAHINY SOONEST ETA AND COMPOSITION DELEGATION.

GP-4.

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PAGE 01 TANANA 00989 180825Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
---------- 012282

O P 180753Z JUN 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3802
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 0989

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

REF: STATE 108818

DELIVER ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

1. CALLED ON RABEMANANJARA AT 0945 HOURS AND CONVEYED REFTEL POSITION. HE IS SEEING TSIRANANA LATER IN MORNING AND WILL INFORM ME OF LATTER'S DECISION. RABEMANANJARA SAID THAT HE HIMSELF IS FAVORABLY DISPOSED AND WILL SO RECOMMEND TO TSIRANANA.

2. RABEMANANJARA SAID, HOWEVER, THAT TSIRANANA MUST BE GIVEN NO RPT NO CAUSE BELIEVE THAT OUR REQUEST FOR POSTPONEMENT DEPARTURE IS MERE DELAYING ACTION. HENCE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT OUR DELEGATION ARRIVE SOONEST. I REITERATED FROM REFTEL INSTRUCTION THAT PREPARATIONS TO SEND DELEGATION ALREADY UNDERWAY AND I HAD STRESSED TO DEPARTMENT GOMR DESIRE DELEGATION ARRIVE "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE".

3. RABEMANANJARA SAID HAD RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR RAZAFIMBAHINY REPORTING DEMARCHE SIMILAR TO ABOVE MADE TO HIM BY COHEN(AFC).

4. RECOMMEND I BE PROVIDED SOONEST(OR DEPARTMENT PROVIDE RAZAFIMBAHINY) WITH COMPOSITION DELEGATION AND EARLIEST ETA, SUBJECT CAVEAT GOMR CONFIRMATION POSTPONEMENT FIVE EMBOFFS' DEPARTURE,

SO THAT CAN BE CONVEYED TO RABEMANANAJARA AND HE CAN USE TO PERSUADE TSIRANANA IF THIS NECESSARY.
GRAS. MILLER

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W
---------- 004471

Z O 171327Z JUN 71 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3800
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 0984

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

'71 JUN 17 PM 8:12

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. JUST SUMMONED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY AND INFORMED BY BEZAZA, DIRECTOR GENERAL, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS RABEMANANJARA THAT GOMR ACCEPTS US OFFER SEND MISSION TANANARIVE COMPARABLE RABENORO MISSION IN ORDER PURSUE DISCUSSIONS. MISSION SHOULD ARRIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE."

2. INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BEZAZA HAD MADE NO RPT NO MENTION POSTPONEMENT DEPARTURE OF FIVE EMBOFFS. I INFORMED HIM OF UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON'S REQUEST IN THIS REGARD TO RABENORO AND SAID THAT WE MUST HAVE ANSWER. SUCH POSTPONEMENT SHOULD BE ALL THE MORE RADILY FORTHCOMING NOW THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAD SHOWN CLEAR INTEREST RESOLVING THEIR DIFFERENCES IN SPIRIT OF FRIENDLY UNDERSTANDING. BEZAZA UNDERTOOK CONTACT RABEMANANJARA URGENTLY AT MY PRESSING REQUEST. WILL REPORT RESPONSE FLASH.
GP-4.
MILLER

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

O P 120935Z JUN 71 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3760
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'71 JUN 12 PM 12:58
098474

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TANANARIVE 0936/1

EXDIS

SUBJ: ANALYSIS OF RECENT EVENTS

DELIVER ACTION OFFICER DEPARTMENT OPENING OF BUSINESS

1. OUR ANALYSIS OF RECENT EVENTS AND POSSIBLE MOTIVIATION OF TSIRANANA, VIEWED FROM PERSPECTIVE WHICH LAST FEW DAYS HAS GIVEN US, MAY BE USEFUL TO DEPARTMENT IN ITS DETERMINATION OF FUTURE TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO GOMR ACTIONS. ADMITTEDLY FOLLOWING IS HIGHLY CONJECTURAL BUT IT DOES LEAD TO AND COULD SUPPORT SOME INTERESTING CONCLUSIONS.

2. THOSE FEW KNOWLEDGEABLE DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES WITH WHOM I HAVE HAD CHANCE TO TALK AGREE THAT ACCUSATIONS AGAINST US ARE SO PATENTLY CONTRIVED AND ABSURD THAT EXPLANATION RECENT EVENTS MORE LIKELY BE FOUND IN WEB OF MALAGASY INTERNAL POLITICS THAN IN SINCERE THOUGH MISGUIDED REACTION BY GOMR TO APPARENT DISCOVERY OF INTERFERENCE BY A FOREIGN POWER. THIS WOULD BEAR OUT MOREAU'S STATEMENT (TANANARIVE 916) THAT IS PURELY MALAGASY AFFAIR, "HANDLED AMONG MALAGASY AND AMONG MALAGASY ALONE." WE ARE PROBABLY VICTIM OR USEFUL ACCESSORY IN FINAL CHAPTER TSIRANANA IS WRITING ON RESAMPA, FOR RESAMPA'S "PLOT" AND OUR "INTERFERENCE" SEEM TO BE INEXTRICABLY LINKED THUS FAR. CLUE TO WHY TSIRANANA MOVED AGAINST US MAY THEREFORE BE FOUND IN REASON WHY HE CHOSE TO MAKE HIS MOVE AGAINST RESAMPA NOW AND HOW SERIOUSLY HE MAY HAVE WEIGHED THREAT WHICH HE HAD TO COUNTERACT. I NOW SUSPECT THAT WHAT TRIGGERED WHAT MAY BE TISRANANA'S OWN "PLOT" AGAINST RESAMPA WAS INCIDENT FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF WHICH REGRETTABLY PASSED UNNOTICED BY US AND MOST OTHER OBSERVERS AT THE TIME. IT WAS ELECTION OF PSD GROUP LEADER IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

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EARLY MAY.

3. NDRIVA(NOW UNDER ARREST WITH RESAMPA) WON RE-ELECTION BY ONE VOTE. BUT HE WON OUT OVER CANDIDATE NOW KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN BACKED BY TSIRANANA(JAKOBA, VICE PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND SINCE APPOINTED MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE). APPRECIATION TSIRANANA'S LIKELY REACTION TO THIS DEFEAT MUST BE SITUATED AGAINST BACKGROUND EARLIER STEPS TSIRANANA HADTAKEN AGAINST RESAMPA TO STRIP LATTER OF MUCH OF HIS POWER BASE. FOLLOWING HIS DEMOTION AT TIME OF CABINET SHAKE-UP LAST FEBRUARY, RESAMPA ASSUMED MEEK AND CONTRITE PUBLIC IMAGE, PROFESSING COMPLETE ALLEGIANCE TO TSIRANANA AND NOTABLY ENDORSING TSIRANANA'SREELECTION AS SOLE CANDIDATE. YET THERE WERE SOME SIGNS THAT TSIRANANA WAS STILL WATCHING RESAMPA CAREFULLY AND, INDEED, WAS QUIETLY STILL TRYING TO FERRET OUT INFORMATION DAMAGING TO RESAMPA, E.G., THE "GUN SMUGGLING" AT MORANDAVA, POSSIBLE AGM PAY-OFFS TO RESAMPA OR HIS ASSOCIATES.

4. RUMORS ALSO PERSISTED THAT TSIRANANA MIGHT TRY TO OUST RESAMPA FROM THE POST OF PSD SECRETARY GENERAL(SYG), AND THIS ADMIST THE NAUSEATING CAMPAIGN OF OBVIOUSLY INSPIRED PAP THAT WAS WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN PRESS AND RADIO AS THE BOONDOCKS EXPRESSED FULLY AND UNWAVERING SUPPORT FOR TSIRANANA AND FOR HIS RE-ELECTION AS SOLE CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. IN EARLY APRIL TELEGRAMS(ALSO DOUBTLESS INSPIRED) BEGAN TO COME IN URGING CHANGE OF PSD EXECUTIVE BUREAU AND ALSO SYG. AT APRIL 16 MEETING PSD STEERING COMMITEE WHICH PRESS PUBLICIZED, RESAMPA DISMISSED THESE TELEGRAMS AS MANEUVERS FROM OUTSIDE PSD(TANANARIVE 570). HE ALSO SAID ON THAT OCCASION, WHICH WE DID NOT RPT NOT BOTHER REPORTING BY CABLE BECAUSE WE THOUGHT IT SELF-EVIDENT, THAT EXECUTIVE BUREAU AND SYG COULD BE DESIGNATED AND REPLACED ONLY BY NATIONAL CONGRESS. ONE CAN IMAGINE TSIRANANA'S REACTION TO THIS VEILED PUBLIC WARNING BY RESAMPA THAT HE WAS NOT PRT NOT ABOUT TO LET HIMSELF BE EASED QUIETLY OUT OF SYG POST(SOLE REMAINING POWER BASE ON WHICH HIS POLITICAL FUTURE DEPENDED) AND MIGHT FIGHT BACK AT NATIONAL CONGRESS. TSIRANANA PROBABLY HAD STRONGER WORD THAN INSUBORDINATION TO DESCRIBE RESAMPA'S THUS GOING AGAINST PRESIDENT'S EVIDENT WILL.

5. EVER-NAGGING SUSPICISIONS OF TSIRANANA AGAINST RESAMPA CERTAINLY CONFIRMED BY FIGHT OVER ELECTION PSD GROUP LEADER IN ASSEMBLY IN EARLY MAY. INDEED. ONE CAN IMAGINE TSIRANANA'S LIKELY CONSTERNATION AND RAGE THAT RESAMPA WOULD THUS AGAIN DARE OPENLY OPPOSE HIS WILL AND, WHAT WAS WORSE, BEST HIM. TSIRANANA COULD HAVE SEEN

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A PATTERN(""PLOT"?)
DEVELOPING IN RESAMPA'SRESISTANCE TO HIM. AND WHAT IT MAY HAVE MEANT
TO TSIRANANAWAS THAT IF RESAMPA WAS THUS ABLE MUSTER MAJORITY
AGAINST HIM(TSIRANANA) IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, HE COULD PERHAPS MUSTER
MAJORITY AT PSD NATIONAL CONGRESS IN SEPTEMBER AND WIN
RE-ELECTION AS SYG. AND TO TSIRANANA, WHO SEEMS INTENT ON ELIMINATING
ALL OPPOSITION TO HIS RULE AND TO RE-ELECTION ASPRESIDENT, THIS MAY
HAVE RAISED SPECTER OF POSSIBIILITY THAT RESAMPA MIGHT EVEN TRY AND
PERHAPS SUCCEED FIND MAJORITY AT PSD NATIONAL CONGRESS TO DESIGNATE
HIM(RESAMPA) SOLE CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT IN PLACE OF TSIRANANA. UN-
LIKELY THOUGH WE MAY CONSIDER THIS EVENTUALITY, IT MAY HAVE BEEN
VERY REAL FEAR TO TSIRANANA WHO HAS, AFTER ALL, SHOWN HIMSELF ONLY
TOO PRONE IN PAST TO SEE CONSPIRACY AND PLOTTING WHERE NONE APPEARED
TO EXIST. VICTORY BY RESAMPA FACTION IN PSD GROUP LEADER ELECTION
MAY THUS HAVE BROUGHT TSIRANANA TO RECOGNIZE THAT PAST ACTIONS
HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN ENOUGH TO CUT RESAMPA'S POWER BASE AND THERE
WAS CLEAR NEED NOW TO ELIMINATE HIM AS A REAL THREAT TO THE POL-
TICAL DOMINATION TO WHICH TSIRANANA CLEARLY ASPIRED. AND SO
TSIRANANA MAY HAVE REASONED THAT TIME HAD COME TO DEAL WITH
RESAMPA ONCE AND FOR ALL, TO DISCREDIT HIM ENTIRELY, AND TO REMOVE
HIM--DEFINITIVELY--FROM POLITICAL SCENE. FROM WHAT WE KNOW
OF TSIRANANA IT IS ALSO SAFE TO ASSUME THAT FOR HIM THIS BECAME AN
OBSESSION, A FIXATION TO WHICH ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS BECAME
SECONDARY. OTHER MALAGASY WITH POLITICAL AXE TO GRIND AGAINST
RESAMPA MAY HAVE FUTHER INFLUENCED TSIRANANA.
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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W
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O P 120935Z JUN 71 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3761
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TANANARIVE 0936/2

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6. ON MAY 26 TSIRANANA SUDDENLY DISSOLVED THE PSD EXECUTIVE BUREAU, THOUGH FOR HE PUBLIC APPEARANCES WERE SAVED BY THE BUREAU'S COLLECTIVE "RESIGNATION." IT LITTLE MATTERED THAT THEDEMISE OF THE EXECUTIVE BUREAU AND ITS REQUEST TO TSIRANANA TO EXERCISE THE BUREAU'S FUNCTIONS IN THEINTERIM WERE NOT QUITE LEGAL. (TSIRANANA HAS SHOWN LITTLE REGARD FOR LEGALITY IN HIS HANDLING OF THE RESAMPA "PLOT", FOR NO SPECIFIC CHARGES WERE ANNOUNCED OR LODGED AGAINST RESAMPA TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OTHER THAN "TREASON" AND IT HAS STILL NOT RPT NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED EVEN WHAT RESAMPA WAS PURPORTEDLY PLOTTING TO DO. NDRIVA WAS ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED WITHOUT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BEING SEIZED WITH EVIDENCE ON WHICH TO LIFT HIS PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY, THE EXPLANATION BEING THAT HE WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANT DELIT BUT IT HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN INDICATED JUST WHAT THE FLAGRANT DELIT WAS.) AS OF DAY FOLLOWING "RESIGNATION" OF EXECUTIVE BUREA, AND PERHAPS BEFORE, DATE WAS FIXED FOR TSIRANANA'S MEETING JUNE 2 WITH PSD MEMBERS NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND SENATE(AT WHICH HE WAVED IRREFUTABLE PROOF" AND ALSO ANNOUNCED RESAMPA'S ARREST). WE SUPPOSE JUNE 2 MEETING HAD BEEN SCHEDULED BRIEF PARLIAMENTARIANS ON PSD REORGANIZATION, AND ITMAY BE READING TOO MUCH INTO SITUATION TO SUGGEST THAT NEXT AND FINAL MOVE AGAINST RESAMPA ALREADY PLOTTED AS OF THEN.

7. THERE IS SOME UNCERTAINTY WHETHER RESAMPA REMAINED IN OFFICE AS SYG FOLLOWING EXECUTIVE BUREAU "RESIGNATION," THOUGH IT IS TO BE ASSUMED THAT, LEGALLY AT LEAST, HE DID. WE CANNOT SAY WHETHER TSIRANANA'S DEMANTIA CAUSED HIM TO SEE RESAMPA "PLOT WHERE NONE EXIST ED OR INDEED WHETHER FRAME-UP OF RESAMPA WAS CAREFULLY DEVISED. WE ALSO DO NOT RPT NOT KNOW WHETHER IMPLICATION

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OF US WAS CONSCIOUS DECISION OR WHETHER RESULTED FROM CHANGE EMOTIONAL OUTBURST, TOUCHED OFF BY "GET RESAMPA" FIXATION, WHEN TSIRANANA MAY , FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE SEEN CROSSING HIS DESK ANTI-AMERICAN DATA THAT IN OTHER, CALMER CIRCUMSTANCES HE MIGHT HAVE READ AND PASSED ON. LATTER SURMISE WOULD PARTLY EXPLAIN WHY FRENCH HAD CAUSE TO WORRY THAT SITUATION HAD "GOT OUT OF HAND" IF THEY HAD PLAYED A ROLE OF FEEDING TSIRANANA INFO AIMED ONLY AT PREVENTING HIM BECOMING TOO PRO-AMERICAN: PERHAPS THEY DID NOT RPT NOT ACCURATELY GAUGE DEPTH OF TSIRANANA'S"GET RESAMPA" MOOD. ONE COULD ALSO SPECULATE, HOWEVER, THAT TSIRANANA CONSCIOUSLY ACTED TO IMPLICATE US SINCE WE MIGHT MOST CONVENIENTLY SERVE AS SCAPEGOAT IN SUPPORT HISOVERRIDING POLITICAL OBJECTIVE. LINKING RESAMPA, A SOCIALIST FATHER TO LEFT THAN TSIRANANA, WITH "IMPERIALIST, CAPITALIST" US WOULD, TSIRANANA MAY HAVE CALCULATED, SO SULLY RESAMPA WHO WOULD THUS BE REVEALED AS TWO-FACED ASTO LOSE HIM HIS SUPPORT FROM THE LEFT WITHIN PSD AND FROM THOSE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS KNOWN TO BE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS RESAMPA. IT IS NAIVE REASONING BUT IT IS A POSSIBILTY.

8. IF FOREGOING ANALYSIS IS PLAUSIBLE IN MAIN LINES, WOULD SEEM SUPPORT FOLLOWING TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS:
A) GOMR ACTIONS AGAINST US AND OUR RESPONSE THERETO CANNOT BE DISSOCIATED FROM RESAMPA AFFAIR.

B) TSIRANANA'S OBSESSION WITH "GETTING" RESAMPA MAY MAKE HIM PLACE RELATIVELY LITTLE VALUE ON STATE OF GOMR RELATIONS WITH US IF US CAN SERVE AS CONVENIENT SCAPEGOAT FOR HIM. MOREOVER, HE SEEMS TO ASSUME ANYWAY WE WILL SIMPLY NAME ANOTHER AMBASSADOR, REPLACE PNG'D EMBOFFS, AND AFFAIR WILL BLOW OVER. THIS IN FACT CONFIRMED BY RABENORO STATEMENTS(STATE 103560).

C) HE PROBABLY LITTLE CARES WHETHER OR NOT HE ACTED ON VALID "PROOF" IF IT SERVED HIS PURPOSES IN "GETTING " RESAMPA. HIS GOAL SERVED BY PUBLIC CITATION OF PROOF'S "EXISTENCE" AND NOT RPT NOT BY ITS PUBLIC--OR PRIVATE--REVELATION. IF PROOF WERE SHOWN TO BE INVALID, HIS CASE AGAINST RESAMPA COULD WELL COLLAPSE. HE CANNOT AFFORD THIS AND SO THEREFORE PROBABLY CANNOT AFFORD PRODUCE "PROOF." CONCENTRATION OF OUR EFFORTS ON SEEING"PROOF" AND CHECKING IT VERACITY MAY THUS FALL ON DEAF EAR.

D) TSIRANANA HIMSELF HAS NO PRT NO INTEREST IN LETTING USG CLEAR ITS GOOD NAME; HE WANTS ONLY TO SULLY RESAMPA'S.

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E) TSIRANANA MAY THUS BE IMPERVIOUS TO ANY EFFORTS TO HAVE HIM PULL BACK UNLESS THEY CAN BE CONTRIVED IN MANNERAND TAKE FORM NOT RPT NOT WEAKENING OR COMPLETELY UNDERMINING HIS CASE AGAINST RESAMPA. FRENCH TOO MAY REALIZE, HOWEVER, IF THEY ARE ALERT TO SAME IMPLICATIONS, THAT IF US IS NOT RPT NOT TO BE SCAPEGOAT IN RESAMPA AFFAIR THEN SOMEONE ELSE MAY HAVE TO BE, AND THEY WILL NOT RPT NOT WANT TO RISK BEING THE PATSY.

F) FOREGOING ANALAYSIS WOULD ALSO CLEAR UP MYSTERY OF WHY AMBASSADOR MARSHALL TREATED IN SUCH CAVALIER FASHION BY GOMR, I.E., "PLOT" HAD TO BREAK PUBLICLY WITHOUT AMBASSADOR FIRST BEINGCALLED IN, CONFRONTING "EVIDENCE" SUPPORTING SPECIFIC CHARGES AGAINST HIM OR OTHERS IN EMBASSY, AND GIVEN OPPORTUNITY RESPOND, FOR IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES "EVIDENCE" MIGHT NOT RPT NOT (CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT IN OUR VIEW) HAVE STOOD UP AND WHOLE "PLOT" TO DESTROY RESAMPA WOULD HAVE FIZZLED.

9. IFABOVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS VALID. WE HAVE REASON BE PESSIMISTIC OVER CHANCES THAT TSIRANANA WILL RESPOND FAVORABLY TO DEPARTMENT'SREQUEST GOMR PRODUCE "PROOF" THAT OUR EXPERT CAN EXAMINE. WE HOPE WE'RE WRONG.

PM VAS CONCURS.
GP-4.
MILLER

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O 101125Z JUN 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3744

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 0916

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH FRENCH ADVISERS

REF: STATE 101780

1. MOREAU REFUSED TO SEE ME. SAID THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WAS "NEITHER IN YOUR INTERESTS NOR MINE" THAT WE MEET TO DISCUSS MATTERS FUTHER AT THIS TIME. SAID THAT HE WAS NOT RPT NOT UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT RPT NOT TO RECEIVE ME BUT THERE WAS REALLY NOTHING HE COULD SAY TO ME. SAID THAT LIMITATION OF CONTACTS IN THIS WAY WAS PERSONALLY DISTASTEFUL TO HIM BUT HE HAD NO RPT NO ALTERNATIVE. MEETING BETWEEN US AT THIS TIME COULD BE WRONGLY INTERPRETED. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE THOSE (DOUBTLESS REFERRING TO HIMSELF AND OTHER FRENCH ADVISERS IN PRESIDENCY) WHO HAD DONE WHAT THEY COULD TO LIMIT EXTREMES OF GOMR ACTION, FOR MALAGASY (READ TSIRANANA) SOMETIMES SAYS THINGS IN HEAT OF CONVERSATION WHICH CAN BE TONED DOWN WHEN REDUCED TO WRITTEN WORD OR FINAL ACTION. (COMMENT: THIS REMARK SOMEWHAT INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT HE SAID LATER, REPORTED PARA 2 BELOW.)

2. MOREAU INDICATED THERE WAS VERY LITTLE HE COULD DO ANYWAY IN WHAT WAS PURELY MALAGASY AFFAIR. HIS EXCACT WORDS: "WE ARE KEEPING VERY DISTANT FROM THESE MATTERS WHICH GO FAR BEYOND ROLE OF FOREIGN ADVISER AND WHICH ARE BEING HANDLED AMONG MALAGASY AND AMONG MALAGASY ONLY. BOTH CASTELBON AND I ARE KEPT ENTIRELY OUTSIDE OF THESE MATTERS AND WE DON'T TRY TO LEARN WHAT IS GOING ON. THERE WILL COME A TIME WHEN THE SITUATION BECOMES CLEARER (SE DECANTENT) AND OUR ARGUMENTS CAN BE HEARD..." HE THOUGHT THAT SITUATION MIGHT HAVE ENVOLVED BY TIME OF HIS RETURN FROM PARIS TEN DAYS HENCE

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AND WE COULD PERHAPS MEET THEN.

3. I EXPRESSED REGRET AT HEARING THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE SUCH RIGIDITY IN GOMR POSITION, FOR I HAD HOPED THAT THROUGH DISPASSIONATE REVIEW OF SITUATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO LIMIT DAMAGE. I STATED THAT HIS INABILITY TO RECEIVE ME LEFT US LITTLE RECOURSE LOCALLY FOR OUR DIPLOMACY SINCE HE, RABEMANANJARA AND TSIRANANA WOULD ALL BE AWAY FROM TANANARIVE. MOREAU REMARKED THAT THERE WAS ALWAYS RAHARIJAONA AT FOREIGN MINISTRY AND HE HAD "LEVEL HEAD" ON HIS SHOULDERS.

4. COMMENT: WHILE MOREAU IS CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT COMING CLEAN WITH US, IN LIGHT HIS ATTITUDE I AM EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC WE WILL BE ABLE GAIN HEARING--IF WE WILL THEN BE LISTENED TO-IN TIME AVERT PNG'ING OF EMBOFFS PRIOR THEIR SCHEDULED DEPARTURE. SEEMS TO ME THAT ONLY HOPE NOW IS THROUGH WHATEVER PRESSURE WE CAN BRING TO BEAR VIA TSIRANANA'S EMISSARIES BEING RECEIVED IN DEPARTMENT TODAY AND
OUR ABILITY BRRING FRENCH IN PARIS TO INTERVENE FORCEFULLY WITH GOMR. EVIDENT FROM TANANARIVE 913 THAT WE DO NOT RPT NOT AT PRESENT HAVE FORCEFUL CHAMPION FOR OUR CAUSE IN AMBASSADOR PLANTEY AND I WONDER HOW PERSUASIVE HE WOULD CHOOSE OR BE ABLE TO BE OR HOW CLOSELY HE WOULD BE LISTENED TO BY TSIRANANA EVEN IF HE HAD MOST STRONGLY WORDED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS SUPERIORS IN PARIS. HAS THOUGHT BEEN GIVEN TO URGING FRENCH TO SEND SPECIAL EMISSARY TO TANANARIVE TO SPREAD OIL QUICKLY ON TROUBLED WATERS?

NEW FACTOR BEARING ON SITUATION AS MAY AFFECT FRENCH BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.

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O P 091820Z JUN 71 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3741
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TANANARIVE 0913/1

SUBJ: MEETING WITH PLANTEY

REF: STATE 100907

1. ONE-HOUR MEETING WITH PLANTEY WAS STRONG ON ATMOSPHERICS BUT WEAK ON SUBSTANCE. IN FACT, IT WAS MAGNIFICIENT SNOW JOB. NO SOONER WAS I SEATED THAN PLANTEY IN VERY FAMILIAR, CHATTY FASHION(BUT WITHOUT LOOKING ME OFTEN IN THE EYE) PROCEEDED NON-STOP TO DESCRIBE HIS ROLE OR RATHER NON-ROLE IN RECENT EVENTS.
I FOUND WHOLE PERFORMANCE AN EXTREMELY DEFENSIVE ONE. AT CENTER OF HIS PREOCCUPATIONS SEEMS TO BE FUTURE OF NWJUNGA PROJECT.

2. AT OUTSET PLANTEY SAID THAT HE HAD FIRST LEARNED OF AFFAIR WHEN MEMBER OF HIS STAFF HAD GIVEN HIM BRIEF REPORT AFTERNOON MAY 31 OF TSIRANANA'S SPEECH EARLIER IN DAY AND HE HIMSELF HAD THEN LISTENED TO EVENING NEWS BROADCAST. HE AND OTHERS IN FRENCH EMBASSY HAD IMMEDIATELY BEGUN TO SPECULATE WHICH EMBASSY TSIRANANA MIGHT HAVE IN MIND, NOTING "WITH RELIEF" THAT FRENCH EMBASSY HAD SEEMED RULED OUT BY TSIRANANA HIMSELF. THEIR IMMEDIATE SUSPICIONS HAD BEEN DIRECTED AT GERMAN EMBASSY BECAUSE OF KNOWN CLOSE GERMAN CONTACTS WITH PSD ELEMENTS. PLANTEY CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN INCENSED AT PUBLIC ATTACK ON AN EMBASSY WHICH TSIRANANA HAD NOT RPT NOT NAMED, BUT SAID THAT HE AS DEAN OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS HAD DONE NOTHING JUNE 1 SINCE NONE OF OTHER MEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS HAD APPROACHED HIM ON THIS SUBJECT. WHEN

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SEEING RABEMANANJARA ON ANOTHER MATTER IN COMPANY OF GERMAN AMBASSADOR RAMELOW ON JUNE 2, PLANTEY HAD PROPOSED REMAIN BEHIND TO RAISE MATTER OF "AFFAIR" WITH RABEMANANJARA, BUT RAMELOW HAD SOUGHT DISCOURAGE HIM ON GROUNDS WAS NONE OF THEIR BUSINESS. PLANTEY SAID THAT HAD STAYED TO RAISE MATTER WITH RABEMANANJARA NONETHELESS AND HE DESCRIBED TO ME TALK WITH RABEMANANJARA AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. SINCE RABEMANANJARA HAD THUS POLITIELY TOLD HIM "BILATERAL AFFAIR" WITH US WAS NONE OF DEAN'S BUSINESS, HE HAD THEN SPOKEN FURTHER IN HIS CAPACITY AS FRENCH AMBASSADOR. PLANTEY TOLD ME HE HAD NOT RPT NOT PASSED ON TO OTHER MEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS(STRANGELY ENOUGH) SECOND PART OF HIS TALK WITH RABEMANAJARA, WHEN HE HAD LECTURED LATTER THAT GOMR HAD ACTED GROSSLY IN MANNER CONTRARY TO ALL TRADITIONAL RULES OF POLITE DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURE. HE HAD SAID COULD UNDERSTAND IF GOMR WANTED TO MAKE OF THIS AN "INDIVIDUAL" MATTER AGAINST AMBASSADOR MARSHALL, BUT HAD SAID HE DID NOT RPT NOT FEEL THAT GOMR HAD ACTED PROPERLY IN DOING SO IN PUBLIC FASHION. RABEMANAJJARA HAD REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO CHOICE IN MATTER AND HAD TO DO TSIRANANA'SBIDDING. (COMMENT: PLANTEY SAID NOTHING ABOUT HIS SUBSEQUENT EFFORT RAISE MATTER WITH TSIRANANA.)

3. PLANTEY SAID THAT UPON ARRIVING AT ITALIAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION AT NOON JUNE 2 HE WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT RUMORS WERE ALREADY RAMPANT THAT US WAS EMBASSY INVOLVED AND HE THEREUPON FELT COMPELLED CONFIDE IN CERTAIN OF HIS DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES WHAT RABEMANANJARA HAD JUST TOLD HIM ABOUT US. (I POINTED OUT THAT US HAD ALREADY BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THAT MORNING'S HEADLINES, BUT THIS DID NOT INTERRUPT PLANTEY'S TRAIN OF THOUGHT.) PLANTEY ADDED THAT AT HIS OWN RECEPTION EVENING JUNE 2 RAHARIJAONA HAD INFORMED HIM(AS REPORTED TANANARIVE 0540) THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AMBASSADOR MARSHALL MIGHT BE RETURNING AFTER CONSULTATION. THIS WAS SAID IN PRESENCE OF NUMBER OF OTHER AMBASSADORS. I RECALLED THAT WHEN SO INFORMED BY FRENCH EMBOFF WHO HAD CALLED UPON ME ON PLANTEY'S BEHALF I HAD STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT GOMR POSITION AS CONVEYED BY RABEMANANJARA TO AMBASSADOR MARSHALL WHOSE RECALL HAD BEEN REQUESTED. I HAD ASKED THIS POINT TO BE CONVEYD EXPRESSLY TO PLANTEY. I ALSO NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT FRENCH EMBOFF HAD NOT RPT NOT INFORMED ME THAT PLANTEY HAD BRIEFED DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON HIS TALK WITH RABEMANANJARA, AND I HAD HAD TO LEARN THIS ONLY DAY OR SO AGO FROM ANOTHER COLLEAGUE IN DIPLOMATIC CORPS. PLANTEY SAID NOTHING.

4. PLANTEY SAID HE HAD BEEN SUMONED BACK TO PARIS FOR CONSULTATIONS

CONCERNING THIS AFFAIR BUT HAD THOUGHT IT BEST TO DOWNPLAY PUBLICLY REASON FOR HIS DEPARTURES. (COMMENT: QUESTION IS WHY HE HAD TO DOWNPLAY IT WITH US. NEITHER HE NOR HIS EMBOFF EMISSARY HAD SAID ANYTHING TO US ABOUT REASON HIS PARIS TRIP.) IN PARIS HE WAS TOLD THAT WHILE AFFAIR DID NOT RPT NOT CONCERN FRANCE, IT WAS BEGINNING TO MAKE A LOT OF NOISE AND SO HE HAD BEEN RECALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS TO MAKE ON-THE-SPOT REPORT AND ASSESSMENT. HE SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED THAT HE KNEW VERY LITTLE OF THE WHOLE BUSINESS ESPECIALLY SINCE HE HAD NOT RPT NOT HAD A CHANCE TO MEET WITH AMBASSADOR MARSHALL BEFORE LATTER'S DEPARTURE, THOUGH OF COURSE HE DID HAVE THOSE ELEMENTS WHICH FRENCH EMBOFF HAD BEEN ABLE PROVIDE HIM AFTER LATTER'S MEETINGS WITH ME. MAIN PREOCCUPATION DURING HIS CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS HAD BEEN MAJUNGA LIVESTOCK PROJECT. PROJECT HAD BEEN PAINFULLY PUT TOGETHER, DUE IN NO SMALL PART TO AMBASSADOR MARSHALL'S EFFORTS, HE ADMITTED, AND THERE SEEMED NO OTHER GROUP WHICH WOULD CARRY ON PROJECT. HE HAD BEEN OBLIGED TAKE CARE OF POWERFUL FRENCH COMPETITOR (SOMDIAA), WHICH HAD VERY INFLUENTIAL CONNECTIONS, BY SEEING THAT THEY GOT SOMETHING ELSE (PRESUMABLY LAC AOTRA PROJECT).
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INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

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HE UNDERSTOOD THAT DIAMOND A HAD COME INTO PROJECT NOTABLY THROUGH AMBASSADOR MARSHALL'S PERSONAL CONNECTIONS WITH ANDERSON. IF PROJECT NOW FELL THROUGH, FRENCH WOULD BE CONFRONTED WITH VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION SINCE BOURGES HAD GIVEN FIRM COMMITMENT TO TSIRANANA THAT FRENCH WOULD FINANCE ABATTOIR AND INDEED BIDS HAD ALREADY BEEN SOLICITED. SAID THAT PARIS MIGHT BE QUERYING WASHINGTON ON FUTURE OF MAJUNGA PROJECT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT IN MEANTIME HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF I COULD ASCERTAIN WHERE PROJECT NOW STOOD IN LIGHT RECENT EVENTS. I REFRAINED FROM COMMENT AND SAID WOULD FORWARD HIS REQUEST TO WASHINGTON.

5. PLANTES THEN SAID HAT HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS TO SEE WHAT HE COULD NOW DOD WITH GOMR TO HELP CALM THINGS DOWN. HE ASKED ME TO TREAT THIS FACT IN CONFIDENCE AND NOT RPT NOT REPORT IT TO WASHINGTTN SINCE HE UNDERSTOOD THAT PARIS WOULD BE CONTACTING WASHINGTON ON THIS MATTER AND IT WAS BEST TO LET THESE EVENTS RUN T HEIR COURS. I MENTIONED CASUALLY THAT I THOUGHT THERE AD ALREADY SEEN SOME CONTACT THIS SUBJECT BETWEEN PARIS AND WASHINGTON, BUT HE APPEARED NOT TO HEAR ME FOR AGAIN LATER HE ASKED THAT I RESPECT THE CONFIDENCE OF "HIS INSTRUCTIONS." HE CONFESSED THAT FRANKLY HIS TASK WAS DIFFICULT AND HE DID NOT RPT NOT REALLY KNOW HOW TO PROCEED. HE SAW LITTLE THAT COULD BE DONE WITH TSIRANANA AND RABEMANANJARA BOTH OUT OF TOWN, AND HE CLJCMED TO HAVE BEEN SURPRISED ON HIS RETURN TO LEARN THAT RABEMANANJARA WOULD BE AWAY SO LONG. THERE WAS ALSO PROBLEM OF DEALING WITH TSIRANANA IN LATTER'S PRESENT "NERVOUS, IRRATIONAL"

STATE. PLANTEY THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT
EAIN#TO MAKE THE
POINT THAT GOMR HAD NOT RPT NOT ACTED PROPERLY THROUGH FAILURE
RESPECT TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATIC NORMS. HE ALSO FELT THAT A PERSUASIVE
ARGUEMENT MIGHT BE TO POINT OUT TO RABEMANANJARA THAT ONLY MALAGASY
OPPOSITION COULD GAIN THROUGH ANY GOMR ATTACK ON "THE WEST"
IN VIEW OF GOMR'SHITHERTO FIRM ANTI-COMMUNIST, PRO-WESTERN STANCE.
PLANTEY THEN SOLEMNLY ASKED ME NOT RPT NOT TO USE THIS ARGUEMENT
IN ANY CONVERSATIONS I MIGHT HAVE WITH THE GOMR SO AS TO SAVE A
STRONG POINT FOR HIS OWN PRESENTATION. I POINTED OUT THAT UNFORT-
UNATELY THE ARGUMENT CUT BOTH WAYS, SINCE FOR GOMR TO ATTACK "THE
WEST " WOULD UNDERCUT OPPOSITION TACTICS WHICH HAD LONG CASTIGATED
THE GOMR FOR ITS PRO-WEST AND ANTI-COMMUNIST POLICY.

6. OTHER POINTS RAISED:

A) WHEN IN PASSING I MENTIONED PNGING OF EMBOFFS, PLANTEY
CLAIMED NOT RPT NOT TO BE WELL INFOREMD SINCE THIS HAD OCCURRED
AFTER HIS DEPARTURE.(I FILLED HIM IN ON CIRCUMSTANCES, LEST
HE CLAIM SUBSEQUENTLY NOT TO HAVE REALIZED SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION
DUE TO PRESS REPORTS INDICATING EMBOFFS WERE LEAVING ONLY "ON
CONSULTATION.")

B) IN COURSE DISCUSSION OF AFFAIRS POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP TO
MALAGASY DOMESTIC POLICIES, SUBJECT ON WHICH PLANTEY HAD BEEN
PONTIFICATING, I MENTIONED ABSURDITY OF US BEING LINKED IN PLOT WITH
RESAMPA. RESAMPA'S ULTRA-SOCIALIST, PRO EASTERN PROPENSITIES WERE
CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT THOSE WHICH
SQUARED WELL WITH USG POLITICAL PHILOSPHY AND HE WAS THEREFORE
HARDLY MAN WE WOULD BACK. WE HAD IMPRESSION THAT THIS SELF-
EVIDENT TRUTH WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZED IN MALAGASY
AND OTHER CIRCLES. OBSERVERS AND PUBLIC IN GENERAL COULD NOT RPT
NOT FAIL RALIZE WHOLE AFFAIR HAD BEEN RECKLESSLY CONTRIVED AND
WHOEVER HAD PROMPTED TSIRANANA TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST US ON SUCH
SHAKY GROUNDS AS PARTICIPATION IN RESAMPA PLOT HAD BEEN
MOST ILL-ADVISED. I EXPRESSED ALL THE MORE SURPRISE THAT TSIRANANA
HAD MADE SPEECH WHICH HE DID MAY 31 AND THEN MOVED AGAINST AMBASSADOR
MARSHALL WHEN TSIRANANA HAD BEEN QUITE SOCIABLE IN CHAT
WITH AMBASSADOR MARSHALL ON MAY 29. AT THIS POINT PLANTEY
WHIPPED OUT AND CONSULTED LITTLE BLACK BOOK, NOTING AMBASSADOR
MARSHALL HAD INDEED BEEN OBSERVED TALKING FOR 15 OR SO MINUTES
WITH TSIRANANA ON THAT DATE AND MANY HAD WONDERED WHAT SUBJECT

COULD HAVE BEEN.

C) I MENTIONED THAT GOMR HAD AS YETCONFRONTED US WITH NO RPT NO SPECIFIC CHARGES OR ANY EVIDENCE OF PROOF BUT(ASSUMING PLANTEY ALREADY KNEW VIA PARIS) GOMR EMISSARIES WOULD BE MEETING WITH DEPARTMENT TOMORROW. PLANTEY SEEMED SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS.

D) DURING PERIOD OF POLITE-CHIT-CHAT PRIOR DEPARTURE, I CITED WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL OTHER PROJECTS,EG, AGM, ADDITIONAL RAILWAY LOAN, IN WHICH GOMR SELF-INTEREST DICTATED COURSE DIFERENT FROM THAT WHICH THEY HAD TAKEN. I INDICATED THAT US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN MADAGASCAR WERE, AS HE KNEW, RELATIVELY MODEST ANDTHAT WASHINGTON'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO WORK CLOSELY HERE WITH FRENCH, AS ON MAJUNGA PROJECT FOR EXAMPLE, IN RECOGNITION HEAVY FRENCH AID EFFORT AND ASSISTANCE TO MALAGASY ECONOMY.

7. MEETING ENEDED WITH EXPRESSIONS OF FATHERLY COUTSEL AND SYMPATHY FROM PLANTEY,EG,"YOURTASK HERE NOW IS NOT AN EASY ONE," ETC)
.

8. COMMENT: AT NO RPT NO TIME DID PLANTEY ASK WHAT WE MIGHT WISH HIM TO DO ON OUR BEHALF OR WHAT ARGUMENTS WE MIGHT PROVIDE HIS TO STRENGTHEN HIS CASE IN SEEKING TO SMOOTH OVER AFFAIR. RESPECTING PARA 4 REFTEL INSTRUCTIONS, I ASKED HIM FOR NOTHING AND TOLD HIM NOTHING OF OUR POSITION.

GP-3.
MILLER

NOTE BY OCT: TANANARIVE 913/2 - #AS RECEIVED;
CORRECTION UPON REQUEST.

CONFIDENTIAL

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 246

PAGE 01 TANANA 00852 031820Z

50
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

Z 031654Z JUN 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3690

S E C R E T TANANARIVE 0852

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

REF: TANANARIVE 851

1. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT POLICY DECISION NOW CONFRONTING USG IS (A) CHOICE BETWEEN INITIATING OR PRECIPITATING FULL BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ON GROUNDS UNFRIENDLY, ARBITRARY AND COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED CHARGES AND ACTIONS ON PART OF GOMR WHICH MAKES CONTINUATION ANY MEANINGFUL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IMPOSSIBLE, OR (B) TO GO ALONG WITH TSIRANANA REQUEST BUT SCALE DOWN (AND KEEP IT THAT WAY) OUR MISSION HERE TO LITTLE MORE THAN WAVE-THE-FLAG PRESENCE WITH ALL THAT THIS IMPLIES, E.G., COMPLETE SHUTDOWN OF CULTURAL CENTER, TOTAL EMBASSY STAFF CONSISTING OF ONLY ONE OR TWO OFFICERS PLUS NECESSARY SUPPORT STAFF. UNDER LATTER CIRCUMSTANCES I ALSO BELIEVE THAT OF OUR OWN VOLITION DATT AIRCRAFT SHOULD GO AND DATT BE REDUCED TO ONEOFFICER. PRESUMABLY DATT PRESENCE ACCEPTABLE SINCE HE NOT ON TSIRANANA'S LIST.

2. TSIRANANA SEEMS TO EXPECT THAT WE WOULD, AS HE HAS REQUESTED, SIMPLY REPLACE ALL OFFICER HE HAS SAID MUST GO. IF THERE IS NO RPT NO BREAK IN RELATIONS AND WE CONTINUE DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE HERE, IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WE SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT ACCOMMODATE TSIRANANA BY SENDING OUT NEW OFFICERS (WHOM HE MIGHT AT SOME LATER DATE ARBITRARILY ASK TO LEAVE IN TURN?) BUT CUT BACK TO THE BONE. DECISION AS TO SIZE OUR DIPLOMATIC STAFF IS OURS ALONE TO DETERMINE IN LIGHT OF WHAT WE CONSIDER NECESSARY FOR WORKLOAD (AND IN ABSENCE ANY LIMITATION ON SIZE OF MISSION BY HOST GOVERNMENT) AND THIS IS MATTER ON WHICH

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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PAGE 02 TANANA 00852 031820Z

TSIRANANA CLEARLY CANNOT DICATE TO US.

3. SITUATION HAS PROBABLY MOVED BEYOND POINT WHERE THREATS, IF WE NOW WISHED TO INDULGE IN THEM, WOULD BE LIKELY TO SAVE SITUATION, AND INDEED THREATS MIGHT FUTHER INFLAME TSIRANANA, IF THAT IS POSSIBLE. WE MUST LEAVE TO DIAMOND A AND MORGANS GROUP(AGM) DECISIONS AS TO WHAT THEY NOW PREPARED DO ON BASIS THEIR OWN COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS, BUT I DO FEEL, AND MOST STRONGLY, THAT USG PARTICIPATION IN FINANCING OF MAJUNGA PROJECT THROUGH AID LOAN IS--OR SHOULD BE--SO MUCH OUT OF QUESTION AT THIS JUNCTURE THAT IT WOULD BE CALLOUS OF US NOT RPT NOT TO SO TELL ANDERSON AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. THIS WILL MEAN COLLAPSE OF MAJUNGA PROJECT AT LEAST INSOFAR AS US PARTICIPATION CONCERNED. BUT NOT RPTNOT ONLY WOULD I CONSIDER IT REPREHENSIBLE ON OUR PART TO LEAVE THIS FINANCING OFFER OPEN AFTER WE HAVEBEEN KICKED IN TEETH IN THIS FASHION BY TSIRANANA, BUT PERHAPS EVIDENCE THAT HIS ACTIONS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN TORPEDOING--HOPEFULLY ONLY TEMPORARILY IF WE CAN RESTORE RELATIONSTO SEMBLANCE OF NORMALCY--PROJECT SUPPOSEDLY DEAR TO HIS HEART WILL PERHAPS AWAKEN HIM TO REALITY BY DISABUSING HIM OF ASTONISHING NOTION THAT ACTIONS AGAINST EMBASSY WILL HAVE NO RPT NO IMPACT ON US-MALAGASY ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

4. IF WE WERE TO OPT FOR SMALL WAVE-THE-FLAG STAFF ANDALL THAT THIS IMPLIES, I ALSO FEEL THAT CONTINUATION NASA PRESENCE IN MADAGASCAR SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED AND THOUGHT BE GIVEN TO POSSIBLE PHASE-OUT TRACKING STATION HERE IN FAVOR EXPANDED ACTIVITIES STATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. HOWEVER, I REALIZE THAT THIS DECISION WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY OVERRIDING TECHMICAL REQUIREMENTS, NOT TO SPEAK OF OTHER POLITICAL OVERTONES RE SOUTH AFRICA. IF SUCH RECONSIDERATION WERE TO SUPPORT PULL-OUT, WE WOULD OF COURSE THEN HAVE TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY, FOR AT PRESENT JUNCTURE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION MUST BE TO PROTECT OUR $14 MILLION NASA PLANT INVESTMENT HERE.

GP-3.
MARSHALL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

JUN 3 AM 9:20

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PAGE 01 TANANA 00829 030201Z

81
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

O R 022245Z JUN 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3675
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 0829

EXDIS

REF: TANANARIVE 828

1. I AM MOST APPRECIATIVE OF PROMPT AND STRONG SUPPORT WHICH DEPARTMENT AND IN PARTICULAR UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON HAVE SHOWN. HOWEVER, APPEARS TO ME THAT PROBLEM POSED BY GOMR CHARGES HAS ONE ASPECT THAT IS NOT ADEQUATELY DEALT WITH BY SIMPLY DENYING--AND RIGHTLY SO--BASIS OF GOMR ALLEGATION OUR INTERFERENCE IN MALAGASY INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND FAILURES THUS FAR PRODUCE SPECIFIC EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING THESE CHARGES OR MY RECALL. FACT IS THAT ISSUE HAS BEEN GIVEN DIMENSION BY TSIRANANA FROM OUTSET THAT FAR TRANSCENDS ROLE THIS PARTICULAR EMBASSY OR THIS PARTICULAR AMBASSADOR. TSIRANANA HAS ALSO AIMED HIS ATTACKS AT UNITED STATES ITSELF, LABELLING US AS "IMPERIALIST" (ADJECTIVE WITH WELL-USED CONNOTATIONS AND GENERALLY NOT APPLIED TO US BY FRIENDLY COUNTRIES), CHARGING THAT WE SEEK ONLY TO DIVIDE MADAGASCAR, THAT WE HAVE DONE NOTHING TO HELP MALAGASY DEVELOPMENT, AND NOW THAT WE HAVE BEEN GUILTY OF PLOTTING WITH REHAMPA (TANANARIVE 810 AND 822). TO BE SURE WE HAVE NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED YET PUBLICLY BY TSIRANANG, BUT RUMORS IDENTIFYING US AS THE FOREIGN POWER TO WHICH TSIRANANA ALLUDED TO ARE NOW RAMPANT.

2. NOTIFICATION TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR PLANTEY JODAY (REFTEL), IF SUCH NOTIFICATION NEEDED, THAT US IS GUILTY POWER MEANS THAT THROUGH INDIRECT ROUTE OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION FROM GOMR WILL NOW BE BRUITED THROUGHOUT DIPLOMATIC CORPS, CERTAINLY THROUGHOUT FRENCH COMMUNITY AND ELSEWHERE AMONG LOCAL PUBLIC OPINION, AND INEVITABLY SOON FIND ITS WAY TO WIRE SERVICES AND FOREIGN PRESS. IN SHORT, AS FAR AS I PERSONALLY AM CONCERNED, AND CERTAINLY AS FAR AS CONCERNS THOSE IN EMBASSY WHO MUST LIVE WITH THIS PROBLEM AFTER MY

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DEPARTURE, CAT IS OUT OF BAG.

3. I MIGHT NOTE, INCIDENTALLY, THAT I HAD HAD APPOINTMENT CALL ON TSIRANANA AT 1100 HOURS JUNE 2 WHICH PROTOCOL AT PRESIDENCY HAD NOTIFIED US OF LATE AFTERNOON MAY 28. I HAD SOUGHT MOVE UP APPOINTMENT IN ORDER NOT INTERFERE WITH PLANNED TRIRSTO NOSSI-BE JUNE 2 FOR SHIP VISIT, BUT WE WERE INFORMED TIME HAD BEEN FIXED BY TSIRANANA HIMSELF AND COULD NOT BE CHANGED. AFTER MY INQUIRY YESTERDAY TO RABEMANANJARA WHETHER TODAY'S APPOINTMENT WITH TSIRANANA STILL STOOD, WE WERE ADVISED BY PRESIDENCY ONE HOUR BEFOREHAND THAT APPOINTMENT CANCELLED. I HAD ASSUMED THAT APPOINTMENT WAS ONE I HAD REQUESTED TO PRESENT TSIRANANA WITH, OF ALL THINGS, SAMOAN GRAMMAR IN WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED INTEREST. MIGHT NOTE THAT AS OF MAY 29 AM RABEMANANJARA SUMMONED BACK URGENTLY FROM PARIS TO BE INFORMED BY TSIRANANA OF MY RECALL. FUNNY TIMING.

4. CHARGES THAT TSIRANANA TRUMPETS PUBLICLY FROM ROOFTOPS ARE QUITE A DIFFERENT THING FROM WHAT RABEMANANJARA MAY TELL ME IN PRIVACY HIS OFFICE. AS I HAVE REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, EVERYTHING LEADS ME TO SUSPECT RWEEMANANJARA IS SIMPLE MESSENGER FOR TSIRANANA ON THIS MATTER AND HAS NO POWER OF DECISION HIMSELF AND THUS FAR HAS BEEN POWERLESS TO INFLUENCE TSIRANANA'S DECISION. IT IS PUBLIC CHARGES MADE BY TSIRANANA, AND IDENTITY OF FOREIGN POWER NOW ALMOST OPENLY CONFIRMED, THAT IT DAMAGING TO OUR INTERESTS AND IMAGE, NOT ONLY HERE IN MADAGASCAR BUT DOUBTLESS IN AFRICA AND IN REST OF WORLD. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER TSIRANANA WILL EVER PRODUCE PUBLICLY EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS RECKLESS CHARGES, WHICH IN MEANTIME HE IS KEEPING ALIVE (TANANQRIVE 822). AND SO LONG AS WE DO NOT REFUTE THESE CHARGES, EVEN THROUGH INDIRECT MEDIUM, WE LOOK GUILTY.

5. IT IS IN ABOVE CONTEXT THAT I REITERATE POSSIBLE DESIRABILITY SUGGESTED PARA 4 TANANARIVE 818 OF MEETING WITH PRESS AT AIRPORT JUST PRIOR MY DEPARTURE. SEEMS TO ME THAT IF GOMR WISHES THAT I DEPART QUICKLY ON ONE-WAY "CONSULTATION": (NUANCE WHICH RABEMANANJARA IN SPLITTING OF SPLIT HAIR PREFERS NOT CALL PNG'ING), THERE'S NO BARGAIN INVOLVED TO EXTENT THAT I AM COMMITTED GO ALONG ENTIRELY LITH THIS FICTION IF NEWSPAPER REPORTERS JUST HAPPEN TO BUMP INTO ME ON WAY TO PLANE OR JUST HAPPEN TO ASK ME QUESTIONS. WHILE I WOULD NOT RPT NOT PROPOSE ADMIT TO THEM THAT I AM BEING RECALLED, IN ORDER THUS PRESERVE FICTION OF "CONSULTATION," I WOULD BE PREPARED REACT ENERGETICALLY TO INEVITABLE QUESTION WHETHER THIS EMBASSY

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MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTERFERING IN MALAGASY INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR PLOTTING WITH RESAMPA. MIGHT ALSO REMARK THAT QUESTIONABLE WHETHER USG COULD BE SINGLED OUT FOR ATTACK IN VIEW MANNER IN WHICH "FOREIGN POWER" WAS PUBLICLY DESCRIBED. US, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS GIVEN AID TO MADAGASCAR FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ADDITIONAL PROJECTS NOW PENDING. WOULD THEREFORE HOPE THAT DEPARTMENT WOULD AUTHORIZE ME LATITUDE SPEAK TO PRESS IN ABOVE VEIN IF I CONSIDER THIS WOULD BE USEFUL IN CONTEXT THEN PREVAILING SITUATION. IDEA OF PRESS COMMUNIQUE ABANDONED. I ALSO SUGGEST DEPARTMENT IN TURN GIVE THOUGHT TO MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER OF REACTION TO HARDLY FRIENDLY MANNER IN WHICH TSIRANANA HAS PUBLICLY REFERRED TO OUR COUNTRY. MERCURIAL OR NOT, HE DESERVES SOME KIND OF REBUTTAL.

MARSHALL
GP-3

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CONFIDENTIAL 442

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41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
014391

O 021510Z JUN 71 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3674
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 0828

EXDIS

REF: (A) STATE 95787, (B) STATE 95996

1. PRESENTED NOTE TO RABEMANANJARA CONTAINING SUBSTANCE REF A AND CONTENTS (QUOTED) PARAS 2 AND 3 REF B. AT 1600 TODAY. AFTER HE HAD READ NOTE I ADDED MY COMMENTS INDICATING I PERSONALLY BELIEVED THE GOMR (I DID NOT SAY PRESIDENT, PURPOSELY) WAS MAKING A GREAT MISTAKE. I REFERRED TO THE MORNING COURRIER (TANANARIVE 0822) SAYING IT WAS NOT TRUE THAT THE USG WOULD SUPPORT RESAMPA IN AN ALLEGED COUP. IF THIS INDEED WAS WHAT TSIRANANA BELIEVED WE HAD DONE. REBAMENANJARA SAID HE QUESTIONED TISRANANA WHEN LATTER CHARGED HIM TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST ME, POINTING OUT SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS MATTER COULD HAVE INTERNATIONALLY. HOWEVER, RABEMANANJARA STATED HE WAS ONLY CARRYING OUT ORDERS OF HIS BOSS.

2. RABEMANANJARA REPEATED THAT SITUATION NEITHER MEANT BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS NOR SHOULD IT ALTER IN ANY WAY GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN USG AND GOMR. THIS WAS WHY, HE POINTED OUT, I WAS NOT BEING PNGED BUT ASKED TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON CONSULTATION, AND REMAIN AWAY PERMANENTLY. I STATED THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION IF SITUATION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN PRIVATE FROM THE START, BUT JUST WAS NOT POSSIBLE NOW IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS. RABEMANANJARA STATED PRESIDENT HAD NOT NAMED USG PUBLICLY. I POINTED OUT THIS WAS ILLOGICAL THINKING AS PEOPLE HAD ALREADY PUT TSIRANANA'S STATEMENTS TOGETHER WITH GROWING KNOWLEDGE OF FACT I LEAVING WITH INEVITABLE CONCLUSION. I STATED I WAS STICKING TO STORY OF RETURN ON CONSULTATION BUT THAT AS I WAS PACKING MY BELONGINGS

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AND CLEARING OUT MY OFFICE. MY DEPARTURE ON MORE THAN TEMPORARY BASIS WAS EVIDENT.

3. I FELT IT INCUMBENT TO POINT OUT THAT IF PRESIDENT TSIRANANA HAD PROOF AGAINST A MEMBER OF US EMBASSY AND IF PROOF TURNED OUT TO BE TRUE, A NORMAL ACTION WAS TO REQUEST THE RECALL OF INDIVIDUAL. RABEMANANJARA REPLIED THAT TSIRANANA WAS HOLDING ME RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTIONS OF ALL EMBASSY MEMBERS, THUS HIS DECISION.

4. I TOLD RABEMANANJARA I HAD GONE OVER ALL POSSIBILITIES OF MISINTERPRETATION OF EMBASSY ACTIONS IN DISCUSSION WITH MY STAFF AND HAD COME TO CONCLUSION THERE WAS NO POSSIBLE EMBASSY CONNECTION OF ANY SORT INVOLVING US ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MADAGASCAR. I VENTURED ON TO SAY THAT IF INDEED THERE WERE NO PROOF OR IF THE PROOF PROVED TO BE INVALID, THEN THE GOMR WOULD OF COURSE BE EXPOSING ITSELF TO SEVERE COUNTER-REACTION FROM USG.

5. RABEMANANJARA REPEATED HE IN FULLY SYMPATHY WITH ME, NOT ONLY AS FRIEND BUT REGARDING ME AS OUTSTANDING MEMBER DIPLOMATIC CORPS REP IN TANANARIVE AND FIRST US AMBASSADOR WHO REALLY TOOK AN INTEREST IN THE ECONOMY OF MADAGASCAR (ALWAYS NICE TO GET COMPLIMENTS AT A TIME LIKE THIS). HE INDICATED ACTION WAS NOT BEING TAKEN AGAINST ME PERSONALLY BUT BECAUSE OF SOMEONE IN MY EMBASSY. I ASKED WHETHER HE KNEW WHO IT WAS. NO.

6. RABEMANANJARA SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONTACT PRESIDENT WITH NOTE BUT ANTICIPATED NO CHANGE IN PRESIDENT'S POSITION TO SEND ENGLISH SPEAKING MALAGASY MINISTER TO SEE PRESIDENT NIXON. I REMINDED RABEMANANJARA PRESIDENT NIXON VERY BUSY, AND MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO SEE TSIRANANA'S ENVOY. RABEMANANJARA SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY WELL AWARE OF FACT.

7. I REFERRED TO NOTE AND INDICATED THAT I WAS STILL AMBASSADOR AND THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. I SUGGESTED THAT RABEMANANJARA SUGGEST TO PRESIDENT THAT HE INFORM ME DIRECTLY OF CHARGES AGAINST USG. RABEMANANJARA SAID HE WOULD DO SO.

8. RABEMANANJARA TOLD ME HE HAD JUST INFORMED FRENCH AMBASSADOR PLANTEY THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE EMBASSY IN QUESTION WAS THE USG. I COMMENTED THAT NOW EVERYONE KNEW OFFICIALLY EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT QUOTED BY THE PRESS AS FINGERING THE US.

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9. WHAT MADE RABEMANANJARA'S INFORMATION TO ME OF YESTERDAY EVEN MORE INCREDIBLE, I TOLD HIM, WAS TSIRANANA'S MOST WELCOME AND FRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARD ME LAST WEEK WHEN ON 25 MAY I VISITED HIS HOMETOWN OF ANAHIDRANO (AS FIRST AMBASSADOR OF ANY COUNTRY EVER TO DO SO) AS TSIRANANA'S GUEST (HE SENT HIS CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, CMDT. SAIDIBARY, A HALF-BROTHER, AND REPRESENTATIVE OF FONMIN TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS AND GREET ME). ON MAY 28 AT CHILDREN'S HOLIDAY FESTIVITY I HAD TEN MINUTE VERY CORDIAL TALK ALONE WITH TSIRANA (COMMENT: WHO WAS UNSHAVEN AND SEEMED TIRED), IN WHICH WE DISCUSSED ANAHIDRANO. THREE DAYS LATER I AM PNGED. RATHER INCREDIBLE, WASN'T IT, I ASKED RABEMANANJARA. NO COMMENT.
GP-3.
MARSHALL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
JUN 12 AM 8:48

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PAGE 01 TANANA 00818 01 OF 02 020123Z

87
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
---------- 008874

O 012215Z JUN 71 ZFF
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3668

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TANANARIVE 0818

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEWSOM

REF: TANANARIVE 817 AND PREVIOUS

1. AS NUMBING SHOCK RECEDES AFTER BEING ASKED TO LEAVE COUNTRY WHOSE OWN INTERESTS IN FIELD OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT I HAD THOUGHT WELL SERVE IN ADDITION TO FOREMOST INTERESTS MY OWN COUNTRY, IT IS NOT TOO EARLY TO DISTANCE MYSELF FROM PROBLEM AND DISPASSIONATELY CONVEY TO DEPARTMENT WHERE THIS SORRY SITUATION LEAVES US IN MADAGASCAR AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE.

2. I WOULD NOT WISH REFERENCES TO POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS ON MAJUNGA AND AGM PROJECTS, FOR EXAMPLE, TO BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT I HAVE THREATENED OUT OF SPITEFUL RETALIATION OR AM SO RECOMMENDING TO USG THAT THESE PROJECTS BE TORPEDOED. I HAVE SIMPLY REFLECTED WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE SELF-EVIDENT FACT, NAMELY, THAT MY OWN KNOWN CLOSE PERSONAL ASSOCIATION BOTH THESE PROJECTS, WHETHER WITH ANDERSON OR MORGANS, WILL INEVITABLY GIVE PRINCIPALS CAUSE FOR SECOND THOUGHT WHEN THEY SEE ARBITRARY MANNER IN WHICH GOMR HAS DEALT WITH ONE WHO UNTIL NOW WAS GENERALLY CONSIDERED ONE OF WARMEST FRIENDS OF GOMR. BUSINESS-MEN UNFORTUNATELY AND WITH CAUSE ARE NOT COMFORTABLE IN PRESENCE ARBITRARY ACTION OR WHIMSY, FOR OBJECTIVE COULD AS EASILY ANOTHER DAY BE HARASSMENT OR EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN BUSINESS INTERESTS RATHER THAN SIMPLE PNG'ING OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR. AND IF RELATIONS AMONG GOVERNMENTS HAVE ANY WEIGHT AND VALUE AT ALL, PRESUMABLY BUSINESS TIES ARE OR CAN BE ALL THE MORE TENUOUS WHEN IT COMES TO HOST GOVERNMENT ACTION. SO I WAS ONLY BELABORING THE OBVIOUS PU HAVING INDICATED TO GOMR THAT THERE MAY BE BREAKAGE AS REGARDS

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ECONOMIC PROJECTS IN WHICH THEY HAVE STRONG INTEREST, BUT OF COURSE FINAL DECISION RESTS WITH PRINCIPALS CONCERNED, I.E., ANDERSON AND MORGANS AS REGARDS TO TWO KEY PROJECTS. I WOULD HOPE THAT THEY WILL SEE THEIR WAY CLEAR TO CONTINUING WITH THEIR PLANS SUBJECT TO THEIR OWN WISHES AS REGARDS FURTHER ASSURANCES THEY MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TO ASK OF GOMR. AS REGARDS MORGANS AND AGM, HOWEVER, I WOULD COUNSEL A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE IN VIEW OF RESAMPA'S SUDDEN TOTAL DISGRACE AND FACT THAT IT IS LINKED TO HIS ALLEGED "CONNIVANCE" WITH A FOREIGN POWER, NAMELY, THE US. SEEMS TO US THIS MAY STILL RELATE SOMEHOW TO AGM, AND PERHAPS FAMOUS PAY-OFF OF WHICH GOMR WAS SO DETERMINED FIND TRACE.

3. WE HAD NOURISHED DIM HOPE, AND THIS WAS PURPOSE BEHIND OUR APPROACH TO MOREAU (TANANARIVE 815), THAT REASON COULD BE MADE TO PREVAIL, THAT TSIRANANA WOULD RETRACT HIS ORDER FOR MY DEPARTURE, AND STORY OF ALLEGED INTERFERENCE BY FOREIGN EMBASSY BE PERMITTED DIE QUIET DEATH AFTER HAVING FRUITLESSLY FED LOCAL RUMOR FACTORY. THIS WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN IN BEST INTERESTS OUR GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS. BUT GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS EVIDENT THAT EVEN IF GOMR WERE NOW TO BACKTRACK, MY CONTINUED PRESENCE HERE WOULD BE UNTENABLE FOR ALL CONCERNED. AT LEAST WE WOULD HAVE WON RESPITE, HOWEVER, AFTER WHICH I COULD HAVE DEPARTED DEFINITIVELY BUT GRACEFULLY ON SOME PRETEXT THAT WOULD NOT HAVE HURT OUR PUBLIC IMAGE AND WOULD HAVE MADE IT EASIER TO SALVAGE WHAT COULD BE SALVAGED IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH MADAGASCAR. BUT APPARENTLY THAT IS NOT TO BE AND I NOW PLAN TO DEPART VIA ALITALIA ON JUNE 6 (ARRIVING WASHINGTON JUNE 7) IN VIEW FIVE-DAY DEADLINE GIVEN ME.

4. SUBJECT TO DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF WHAT IF ANYTHING I SAY PUBLICLY PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. AS I HAVE ALREADY BEEN FORCED TO SET IN MOTION ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS FOR DEPARTURE, E
JFMN#
CLOSING OUT RESIDENCE, SUMMONING PACKERS, ETC., ALREADY WIDESPREAD RUMORS ARE BOUND AS EARLY AS TOMORROW TO BE CONFIRMED AS FACT.
GOMR HAS INDICATED TO ME VIA RABEMANANJARA THAT NO
RPT NO PUBLIC STATEMENT LIKELY BE MADE CONCERNING MY DEPARTURE ON "CONSULTATION." SINCE IT WILL BE AN OPEN SECRET THAT I AM BEING RECALLED, HOWEVER, I WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE WISE IN ORDER SCOTCH RUMORS AND TO GET FACTS STRAIGHT FOR EMBASSY TO ISSUE STARK COMMUNIQUE STATING THAT I AM DEPARTING AT GOMR REQUEST; NO DETAILS WHATEVER AS TO CHARGES HAVE BEEN MADE BY GOMR; AND USG DEPLORES EFFECT WHICH THIS ACTCON BOUND TO HAVE ON US-MALAGASY RELATIONS.

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I FURTHER PROPOSE TO HOLD PRESS CONFERENCE AT AIRPORT PRIOR MY DEPARTURE AND TO BE ENTIRELY FORTHCOMING IN RESPONSE ANY QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT BE PUT TO ME.

5. I AM PAINFULLY CONSCIOUS OF FACT THAT CONCERN OVER MY OWN PLIGHT MUST NOT FURTHER ENVENOM OUR RELATIONS WITH GOMR OR MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO PICK UP PIECES AFTERWARDS. HOWEVER, I THINK

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED, WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 176

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
JUN 2 AM 8:49
008946

PAGE 01 TANANA 00818 02 OF 02 020138Z

87
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

O 012215Z JUN 71 ZFF
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3669

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TANANARIVE 0818

EXDIS

IT INCUMBENT ON USG, NOT ONLY VIS-A-VIS US DOMESTIC AND MALAGASY OPINION BUT VIS-A-VIS OUR FRIENDS AND POLITICAL ADVERSARIES ABROAD, TO REFUTE MORE IN SORROW THAT IN ANGER UNFOUNDED AND I KNOW,

BASELESS CHARGES LODGED AGAINST US. CHARGES ARE DIRECTED NOT ONLY AGAINST THIS EMBASSY SPECIFICALLY BUT AT US AS A WHOLE (TANANARIVE 810). THIS CONSIDERATION MAY DICTATE WHETHER DEPARTMENT, AND CERTAINLY NOT PRESIDENT NIXON, WOULD WISH EVEN RECEIVE MALAGASY ENVOY RABEMANANJARA TOLD ME TSIRANANA INTENDS SEND TO WASHINGTON.

6. CONCERNING SPECIFIC US OBJECTIVES IN MADAGASCAR OUTLINED IN COUNTRY POLICY PAPER, I HAVE ORDERED CANCELLATION VISIT TO NOSSI-BE BY USS LAWES SCHEDULED JUNE 3-4 AS WELL AS VISIT TO DIEGO SUAREZ NEXT WEEK BY USS MCCAFFERY. SEEMED TO ME THAT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE BY US NAVY VESSELS AT THIS JUNCTURE MAKE "GOODWILL" VISITS MADAGASCAR AND, MOREOVER, WE CANNOT FORETELL HOW LOCAL POPULATION MIGHT REACT TO RUMORS OF US "INTERFERENCE" OR EVEN TO POSSIBLE SWITCH IN SIGNALS THAT MIGHT PROMPT GOMR TO PUT THE FINGER ON ME PUBLICLY. HOWEVER, THIS WHOLE INCIDENT WILL BLOW OVER IN TIME AND I FORESEE NO RPT NO LONG-TERM DAMAGE TO OUR ABILITY USE MALAGASY PORTS AND AIRFIELDS, THOUGH THIS IS ADMITTEDLY INITIAL, OFF-THE-CUFF REACTION.

7. AS REGARDS OUR OTHER PRIORITY OBJECTIVE OF NASA PRESENCE, PROGNOSIS IS MORE DIFFICULT. GOMR HAS ADMITTEDLY DRAGGED FEET ON RENEWAL, BUT I ATTRIBUTE THIS SOLELY TO INEFFICIENCY OF FOREIGN MINISTRY RATHER THAN TO CONSCIOUS FOOT-DRAGGING BY GOMR. HOWEVER, FACT REMAINS THAT RENEWAL OF AGREEMENT IS IN ABEYANCE AND ONE CAN ONLY ASK WHAT GOMR ATTITUDE WILL NOW BE TOWARD THIS AGREEMENT.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 TANANA 00818 02 OF 02 020138Z

RABEMANANJARA DID SPECIFICALLY STATE TO ME TODAY PRESENT SITUATION DOES NOT MEAN ANY CHANGE IN NASA PRESENCE IN MADAGASCAR (FOR WHATEVER RABEMANANJARA'S WORD MAY BE WORTH AS TSIRANANA'S MESSENGER). THERE IS ALSO, OF COURSE, ATTITUDE OF NASA ITSELF TO BE CONSIDERED IN VIEW THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

8. IN SHORT, I AM CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT INCLINED TO LEAVE BEHIND WITH GOMR THE THOUGHT THAT THEY HAVE ACTED DECENTLY OR WISELY TOWARD ME AND USG THAT I REPRESENT. MOREOVER, OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOMR AND WITH THE MALAGASY PUBLIC PROMISE TO BE EXTREMELY TOUCHY IN THE COMING WEEKS. BUT WE MUST PUT OUT BEST FOOT FORWARD, AND I

AM DETERMINED THAT EMBASSY DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRANSITION TO THE POST-MARSHALL PERIOD OF US PRESENCE IN MADAGASCAR. TONIGHT'S COMMUNIQUE ON RESAMPA'S DISMISSAL AND LINKING US TO HIS ALLEGED "CONIVANCE" MAY WELL HELP US, FOR NOT EVERYONE WILL BE TAKEN IN BY THE ABSURDITY OF CHARGES MAKING US THE SCAPEGOAT IN THE LAST CHAPTER OF TSIRNANAN'S ANTI-RESAMPA WITCHHUNT. I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT THE USG AND I PERSONALLY ARE BEING ASKED TO PAY THE PRICE OF THE WHIM OF A MENTALLY SICK OLD MAN WHO UNFORTUNATELY REMAINS PRESIDENT OF THIS COUNTRY. IT IS TOO BAD THAT THE NOVEL "NIGHT OF CAMP DAVID" HAS NOT BEEN TRANSLATED INTO MALAGASY.
MARSHALL
GP-3

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CONFIDENTIAL

08 | EO | WEL

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 886

PAGE 01 TANANA 00815 012210Z

87
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
---------- 007692

O 011510Z JUN 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3665

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 0815

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA'S 1,2,3&4)

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEWSOM-AF

REF: TANANARIVE 0809, 0810, 0813

1. MOREAU, SECRETARY GENERAL AT PRESIDENCY AND FRENCH ADVISER WHO IS PROBABLY CLOSEST TO PRESIDENT TSIRANANA, WAS CONTACTED BY DCM THIS MORNING PRIOR MY BEING CALLED IN BY RABEMANANJARA. DCM EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN OVER SPECULATION TSIRANANA'S PUBLIC AND UNFOUNDED ACCUSATIONS BOUND TO PRECIPATE VIS-A-VIS US AND OTHER EMBASSIES. SAID WE HAD CONTACTED OTHER EMBASSIES WHO SHARED OUR CONCERN AT THIS MANNER OF CONDUCTING RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS IN PUBLIC MARKETPLACE AND AMBASSADOR WAS RAISING MATTER WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN LATTER'S CAPACITY AS DEAN OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS. (APPOINTMENT WITH LATTER WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CANCELLED BY ME). MOREAU SAID HE TOO WAS IN DARK CONCERNING THIS WHOLE MATTER, WHICH HE HAD LEARNED ABOUT ONLY AFTERNOON MAY 31 AND THEN THROUGH FRENCH SHORTWAVE NEWS BROADCAST FROM PARIS. HE REASSURED US THAT HE WAS NOT RPT NOT ONLY OFFICIAL AT PRESIDENCY CAUGHT UNAWARES BY TSIRANANA'S ACCUSATION AND COMPLETELY IRGNORANT OF WHAT HAD TRIGGERED IT.

2. DCM ON MY INSTRUCTIONS SOUGHT CALL ON MOREAU URGENTLY THIS AFTERNOON TO CONFRONT HIM WITH DEVELOPMENTS RESULTING FROM MY BEING CALLED IN BY RABEMANANJARA. MOREAU WAS AWARE THAT I HAD BEEN ASKED TO LEAVE BUT CLAIMED STILL NOT RPT NOT HAVE INKLING OF WHAT HAD PROMPTED TSIRANANA'S DECISION. SAID THAT HE WOULD ENDEAVOR SEE TSIRANANA LATER IN DAY IN

'71 JUN 1 PM 10:22
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

EFFORT TO LEARN DETAILS AND WOULD APPRISE US OF RESULTS ANY SUCH MEETING.

3. DCM STATED THAT DAMAGE HAD NOW BEEN DONE TO RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND IT MIGHT BE TOO LATE TO PICK UP THE PIECES. HOWEVER, WAS PATENTLY RIDICULOUS TO CONTEND THAT USG OR ITS EMBASSY HAD BEEN PLOTTING AGAINST TSIRANANA OR OTHERWISE ENGAGING IN ANY ACTIVITY INCOMPATIBLE WITH PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL MALAGASY AFFAIRS. WE WERE COMPLETELY UNAWARE OF SPECIFICS OF ANY CHARGES THAT MIGHT BE MADE AGAINST US, BUT WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT GOMR MIGHT BE BETTER ADVISED LOOK FOR PLOT AGAINST US INTERESTS IN MADAGASCAR RATHER THAN PLOT AGAINST GOMR. PERHAPS GOMR'S OWN SECURITY SERVICES WERE NOT IMPERVIDOUS TO PLANTED MATERIAL CALCULATED TO MAKE US LOOK BAD AND THUS SERVE INTERESTS OF OTHERS.

4. IT WAS OPPOSITION ELEMENTS IN MADAGASCAR AND SOVIETS AND THEIR FRIENDS WHO WOULD NOW TAKE DELIGHT IN POINTING TO ALLEGED US PERFIDY AND RECALLING OF AMERICAN AMBASSADOR. MOREOVER, TSIRANANA HAS ACTED CONTRARY TO GOMR ECONOMIC INTEREST FOR PROJECTS IN WHICH HE PERSONALLY HAD STRONG INTEREST, OR SO WE THOUGHT, MIGHT NOW GO DOWN THE DRAIN, E.G. MAJUNGA PROJECT, REFLOATING OF AGM.

5. DCM ALSO POINTED OUT THAT TSIRANANA'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT COUNTRY IN QUESTION HAD GIVEN NO AID TO MADAGASCAR WAS COMPLETELY INCORRECT SO FAR AS US CONCERNED, AND ESPECIALLY REGRETTABLE AT TIME WHEN GOMR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL $1 MILLION IN AID FINANCING FOR RAILROAD IMPROVEMENTS LOAN STILL PENDING AND AID COMMITTED IN PRINCIPLE TO LARGE LOAN FOR MAJUNGA PROJECT. AS RECENTLY AS DURING HIS PRESS CONFERENCE LAST WEEK (TANANARIVE A-67) TSIRANANA HAD PUBLICLY THANKED US FOR EARLIER AID PROGRAM FINANCING WATER SUPPLY PROJECTS IN SOUTH. DCM THEN ADDED THAT DIFFICULT FOR ANY MALAGASY TO HAVE SNEAKED INTO THIS EMBASSY THROUGH "SIDE DOOR" SIMPLY BECAUSE WE DON'T HAVE ONE. MOREAU SAID LATTER POINT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL FOR HIM USE WITH TSIRANANA, SINCE LATTER SOMETIMES IS SWAYED INTO MAKING DECISION ON BASIS ONE LITTLE INCIDENTAL DETAIL SUCH AS THIS.

6. MOREAU CONFIRMED PRESIDENCY ABUZZ WITH RUMORS THAT WE HAD HEARD EARLIER THIS AFTERNOON FROM MALAGASY PRIVATE SOURCES TO

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PAGE 03 TANANA 00815 012210Z

EFFECT VICE PRESIDENT RESAMPA HAD BEEN ARRESTED EARLIER TODAY. HOWEVER, MOREAU SAID THERE WAS COMPLETELY BLACKOUT AT PRESIDENCY AND EVEN HE UNABLE TRACK DOWN WHETHER THERE WAS ANY TRUTH THIS RUMOR.

7. MOREAU HAS JUST PHONED BACK AFTER MEETING WITH TSIRANANA THIS SUBJECT. SAID THAT ON BASIS NOTES MADE DURING ABOVE REPORTED CONVERSATION WITH DCM HE HAD OUTLINED THESE POINTS TO TSIRANANA. LATTER HAD LISTENED TO HIM WITHOUT INTERRUPTION FOR TEN MINUTES, THEN SAID SIMPLY "I THANK YOU, MR. MOREAU," AND MEETING ENDED. MOREAU THEREFORE CLAIMED TO BE STILL AS MUCH IN DARK AS EVER AS TO WHAT HAD PROMPTED TSIRANANA ACT AS HE HAD.

8. DCM SEEKING URGENT APPOINTMENT VICE PRESIDENT MIADANA SIMPLY TO ALERT HIM TO POSSIBLE BREAKAGE ON ECONOMIC FRONT AS RESULT ACTION TSIRANANA HAS TAKEN.

9. COMMENT: WE CONSIDER MOREAU TO BE PROBABLY MOST TRUTWORTHY AND OBUECTIVE OF FRENCH ADVISERS SURROUNDING TSIRANAN AND SUSPECT THAT HE HAS COME CLEAN WITH US. I AM NOT SO CONFIDENT IN RABEMANANJARA'S ASSERTION(TANANARIVE 0813) THAT FRENCH AND SPECIFICIALLY FRENCH AMBASSADOR PLANTEY ARE CLEAN IN THIS REGRETTABLE MATTER.
GP-3.
MARSHALL

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CONFIDENTIAL 507

'71 APR 23 AM 8:48

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TANANA 00611 230721Z

18
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
---------- 089176

O 230649Z APR 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3537

C O N F I D E N T I A L TANANARIVE 0611

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVID NEWSOM

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS

REF: (A) STATE 068310 (B) STATE 068689

AS UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON NOW NOT ATTENDING CONFERENCE
TANANARIVE, WILL DISCUSSION RE INDIAN OCEAN SCHEDULED
FOR 1130 APRIL 28 STILL STAND? IF SO, WHO WILL GIVE
PRESENTATION?
MARSHALL

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'74 APR 5 AM 8:31

CONFIDENTIAL 8815

PAGE 01 STATE 068529

62
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY AFR/ESA:JKNOLL/AF/E:WBCOOTE:SM X29742
APPROVED BY P - MR. SISCO
AF:AMB. ROOT
AA/AFR:MR. ADAMS
A/AID:MR. JONNES (SUBS)
S/S - SRGAMMON
---------- 090421

O 042255Z APR 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE NIACT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 068529

EXDIS

E.O. 11652GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EAID, MA, US

SUBJECTFY 1975 ASSISTANCE

REF: TANANARIVE 426, 424

FOR AMBASSADOR
JOINT STATE/AID MESSAGE

1. WE WERE DELIGHTED TO RECEIVE WORD THAT GEN. RAMANANTSOA HAS APPROVED THREE-YEAR EXTENSION OF NASA STATION AGREEMENT, AND CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS WITH GOMR. WE WILL BE GUIDED BY YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS IN MOVING AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RAILRO D LOAN. IN THIS CONNECTION THERE IS AGREEMENT HERE THAT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE PARALLEL TO NEGOTIATIONS ON TEXT OF NASA STATION AGREEMENT.

2. WHILE WE UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN RE DESIRABILITY OF USG'S MAINTAINING BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH FONMIN

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FORM DS-1652

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 STATE 068529

RATSIRAKA, IT IS, AS YOU KNOW, EXTREMELY DIFFICULT MAKE FY 1975 COMMITMENT OF TYPE PROPOSED BY AMBASSADOR ESPECIALLY WITHIN LIMITED TIME FRAME AVAILABLE. WHILE CONCESSIONAL RICE AVAILABILITIES FOR FY 1975 LOOK MORE PROMISING THAN IN FY 1974, CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION ESTIMATES ARE NOW FULLY PROGRAMMED FOR EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES. AT THIS STAGE FIGURES ARE ONLY ILLUSTRATIVE AND ACTUAL AVAILABILITIES WILL BE DEPENDENT ON SIZE NEW CROP, PRICES, AND FIRM REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH PRIORITY RECIPIENTS IN EAST ASIA. DEVELOPMENT LOAN PROJECT FINANCING DIFFICULT TO JUDGE IN ADVANCE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON APPROPRIATIONS AND AID REVIEW OF 20-COUNTRY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT LIMITATION FOR DEVELOPMENT LOANS, AND WITHOUT INDICATION READY AVAILABILITY OF PROJECT MEETING CURRENT AID CRITERIA. (IN THIS CONNECTION, EMBASSY SHOULD NOTE THAT AID PRIORITIES ARE IN FOOD AND NUTRITION, POPULATION PLANNING AND HEALTH, AND EDUCATION AND HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT. ROAD PROJECT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY IN FY 1975 IN VIEW PRIOR AID COMMITMENTS FOR LIMITED FUNDING AVAILABLE FOR TRANSPORT SECTOR.)

3. IN VIEW ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE ARE NOT IN POSITION AT THIS TIME TO AUTHORIZE YOU TO MAKE COMMITMENT FOR FY 1975 WHICH WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO FULFILL. INSTEAD, IF YOU DEEM IT USEFUL, WE SUGGEST YOU INFORM FONMIN THAT USG IS WILLING TO DISCUSS WITH GOMR POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL AID PROGRAMS IN MADAGASCAR IN FUTURE, BUT WITHOUT MAKING COMMITMENT OR STATING PRECISE TIME FRAME.

4. BEGIN FYI: SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINTS OUTLINED ABOVE, US AID MIGHT INCLUDE A) RICE UNDER PL-480 OR DL FINANCING, ASSUMING SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES RICE AVAILABLE AND RICE NOT REQUIRED BY HIGHER-PRIORITY AREAS, OR B) A DL PROJECT. SINCE IMPLEMENTATION TELECOM AND RAILROAD LOANS WILL BEGIN IN EARLY FY 1975, WE BELIEVE US AID PICTURE STI[illegible] RESPECTABLE EVEN IF NO AID APPROVED IN FY 1975.

5. VIEW OUR LIMITED CAPABILITIES FOR PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION IN MADAGASCAR, WE PREFER PROVIDE RICE IF THIS POSSIBLE. SHOULD KNOW BY SECOND QUARTER FY 1975

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FORM DS-1652

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PAGE 03 STATE 068529

WHETHER RICE WILL BE AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, IN MEANTIME WE WILL DISCUSS DL PROJECT POSSIBILITIES WITH IBRD AND WITH HOGAN, DIRECTOR REDSO, WHEN HE IS IN WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH. AT APPROPRIATE TIME, POSSIBLY WHEN RAILROAD LOAN AGREEMENT IS NEGOTIATED, REDSO REPRESENTATIVE CAN ASSIST EMBASSY IN PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH GOMR ON ITS PRIORITIES AND US AID CRITERIA.

6. QUESTION OF LONGER TERM ASSISTANCE STRATEGY FOR MADAGASCAR WILL BE CONSIDERED IN CONTEXT 1974 PARA REVIEW. SHOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, CONCEPT OF ANNUAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OF DOLS. 5-10 MILLION MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE GIVEN FUNDING AVAILABILITIES, AFRICA PROGRAM PRIORITIES IN RLDCS, NUMBER OF COUNTRIES LIMITATIONS, AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. END FYI. RUSH

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FORM DS-1652

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'74 APR 2 A

SECRET 0513

PAGE 01 STATE 065432

62
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

66615
DRAFTED BY NASA B. GOETZ/D.R. MORRIS
APPROVED BY AF/E - WENDELL B. COOTE
AF/E. RBRESLER
AF:GFROOT
S/S - DMILLER
---------- 044403

P 012329Z APR 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 065432

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:N/A
TAGS: TSPA, MA
SUBJECT: NASA STATION NEGOTIATIONS

REF: TANANARIVE 0399

1. DEPARTMENT AND NASA PLEASED AT PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS, THOUGH UNTIL GOM MAKES COMMITMENT, NASA REMAINS IN DIFFICULT POSITION.

2. HOWEVER, NASA WILL TAKE NO REPEAT NO STEPS TO REMOVE SMS EQUIPMENT. THIS MEANS NASA COMMITTED TO COVERING MISSION FROM TANANARIVE NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENS IN COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

3. MALAGASIZATION PLAN UNDER FINAL REVIEW WITHIN NASA AND WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO CABLE FINAL APPROVAL WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. RE CONCERNS OVER BENDIX (PARA 3 REFTEL) NASA PREPARED RELY ON STATION DIRECTOR FOR FINAL SELECTION

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

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OF THOSE MALAGASY PERSONNEL TO RECEIVE TRAINING IN U.S.
HE WILL OF COURSE BE GUIDED IN HIS SELECTIONS BY INFORMED
RECOMMENDATIONS OF BENDIX PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING
WITH THE MEN. ONCE MALAGASIZATION IS COMPLETED NASA
INTENDS TO HAVE TWO NASA EMPLOYEES REMAIN AS STATION DIRECTOR
AND DEPUTY. MALAGASY WOULD PROVIDE THE OPERATING PERSONNEL
AND TECHNICAL DIRECTOR. ANY SPECIALIZED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE,
IF REQUIRED SHOULD BE LEFT FOR LATER DISCUSSION.

5. DEPARTMENT AND NASA CONCUR IN NEED FOR INFORMATION
REFTEL TO BE HELD CLOSELY AND WILL RESPECT EMBASSY
SUGGESTIONS IN THIS REGARD. DEPARTMENT DOES HOWEVER PLAN TO
INFORM PRETORIA THAT EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE SENT.
NO EXPLANATION WILL BE GIVEN.
RUSH

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Department of State

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

'74 JAN 17 AM 7:50

SECRET 499

PAGE 01 STATE 009496

53
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY AF/C:COHEN:OSM
APPROVED BY AF:AMB. ROSS
NASA:MORRIS
S/S - MR. LUERS

---------- 118461

O 161728Z JAN 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 009496

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: TSPA, PFOR, MA, US
SUBJECT: NASA STATION NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) TANANARIVE 52 (B) STATE 9253

IN VIEW ANDRIAMAHAZO'S REMARKS TO YOU REPORTED PARA 1 REFTEL (A), DEPT WISHES TO ASSURE YOU THAT COMBINED RENTAL AND EQUIPMENT OFFER WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR JANUARY 17 NEGOTIATING SESSIONS TRANSMITTED REFTEL (B). WHILE WE WISH TO MAINTAIN PREVIOUS POSITION WITH RESPECT TO ARREARS AND GOMR DESIRE FOR SYMBOLIC PAYMENT, GOMR IS FREE TO CATEGORIZE COMBINED EQUIPMENT AND RENTAL OFFER IN ANY WAY THAT IS CONVENIENT TO THEIR REQUIREMENTS. RUSH

SECRET
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CONFIDENTIAL 242

PAGE 01 STATE 159588

92
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66645
DRAFTED BY:AF/C:HJCOHEN
APPROVED BY:AF:DONEWSOM
AF:CRMOORE S/S:MR.ELIOT

---------- 050108

R 310032Z AUG 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 159588

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH TSIRANANA

REF: TANANARIVE 1407

DEPT INTRIGUED BY TSIRANANA'S CLAIM THAT RABENORO MISSION TO WASHINGTON HAD EVIDENCE AVAILABLE BUT WE REFUSED TO EXAMINE IT. WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE FURTHER DETAILS YOUR MEMCON AND COMMENTARY BY CABLE INSTEAD OF AIRGRAM. WOULD ESPECIALLY LIKE YOUR VIEWS ON MOST PROBABLE REASON FOR DISCREPANCY BETWEEN TSIRANANA'S STATEMENT TO YOU AND RABENORO'S PERFORMANCE IN WASHINGTON. WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO HAVE YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF TSIRANANA'S MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH ON BASIS AUGUST 27 MEETING. 3P-4.
ROGERS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Ed

UNCLASSIFIED 539

PAGE 01 STATE 173103

22
ORIGIN CPR 02

INFO OCT 01,AF 12,PM 04,NSC 10,P 03,RSC 01,SS 20,USIA 12,PRS 01,

SSC 01,/067 R

66661
DRAFTED BY:S/CPR:DMJOHNSON
APPROVED BY:EMIL MOSBACHER,JR. CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
AF/CM:MR.SULLIVAN
AF
P:FOR INFO
S/S-C:MRS.DENHAM
S/S:MR.BROWN
THE WHITE HOUSE:MR.MORRIS
---------- 057434
R 120405Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO PC HIS EXCELLENCY, PHILIBERT TSIRANANA
PRESIDENT OF THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC, TANANARIVE

UNCLAS STATE 173103

IT IS WITH PLEASURE THAT I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC THE BEST WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THIS ELEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC. WE RECOGNIZE THE PROGRESS WHICH YOUR REPUBLIC HAS MADE UNDER YOUR WISE LEADERSHIP AND SINCERELY HOPE THAT THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS WILL CONTINUE.
RICHARD NIXON

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 STATE 078740

63
ORIGIN AF-13

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 PER-05 M-03 A-01 SS-14 NSC-10 PRS-01

RSC-01 /069 R

66646
DRAFTED BY: AF/C:JKBISHOP
APPROVED: U - THE ACTING SECRETARY
AF/C - JAPARKER
AF - AMB MOORE
J - UAJOHNSON
WHITE HOUSE - MR LEVINE
M/DG - AMB HALL
S/S - MR MILLER (7208022)

Ed Roberts

065360

R 052007Z MAY 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 078740

SUBJECT: NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE GOMR

AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY YOU SHOULD INFORM PRESIDENT TSIRANANA ORALLY THAT YOU HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPRESS TO HIM THE APPRECIATION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE GOOD WILL MANIFEST IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT OF MAY 3. YOU MAY INFORM THE PRESIDENT THAT THE USG LOOKS FORWARD TO AN EARLY NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR, AND A RESUMPTION OF THE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS THROUGHOUT MOST OF THEIR HISTORY. IRWIN

RM DS-1652

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 308

PAGE 01 STATE 114056

87
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66639
DRAFTED BY: AF: DDNEWSOM/JKBISHOP
APPROVED BY: AF - MR. DAVID D. NEWSOM
U - UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON (IN SUBSTANCE)
WH - MR. WRIGHT (IN SUBSTANCE)
S/S-O:MR EMMONS

---------- 064382

O P 250230Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 114056

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

REF: TANANARIVE 1057

DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS JUNE 25

1. IN VIEW REFTEL, YOU ARE TO REQUEST URGENT APPOINTMENT WITH RABEMANANJARA, INFORMING HIS OFFICE YOU HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED DELIVER IMPORTANT MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. WHEN YOU SEE RABEMANANJARA, YOU ARE TO TELL HIM AMERICAN JOURNALIST HAS CLAIMED THAT RABEMANANJARA HAS DESCRIBED TO HIM ALLEGED EVIDENCE AGAINST EMBASSY OFFICERS IN DETAIL. GOMR HAS BEEN UNWILLING PROVIDE USG REPRESENTATIVES EITHER IN TANANARIVE OR IN WASHINGTON. THIS DESCRIPTION VERY LIKELY WILL BE PUBLISHED PRIOR ARRIVAL US DELEGATION. IF THIS TRUE, USG DEEPLY DISTRUBED BY THIS DEVELOPMENT. THIS MAKES IT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAT USG HAVE OPPORTUNITY EXAMINE AND DETERMINE NATURE AND AUTHENTICITY EVIDENCE AS PART OF PROCESS LEADING TO RESUMPTION NORMAL RELATIONS.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 114056

3. YOU ARE TO INFORM RABEMANANJARA, AND OTHERS IN GOMR AT YOUR DISCRETION, THAT IN VIEW THIS DEVELOPMENT, USG HAS DECIDED THAT DELEGATION WILL VISIT TANANARIVE, ONLY IF GOMR GIVES PRIOR ASSURANCE ALLEGED EVIDENCE WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION BY DELEGATION. AS NEWSOM SCHEDULED DEPART WASHINGTON 14:30 LOCAL JUNE 26 TO MAKE NECESSARY CONNECTIONS, USG MUST RECEIVE THIS ASSURANCE SOONEST, IF DELEGATION TO ARRIVE AS SCHEDULED JUNE 29. OTHERWISE DELEGATION WILL AWAIT SUCH ASSURANCE AND RESET LATER DATE FOR ARRIVAL. ROGERS

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CONFIDENTIAL

729/03/92

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

71 JUN 23 PM 8:23

SITUATION ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL 980

PAGE 01 STATE 112089

41
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66612
DRAFTED BY: AF/C:COHEN:OSM
APPROVED BY: AF-MR. NEWSOM
EUR/FBX-MR. BOCK
S/S-MR. CURRAN

---------- 050611

R 231637Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 112089

EXDIS

SUBJ: US-MALAGASY RELATIONS

REF: TANANARIVE 1021

WHILE ANY INFO MARTY MIGHT BE WILLING DIVLUGE WOULD BE INTERESTING, AND COULD BE USEFUL AS BACKGROUND IN FORTHCOMING TALKS, DEPT BELIEVES OVERIDING CONSIDERATION AT THIS POINT IS TO RESTRICT FURTHER EVOLUTION OF CURRENT PROBLEM TO BILATERAL US-MALAGASY CHANNEL. SINCE BEGINNING OF SERIOUS BILATERAL EFFORT FIND A SOLUTION WITH RABENORO MISSION AND SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN CHARGE AND RABEMANANJARA, RESULTS HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING, ALTHOUGH STILL NOT CONCLUSIVE. CONSEQUENTLY, SEPT FEELS WE SHOULD NOT BE CONSULTING WITH THIRD PARTIES ON THIS MATTER FOR TIME BEING. GP-3. ROGERS

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH.

SECRET 291

PAGE 01 STATE 109629

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66641
DRAFTED BY: AF:C:HJCOHEN
APPROVED BY: J- AMB. JOHNSON
AF- MR NEWSOM
S/S MR BREWSTER
WHITE HOUSE MR KISSINGER

71 JUN 19 AM 9:33
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

019217

O 182226Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 109629

EXDIS

SUBJECT: US- MALAGASY RELATIONS

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS SATURDAY MORNING

REF: TANANARIVE 999

1. PLEASED TO RECEIVE ENCOURAGING NEWS REFTEL.

2. YOU MAY INFORM RABEMANANJARA THAT DELEGATION HEADED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVID D. NEWSOM. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY NSC SENIOR STAFF OFFICIAL MARSHALL WRIGHT AND AF: C DIRECTOR COHEN.
3. WITH RESPECT ARRIVAL TIME, WE WISH BE REASONABLY RESPONSIVE TO RABEMANANJARA'S EMPHASIS ON EARLY ARRIVAL. NEWSOM SCHEDULED TESTIFY BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TUESDAY, JUNE 22. EARLIEST POSSIBLE ARRIVAL THEREFORE WOULD BE THURSDAY, JUNE 24 WITH TALKS BEGINNING JUNE 25 AFTER APPROPRIATE REST. WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT MALAGASY INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE JUNE 26 AND BELIEVE IT MIGHT BE AWKWARD FOR BOTH GOMR AND DELEGATION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IF DELEGATION WERE PRESENT WEEKEND OF JUNE 26. WE THEREFORE PREFER TO DELAY ARRIVAL

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 109629

UNTIL TUESDAY, JUNE 29. BUT WILL LEAVE THIS DECISION TO GOMR.
PLEASE ADVISE URGENTLY. GP-4. ROGERS

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SECRET

7304/02/04

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 006

PAGE 01 STATE 108818

90
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66664
DRAFTED BY AF/C:HJCOHEN
APPROVED BY: J-AMB. JOHNSON
AF-AMB. MOORE
S/S-O-SEFRY
AF/C-AMB. MARSHALL
WHITE HOUSE-MR. KISSINGER

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

71 JUN 18 AM 8:46

009596

O P 180054Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 108818

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

REF: TANANARIVE 984

1. WE ARE PLEASED THE GOMR FEELS THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION THIS PROBLEM. IT VERY IMPORTANT FROM USG POINT OF VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT GOMR MAKE SOME GESTURE OF ACCOMMODATION IN OUR DIRECTION BEFORE SPECIAL DELEGATION IS SENT.

2. IN VIEW KEY ELEMENT REPRESENTED BY FIVE EMBASSY OFFICERS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT DEPARTURE BE POSTPONED WHILE TALKS CONTINUE. CONCUR, THEREFORE, IN YOUR REQUEST TO BEZAZA THAT THIS BE CLARIFIED URGENTLY. HOWEVER, TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY SURE GOMR UNDERSTANDS IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACH TO POSTPONEMENT, YOU SHOULD GO BACK TO BEZAZA, OR IF POSSIBLE TO RABEMANANJARA, AND SAY, ON INSTRUCTIONS, THAT WE ARE MAKING PREPARATIONS TO SEND APPROPRIATE DELEGATION INRESPONSE TO THEIR INVITATION. WE ARE DOING SO ON BASIS EXPECTATION, WHICH WE WOULD APPRECIATE THEIR CONFIRMING, THAT ACTION ON THEIR REQUEST FOR DEPARTURE FIVE OFFICERS IS BEING SUSPENDED PENDING FORTHCOMING TALKS. ROGERS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 786

PAGE 01 STATE 103633

53 45
ORIGIN AF-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 SS-20 NSC-10 INR-08 O-03 CPR-02 RSC-01

/084 R

DRAFTED BY: AF/C:JKBISHOP
APPROVED BY: AF - AMB. MOORE
AF/C - HJCOHEN
S/S - MR. ELIOT

---------- 090407

P R 111234Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T STATE 103633

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TSIRANANA LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON:

QTE MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE THE HONOR TO CONFIRM TO YOU THE DESIRE OF MADAGASCAR TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. BUT, I ALSO HAVE THE DUTY TO INFORM YOU THAT, TO PERMIT THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO REMAIN NORMAL, THE IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE OF THE PRESENT AMBASSADOR IS REQUIRED, ALSO OF THE STAFF ATTACHED TO HIM, PRINCIPALLY: MESSERS JOHN F. HASEY, ALOYSIUS J. WARNECKI, STEPHEN TELKINS, F. H. HASSETT AND MISS PATRICIA E. CONNOR.

NO COUNTRY IN THE WORLD CAN PERMIT AN AMBASSADOR TO PLAY DOMESTICALLY THE ROLE OF A SPECIAL AGENT (C. I. A.).

I HOPE THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THIS ATTITUDE AND THAT YOU WILL ACCEPT THIS REASONABLE REQUEST.

MOREOVER, WE MADE THIS COMMENT TO YOU WHEN YOU SELECTED HIM FOR MAGADASCAR, AND, IN RESPONSE TO OUR OBSERVATION, YOU ALLEGED THAT HE WOULD CHANGE. BUT

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHAT WE SEE NOW IS WORSE.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE EXPRESSION OF MY VERY HIGH REGARD.

TSIRANANA PHILIBERT UNQTE

2. ADDRESSES WILL NOTE THAT LETTER CONTAINS CHARGES AGAINST AMB. MARSHALL CONFLICTING DIRECTLY WITH RABENORD'S ASSERTION (SEPTEL) THAT GOMR DOES NOT BELIEVE HER PERSONALLY INVOLVED. ROGERS

739|03|96

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 638

PAGE 01 STATE 103644

52
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 R

DRAFTED BY: AF:CRMOORE/AF/C:HCOHEN
APPROVED BY: J - MR. JOHNSON
AF - MR. NEWSOM
EUR/FBX - MR. TANGUY (SUBS)
CIA - MR. ROOSEVELT (SUBS)
S/S - MR. CURRAN

O R 111349Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T STATE 103644

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH GOMR

REF : TANANARIVE 920

BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HASEY GO TO PARIS IMMEDIATELY SO AS TO BE AVAILABLE FOR MEETING WITH FOCCART SHOULD LATTER SO REQUEST. HASEY'S MAIN OBJECTIVE, IF SUCH MEETING TAKES PLACE, IS TO CLEAR UP ANY DOUBTS FOCCART MAY HAVE ABOUT PROPRIETY OF ACTIVITIES OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL INVOLVED. UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES WE WOULD EXPECT SENIOR OFFICIAL EMBASSY PARIS TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY SUCH MEETING, BUT APPRECIATE THAT THERE COULD BE ADVANTAGE IN FOCCART HASEY MEETING NOT AS REPRESENTATIVES OF RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS, BUT ON BASIS THEIR COMMON LIBERATION EFFORT.

GP-4 ROGERS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'71 JUN 11 PM 5:46
089609

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SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 455

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92
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66641
DRAFTED BY: AF: C: JKBISHOP
APPROVED BY:S/S THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR
AF: C- MR COHEN
AF- MR NEWSOM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
71 JUN 11 AM 9:16
084743

P 110014Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 103560

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH THE GOMR: JOHNSON- RABENORO MEETING

FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED, NOFORO, FYI ONLY, SUBJECT TO REVISION ON REVIEW:

1. AT UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON'S SUGGESTION, MALAGASY PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY RABENORO OPENED DISCUSSION DURING JUNE 10 MORNING MEETING. RABENORO DESCRIBED MADAGASCAR'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE, ANTI- COMMUNIST POLICIES AND LONG HISTORY OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH U S. HE SAID MALAGASY GOVT HAD CHOSEN IGNORE SMALL INTRIGUES IN WHICH U S EMBASSY HAD BEEN ENGAGED FOR NUMBER YEARS, BUT EMBASSY HAD BECOME INVOLVED IN PLOT DESIGNED OVERTHROW REGIME AND INSTALL SOMEONE IN TSIRANANA'S PLACE, A DEVELOPMENT TOO SERIOUS TO IGNORE. RABENORO SAID GOMR HAD QUOTE ABSOLUTE PROOF UNQUOTE OF THIS INVOLVEMENT.

2. RABENORO CHARACTERIZED REACTION HIS GOVT AS ONE OF DIS-APPOINTMENT, BUT SAID GOMR DETERMINED MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS AND EVEN WILLING HELP U S SAVE FACE BY PERMITTING AMBASSADOR AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF TO DEPART ON CONSULTATIONS AND BY WITH-DRAWING MALAGASY AMBASSADOR, AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, IF USG WISHED. SUMMING UP, RABENORO STRESSED

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PAGE 02 STATE 103560

DESIRE OF GOMR TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS.

3. UNDER SECRETARY AGREED WITH RABENORO'S DESCRIPTION OF GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS AND SAID THAT SELECTION BY PRESIDENT NIXON OF PERSONAL FRIEND AS AMERICAN AMBASSADOR REFLECTED IMPORTANCE U S PLACED IN ITS RELATIONS WITH MADAGASCAR. EXCELLENT EXCELLENT STATE THOSE RELATIONS LEFT NO OBJECTIVE REASON FOR U S TO CONSPIRE AGAINST GOMR.

4. TURNING TO REQUEST FOR RECALL, UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT IN THIRTY FIVE YEARS EXPERIENCE HE COULD NOT THINK OF SINGLE INCIDENT, EVEN THOSE INVOLVING HOSTILE COUNTRIES, IN WHICH AN AMBASSADOR TREATED IN SUCH CAVALIER OR SHOCKING WAY. CONTINUING, HE POINTED OUT AMBASSADOR MARSHALL NEVER TOLD OF REASON FOR REQUEST FOR HIS RECALL. IF MALAGASY HAD ABSOLUTE PROOF AS RABENORO HAD STATED, AMBASSADOR AND STAFF HAD ACTED CONTRARY TO ALL GUIDANCE. HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT BELIEVE THERE COULD BE SUCH PROOF, BUT, IF IT EXISTS, U S WOULD BE REQUIRED TAKE MOST STRINGENT DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST PERSONNEL INVOLVED.

5. JOHNSON THEN TOLD RABENORO U S HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE WITH FORGING OF DOCUMENTS BY HOSTILE ELEMENTS ATTEMPTING DESTROY OUR RELATIONS WITH FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS. IN VIEW GOOD FAITH EXISTING BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS, U S SHOULD BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY EXAMINE EVIDENCE. WHILE USG EQUALLY ANXIOUS RESTORE GOOD RELATIONS, HOSTILE ELEMENTS IN MADAGASCAR NOW CALLING FOR BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND CLOSING OF NASA STATION. RELATIONS, CREDIBILITY AND GOOD NAME OF UNITED STATES NOW INVOLVED THROUGHOUT AFRICA.

6. IN RESPONSE, RABENORO REPEATED POINTS MADE EARLIER ABOUT DESIRE RESTORE GOOD RELATIONS, ABSENCE OF CHARGES AGAINST AMBASSADOR PERSONALLY, AND GOMR SATISFACTION THAT EVIDENCE VALID. HE SAID BEST WAY TO KEEP GOOD RELATIONS WOULD BE TO QUOTE JUST TURN THE PAGE UNQUOTE.

7. NEWOM THEN STRESSED IMPORTANCE MAKING COMMON EFFORT DETERMINE VALIDITY OF EVIDENCE. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD ALLOW COMMON ENEMIES IN MADAGASCAR PROFIT FROM CONTINUING BELIEF EMBASSY OFFICERS HAD BEEN INTERFERRING. ENDORSING NEWSOM'S STATEMENT, JOHNSON NOTED HE COULD NOT HELP BELIEVING SOMEONE HAD GIVEN SOMETHING TO GOMR OR TO PRESIDENT TSIRANANA TO BRING

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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ABOUT THIS RESULT. HE SAID HE COULD NOT HELP FEELING IT WAS FALSE AND PLOT MIGHT BE AGAINST BOTH MADAGASCAR AND U S. HE SUGGESTED A THIRD PERSON MIGHT PLAY USEFUL ROLE IN EXAMINING EVIDENCE. MR. NEWSOM NOTED DEPT HAD THICK FILE OF CASES IN OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVING DOCUMENTS PROVED BY SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO BE FORGERIES.

8. RABENORO NOTED BOTH SIDES AGREED GOOD RELATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE, DIFFERENCES CONCERNED METHODS RATHER THAN OBJECTIVES. GOMR AND ITS PRESIDENT DID NOT WISH START POLEMIC BY DISCUSSING PROOF AND COUNTER- PROOF. MALAGASY WANTED TO QUOTE TURN THE PAGE UNQUOTE. SAID INTERESTS OF STATE MORE MPORTANT THAN PERSONNEL. JOHNSON SAID USG NOT PROPOSING A POLEMIC BUT FELT OBLIGED EXAMINE DOCUMENTS OR OTHER EVIDENCE INVOLVED BECAUSE CHARGES, IF TRUE, MEAN U S PERSONNEL VIOLATED BASIC POLICY.

9. JOHNSON THEN MADE OFFICIAL AND FORMAL REQUET TO RABENORO THAT GOMR PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS. HE SAID US PREPARED SEND QUALIFIED EXPERT TO MADAGASCAR IMMEDIATELY FOR THIS PURPOSE AND HE WOULD BE PREPARED MEET AGAIN AT ANY TIME WITH RABENORO WHEN HE RECEIVED REPLY FROM HIS GOVT. RABENORO PROMISED TRANSMIT JOHNSON'S REQUEST TO HIS GOVT AND TO REQUEST ANOTHER MEETING TO FURNISH REPLY AS SOON AS IT RECEIVED. BEFORE DEPARTING, RABENORO GAVE JOHNSON PERSONAL LETTER FOR TRANSMITTAL TO PRESIDENT NIXON FROM TSIRANANA. (MALAGASY HAVE NOW REQUESTED MEETING, WHICH SCHEDULED FOR 10:30, JUNE 11).

10. TEXT OF TSIRANANA LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON SEPTEL. GP-3.
ROGERS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 668

PAGE 01 STATE 101780

50
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66604
DRAFTED BY:AF/C:COHEN
APPROVED BY:S/S/O:RUECKERT
AF:NEWSOM DRAFT
AF/C:MARSHALL SUBS

---------- 072442

O 091814Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 101780

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH FRENCH ADVISERS

REF: TANANARIVE 908

CONCUR YOUR PROPOSAL TRY AND SEE MUREAU PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. PROCEED AS OUTLINED PARAGRAPH THREE REFTEL.
IRWIN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 717

PAGE 01 STATE 101078

87
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66606
DRAFTED BY:AF:DDNEWSOM
APPROVED BY:AF:DAVID D NEWSOM
J:UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON (SUBS)
AF/C:AMB MARSHALL
MR COHEN
S/S:MR CURRAN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
71 JUN 8 PM 8:49

064184

P 082137Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 101078

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH FRENCH ADVISERS

REF: TANANARIVE 0896

1. WE WOULD NOT WISH PLACE OURSELVES IN POSITION DEPEND SOLELY ON FRENCH ADVISERS FOR COMMUNICATION WITH GOMR AND TSIRANANA.

2. WE CONCUR IN YOUR HANDLING OF APPROACH BY MOREAU. IF SUBJECT ARISES AGAIN WE BELIVE IT IMPORTANT TO STRESS THAT WE CONSIDER MADAGASCAR FULLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRY AND BELIEVE OUR PRIMARY RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTRY AND MALAGASY OFFICIALS. RECENT EVENTS MAKE IT ALL THE MORE NECESSARY THAT, WHILE NOT EXCLUDING CONTACT WITH FRENCH ADVISERS, WE UTTILIZE NON-FRENCH CHANNELS TO PRESIDENT.
IRWIN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

JUN 6 AM 11:44

CONFIDENTIAL 804

PAGE 01 STATE 099710

53
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 R

DRAFTED BY: AF/C:JKBISHIP
APPROVED BY: S/S - MR. ELIOT
AF - AMB. MOORE (SUBS)
AF/C: HJCOHEN

---------- 043964

O 051716Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 099710

EXDIS

SUBJ: AMB MARSHALL TRAVEL

REF : A) STATE 09861
B) TANANARIVE 0866
C) LONDON 5094

REF A CROSSED WITH REF B. DEPT CONTINUES BELIEVE PREFERABLE AMBASSADOR DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN WASHINGTON PRIOR TO BRIEFING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. ASSUME ETA WASHINGTON REMAINS AS INDICATED INITIALLY, I.E. 1435 JUNE 7 ON PANAM 107. WILL MEET. IRWIN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 038

PAGE 01 STATE 097448

42
ORIGIN AF-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 SS-20 NSC-10 NSCE-00 SSO-00 PRS-01

RSC-01 O-03 /075 R

66608
DRAFTED BY: AF/C:HCOHEN
APPROVED BY: J - AMB JOHNSON
CLEARANCES: AF - MR. NEWSOM
S/S- MR. CURRAN
---------- 025120

O R 031731Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T STATE 097448

SUBJ: SPECIAL ENVOY

1. MALAGASY AMB RAZAFIMBAHINY CALLED ON DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON THURSDAY MORNING. HE TRANSMITTED NOTIFICATION THAT PRESIDENT TSIRANANA'S PERSONAL REP (WHOSE NAME HE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE LATER TODAY) WOULD BE ARRIVING IN WASHINGTON SOMETIME ON FRIDAY, AND WOULD LIKE TO BE RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT NIXON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE NEXT WEEK. HE HAD NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS OR INFO TO CONVEY.

2. JOHNSON INFORMED RAZAFIMBAHINY THAT ATMOSPHERE HAD DEFINITELY NOT IMPROVED SINCE PREVIOUS CONVERSATION ON TUESDAY. REFUSAL TO ALLOW AMB MARSHALL MORE THAN 5 DAYS FOR DEPARTURE, AND LEAKS TO MALAGASY PRESS ABOUT IDENTITY OF FOREIGN POWER HAVE DISTRESSED USG EVEN MORE. WE CONTINUE TO BE PUZZLED AND DISMAYED BY ABSENCE OF ANY BASIS OR EVIDENCE FOR ACCUSATIONS AGAINST AMB MARSHALL AND EMBASSY TANANARIVE.

2. WITH ABOVE AS BACKGROUND, JOHNSON SAID REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO WHITE HOUSE, BUT IN VIEW OF TREATMENT OF MARSHALL WHO NOT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S AMBASSADOR BUT ALSO A FRIEND HE WOULD NOT WANT TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT THE

SECRET

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

PRESIDENT WOULD RECEIVE THE ENVOY.

4. PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY WILL BE RECEIVED IN DEPARTMENT. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT NIXON BEING TRANSMITTED TO WHITE HOUSE WITHOUT RECOMMENDATION FOR THE MOMENT PENDING FURTHER DEVLOPMENTS.

GP-3
IRWIN

739/03/102

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

JUN 3 AM 8:28

CONFIDENTIAL 696

PAGE 01 STATE 097235

11
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 /046 R

DRAFTED BY AF/C: MR. COHEN
6/2/71
APPROVED BY AF: MR. NEWSOM
S/S-O: MR. RUECKERT

---------- 019174

O R 030407Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 097235

EXDIS

REF: TANANARIVE 829

REFTEL CROSSED WITH STATE 97211. FOR REASONS STATED THEREIN, DEPARTMENT CONTINUES TO FEEL THAT YOU SHOULD AVOID EXPLANATIONS TO PRESS, BEYOND GUIDANCE CONTAINED STATE 97211, PRIOR YOUR DEPARTURE. IRWIN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

JUN 3 AM 8:28
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 701

PAGE 01 STATE 097211

11
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66661
DRAFTED BY:AS/DDNEWSOM:AF/C:COHEN
APPROVED BY:J-UALEXIS JOHNSON
S/PRS-BRAY SUES
S/S-RUECKERT

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O R 030221Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T STATE 097211

EXDIS

REF: TANANARIVE 818 AND 828

1. IT CLEAR FROM THE WAY FAST-BREAKING SITUATION DEVELOPING THAT LINK BETWEEN YOUR DEPARTURE AND ACCUSATIONS AGAINST AN UNNAMED FOREIGN POWER WILL BE QUITE EVIDENT BY SATURDAY AND PROBABLY EARLIER. WIRE SERVICE DISPATCHES TODAY REPORT THAT YOU WERE CALLED IN BY RABEMANANJARA TUESDAY FOR "DRESSING DOWN." ASSUME OTHER CALCULATED LEAKS WILL FOLLOW.

2. THIS GLOOMY OUTLOOK NOTWITHSTANDING, OUR FEELING HERE IS THAT THE OCCASION OF YOUR DEPARTURE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE UTILIZED FOR A PUBLIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE MALAGASY GOVT WHICH COULD HARDEN PRESENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS INTO PERMANENT HARD FEELINGS.

3. IN ORDER TO PRESERVE MAXIMUM OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE, AND TO MAINTAIN THE BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO TAILOR YOUR STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS TO OUR HOPE THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO RESUME NORMAL

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RELATIONS WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME AFTER PASSIONS HAVE COOLED. WE WOULD NOT AT THIS TIME WISH EXCLUDE EVEN POSSIBILITY YOUR RETURN FOR MORE NORMAL FAREWELL.

4. WE DO NOT BELIEVE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESS CONFERENCE IS DESIRABLE. IF ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON DEPARTURE REQUIRED AND THERE IS A GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF REQUEST YOUR RECALL, EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON DEPT'S DESIRE REVIEW WITH YOU THIS UNFORTUNATE AND UNFOUNDED DEVELOPMENT BEFORE ANY COMMENT MAKE. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO REITERATE THAT USG AND AMEMBASSY HAVE NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN INTERNAL MALAGASY AFFAIRS. GP-1. IRWIN

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS ADDED PER SSO- MR. RUECKERT.

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DRAFTED BY: AF/C:COHEN
APPROVED BY: AF:AMB MOORE
AF/P: MR PELTIER (SUBS)
S/PRS: MR BRAY
AF/W: MR AGGREY
S/S: MR ELIOT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
1971 JUN 2 AM 8:49

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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INFO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY

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EXDIS

TOSEC 19

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2

SUBJ: ALLEGATIONS OF USG INVOLVEMENT IN MALAGASY AFFAIRS

1. SEPTEL GIVES PRESS GUIDANCE PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO AFP TICKER ITEM FROM TANANARIVE LINKING USG TO ALLEGED PLOT BY VICE PRESIDENT RESAMPA WHO HAS BEEN DISMISSED AND PRESUMABLY ARRESTED. FOLLOWING BACKGROUND IS PROVIDED FYI.

2. AMB MARSHALL WAS CALLED IN BY VICE PRESIDENT RABEMANANJARA JUNE 1 AND REQUESTED TO LEAVE MADAGASCAR IMMEDIATELY (SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED HE SHOULD LEAVE WITHIN 5 DAYS). HE WAS TOLD THAT EMBASSY PERSONNEL (AS DISTINCT FROM AMB.) ACCUSED OF INTERFERIN IN MADAGASCAR'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATE. NO SPECIFICS WERE

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GIVEN. IT IS CLEAR FROM PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON RESAMPA'S DISMISSAL, HOWEVER, THAT HE STANDS ACCUSED OF CLANDESTINE PLOTTING WITH AMERICAN EMBASSY.

3. CHARGES ARE BASELESS, OF COURSE, AND WE ARE REQUESTING MALAGASY GOVT TO SUSPEND ACTION ON REQUEST THAT MARSHALL BE RECALLED PENDING OUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN FURTHER EXPLANATIONS FROM THEM. MALAGASY HAVE INDICATED THEY DO NOT WISH TO MAKE PUBLIC FACT THAT MARSHALL'S RECALL WAS REQUESTED, AND WE HOPE THIS FACT CAN BE KEPT FROM PUBLIC EYE. HOWEVER, IF MALAGASY DENY OUR REQUEST THAT RECALL BE HELD IN SUSPENSE, MARSHALL'S DEPARTURE ON OR BEFORE JUNE 6 ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE LINKED TO THINLY VEILED ALLEGATIONS OF US INVOLVEMENT. MALAGASY MAY ALSO FIND IT NECESSARY TO MAKE PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS AGAINST USG IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN MEMENTUM OF CASE AGAINST RESAMPA.

4. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, DEPT PLANNING FOLLOWING CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: IF MALAGASY GOVT REFUSES TO SUSPEND ACTION ON RECALL, AND AMB MARSHALL DEPARTS WITHOUT MALAGASY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF REASON, WE WILL RESPOND TO QUESTIONS BY SAYING AMB MARSHALL HAS BEEN RECALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS, AND THAT WE CANNOT SAY HOW LONG IT WILL BE BEFORE HE RETURNS.

5. IF MALAGASY GOVT MAKES REASON KNOWN, WE WILL CONFIRM THAT AMB MARSHALL'S RECALL WAS REQUESTED AND THAT USG HAS ACCEDED TO REQUEST. WE WILL ALSO STATE THAT MALAGASY GOVT HAS NOT PROVIDED REASON AND THAT WE HAVE REQUESTED FULL EXPLANATION. AS INDICATED SEPTEL, WE WILL DENY ANY INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MADAGASCAR. GP-4. IRWIN

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DRAFTED BY: AF/C: H. J. COHEN
APPROVED BY: J: AMB. JOHNSON
AF: AMB. MOORE
S/S: MR. CURRAN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'71 JUN 2 AM 8:49

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 095996

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY FROM UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON

REFS: A. TANANARIVE 809
B. TANANARIVE 810
C. TANANARIVE 813

1. WE ARE AS STARTLED AND DISMAYED AS YOU MUST BE BY ABRUPT AND UNPROVOKED ATTACK ON THE EMBASSY. IN ADDITION TO MY CONVERSATION WITH RAZAFIMBAHINY, BEING REPORTED SEPTEL, WE BELIEVE MOST APPROPRIATE RESPONSE IS FOR YOU TO PREPARE DIPLOMATIC NOTE FROM EMBASSY TO FOREIGN MINISTRY INCORPORATING LANGUAGE PARAS 2 AND 3 BELOW. NOTE SHOULD BE DELIVERED BY YOU TO RABEMANANJARA WITH EXPLANATION THAT YOU ARE ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS.

2. IN INTEREST OF OBTAINING THE FULL BACKGROUND TO THIS UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENT, AND IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE CLARIFICATIONS AND APPROPRIATE FACTS TO THE GOMR IN RETURN, THE USG WELCOMES THE DECISION OF THE GOMR TO PROVIDE A FULL EXPLANATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF OFFICIAL AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL MALAGASY AFFAIRS OF STATE. THE USG ASSURES THE GOMR THAT THIS EXPLANATION WILL BE STUDIED CAREFULLY.

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3. FULLY CONVINCED THAT ANY ALLEGATIONS OF USG INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL MALAGASY AFFAIRS ARE WITHOUT FOUNDATION, AND HAVE BEEN UNJUSTLY MADE TO THE HIGHEST GOMR AUTHORITIES BY ELEMENTS WHO DESIRE TO HARM THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND MADAGASCAR, THE USG PROPOSES THAT IN LIEU OF THE DISPATCH OF A SPECIAL ENVOY TO WASHINGTON, THE GOMR ARRANGE FOR THE IMMEDIATE TRANSMISSION OF ITS EXPLANATION BY CABLE, EITHER THROUGH THE AMEMBASSY IN TANANARIVE, OR THE MALAGASY EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. IN THE INTEREST OF ACCORDING FULL JUSTICE TO AMB. MARSHALL, WHO HAS WORKED DILIGENTLY IN BEHALF OF US-MALAGASY COOPERATION, THE USG HOPES THAT THE MALAGASY GOVT WILL ALSO AGREE TO CONSIDER HOLDING IN SUSPENSE ITS REQUEST FOR HIS RECALL WHILE THE USG STUDIES AND REPLIES TO THE GOMR'S EXPLANATION.

4. YOU SHOULD INFORM RABAMANANJARA THE USG BELIEVES THAT ANY PUBLIC AIRING OF CHARGES IN A SITUATION SUCH AS THIS CAN ONLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS WHICH MAY ENSUE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS HOPED THAT THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT THESE ALLEGATIONS, ESPECIALLY WHILE THE GOMR'S STATEMENT IS UNDER STUDY. FYI WE ARE PREPARING PRESS GUIDANCE AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN TO REJECT AS WITHOUT FOUNDATION ANY CHARGES MALAGASY MAY MAKE OF IMPROPER ACTIVITIES BY EMBASSY. END FYI.

5. IN ABSENCE ANY ALTERATION MALAGASY POSITION, YOU SHOULD PLAN DEPART WITHIN FIVE-DAY PERIOD MALAGASY HAVE STIPULATED. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED ANNOUNCE YOU ARE RETURNING ON CONSULTATIONS. ORDERS FOLLOW SEPTEL. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE AT TIME YOU BELIEVE MOST SUITABLE. WHILE WE AGREE MALAGASY SHOULD BE REMINDED PRIVATELY THAT DEMAND FOR YOUR RECALL MAY HAVE ADVERSE EFFECT ON MAJUNGA AND AGM PROJECTS, WE WANT AVOID FORMAL STATEMENT WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS THREAT, ESPECIALLY BY TSIRANANA, WHOSE RECENT BEHAVIOR SUGGESTS HIS MOODS MERCURIAL. YOUR STATEMENTS TO RABEMANANJARA SHOULD SUFFICE FOR THE MOMENT IN THIS REGARD.

GP-1. IRWIN

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DRAFTED BY: AF/C: H. J. COHEN
APPROVED BY: J: AMB. JOHNSON
AF: AMB. MOORE
S/S: MR. CURRAN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'71 JUN 1 PM 10:22

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O 012151Z JUN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 095787

EXDIS

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S RECALL: JOHNSON-RAZAFIMBAHINY MEMCON

REF: TANANARIVE 809

1. MALAGASY AMB. RAZAFIMBAHINY WAS CALLED IN TO DISCUSS SUBJECT DEVELOPMENT WITH DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON AT 11:30 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME TUESDAY. JOHNSON INFORMED RAZAFIMBAHINY OF WHAT HAPPENED AS REPORTED REFTEL. RAZAFIMBAHINY SAID HE HAD BEEN UNAWARE OF DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO MEETING.

2. JOHNSON TOLD RAZAFIMBAHINY IN STRONGEST TERMS THAT HE WAS SHOCKED AND DISTRESSED AT SUMMARY TREATMENT ACCORDED AMB. MARSHALL BY MALAGASY GOVT. SAID IT WAS UNPRECEDENTED FOR FRIENDLY FOREIGN GOVT. TO ASK FOR AMBASSADOR'S RECALL WITHOUT GIVING SPECIFIC REASON WHICH MIGHT BE ANSWERED OR CLARIFIED.

3. JOHNSON SAID SHOCK WAS MUCH DEEPER THAN USUAL BY VIRTUE OF FACT THAT AMB. MARSHALL HAD BEEN SO ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT DEVELOPING COOPERATION BETWEEN US AND MADAGASCAR ESPECIALLY IN FIELD OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT, AND HAD WORKED SO HARD TO BRING ABOUT GOOD RESULTS WITH MAJUNGA MEAT PROJECT.

4. JOHNSON CITED ALLEGATIONS OF EMBASSY INTERFERENCE IN IN-

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TERNAL MALAGASY AFFAIRS, AND DENIED VIGOROUSLY THAT ANY SUCH INTERFERENCE HAD TAKEN PLACE. HE SAID INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL MATTERS IS NOT ONLY CONTRARY TO USG POLICY, BUT OBVIOUSLY MADE NO SENSE. HE KNEW AMB MARSHALL HAS MADE SPECIAL POINT OF AVOIDING ANY ACTIVITY THAT MIGHT INDICATE SUCH INVOLVEMENT.

5. JOHNSON ASKED RAZAFIMBAHINY TO CONVEY DEPT'S FEELINGS TO HIS GOVT. URGENTLY. RAZAFIMBAHINY PROMISED HE WOULD DO SO, AND REGRETTED THAT HE COULD NOT MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT BECAUSE HE HAD NO INFORMATION AND LACKED INSTRUCTIONS. HE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY GOMR'S RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW BY SEPTEL.

GP-3. IRWIN

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INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66648
DRAFTED BY: AF/I:JGKORMANN 12/4/70
APPROVED BY: AF-MR. SMITH
AF/E-MR. COOTE
AF/C-MR. COHEN
AF/I-MR. SPIGLER
PM/ISO:CAPT. FROM
EUR/BMI-MR. BURNS
S/S-O:GLRUECKERT

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R 080054Z DEC 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

S E C R E T STATE 199381

EXDIS

SUBJ: INDIAN OCEAN SITUATION

REF: TANANARIVE 1391; NAIROBI 4912.

1. APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S CONCERN AND AGREE WE SHOULD INFORM GOM AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE.

2. WE ARE ENDEAVORING TO EXPEDITE US/UK THIRD COUNTRY NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS ON DIEGO GARCIA PROJECT. WILL INSTRUCT EMBASSY TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE GOM OFFICIAL AS SOON AS THIS DONE. WILL ALSO FORWARD US/UK STATEMENT FOR YOUR USE AND OTHER RELATED MATERIAL. GP-4.
ROGERS

70 DEC 8 AM 8:23

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DRAFTED BY: AF/C:JPSULLIVAN 1/29/70
APPROVED BY: AF-AMB. MOORE
AF/C-MR. MCKESSON
WHITE HOUSE-ROGER MORRIS
S/S-MR. HORNBLOW

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R 310138Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

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1. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENCY OF GOMR FOR APPROPRIATE TRANSMISSION TO PRESIDENT TSIRANANA:
QTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: IT WAS WITH GREAT REGRET THAT I HEARD, MR. PRESIDENT, OF YOUR ILL HEALTH. I TRUST AND HOPE THAT YOU ARE NOW RECUPERATING WELL. YOUR OWN COUNTRYMEN, AS WELL AS YOUR MANY FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD, HAVE NEED OF YOUR WISE GUIDANCE AND COUNSEL. YOU HAVE MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR A RAPID RECOVERY. SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON UNQTE.

2. DEPARTMENT DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE BY RECIPIENT.

3. DECONTROL UPON RECEIPT.
ROGERS